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Abstract 
 
Modal Truth: Integrating the Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Semantics of the 
Necessary and the Possible 
 
Brian Lars Enden 
 
Chair of the Supervisory Committee: 
Professor Arthur Fine 
Philosophy 
 
The integration challenge for modality states that metaphysical theories of modality tend to fail 
in one of two ways: either they render the meanings of modal sentences mysterious, or they 
render modal knowledge mysterious. I argue that there are specific semantic and epistemic 
constraints on metaphysics implied by the integration challenge and that a plausible metaphysical 
theory of modality will satisfy both of them. I further argue that no popular metaphysical theory 
of modality simultaneously satisfies both of the constraints. Therefore, a new metaphysical 
theory of modality is needed, one that can offer a clear response to the integration challenge. I 
attempt to supply the needed theory and show that it satisfies the constraints of the integration 
challenge. The overall result is an argument for a new and unique metaphysical theory of 
modality that I call constructionism. 
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Introduction 
 
 This is a dissertation in metaphysics. I will ultimately be arguing for a particular theory of 
modal truth. However, I will suggest that discovering a correct theory of modal truth cannot 
plausibly be done without encountering related questions in semantics and epistemology, namely 
“Under what conditions is a modal proposition true?” and “Under what conditions is a modal 
belief justified?” In a sense, therefore, this is also a dissertation in philosophy of language, 
epistemology, and even, to some extent, meta-metaphysics.  
But before the dissertation gets going, I would like to say a few words here about my 
approach to metaphysics. For me, the central question of metaphysics is not “What is the nature 
of the world?” or anything quite as grand as that. Instead, I think that the central focus of 
metaphysics is, or at least ought to be, “What should we believe about the nature of the world?” 
This is not to say that our focus in metaphysics should not be on the truth. It certainly should. 
The problem, I think, is that if we do not ask the central question of metaphysics in relation to 
truth and ourselves, then it is easy to see metaphysics as a fruitless and potentially hopeless 
endeavor. It is all too easy to think that we could never hope to answer a question like “What is 
the nature of the world?” from our epistemic vantage point. A much more promising approach to 
metaphysics, I think, is to think that metaphysical theory-choice amounts to choosing which 
theory is the most plausible from our epistemic position rather than trying to conceive the true 
nature of the world from some kind of God’s eye perspective. Therefore, what you will find in 
these pages amounts to a plausibility argument in favor of a particular theory of modal 
metaphysics. I will not try to argue from first principles or anything like that. Instead I will argue 
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that my favored theory is the most plausible theory available given our epistemic position. I think 
this is as good a reason as we can hope for to think that a metaphysical theory is true. 
I would also like to say a few words about what I see as the division of labor between 
semantics, epistemology, and metaphysics. The part of semantics that will concern me in this 
dissertation is focused on the giving of truth conditions for sentences; and the part of 
epistemology that will concern me is the giving of justification conditions for beliefs. Where 
does that leave metaphysics? For me, metaphysics is in the middle. That is to say that part of 
what metaphysics should be doing is explaining how reality must be in order that we can say 
meaningful and true sentences about it and have justified and true beliefs concerning it. In so far 
as we believe that we can utter true sentences while also having true beliefs concerning some 
aspect of reality, we may want to explain what that reality is like such that those sentences and 
beliefs come out true. That is what metaphysics is for. 
Now that the preliminaries are out of the way, let me try to give an intuitive sense of the 
problem that I will be addressing in this dissertation. Consider the following questions. How do 
we know when a false proposition is still possible, and how do we know when a true proposition 
is necessarily so? On the one hand, knowledge of possibility and necessity seems unproblematic, 
because typical examples seem to be so trivial. We are certain that the proverbial cat could have 
been on the mat even when it is nowhere near the mat, and we are certain that all bachelors must 
be unmarried. On the other hand, knowledge of possibility is mysterious when we consider that 
we do not have a very clear understanding of the truth conditions for these propositions. This 
puts us in an awkward position. We have no very clear idea of what exactly we are talking about 
when we use modal language, but somehow we know many claims with modal content. That is a 
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puzzle: how can we be justified in our modal beliefs when we have no clear idea what they are 
even all about? 
 One might think that we should look to the metaphysical theories of modality for 
answers, but unfortunately the situation is even worse than the initial presentation above may 
have made it seem. Most of the metaphysical theories of modality on the market have very little 
enlightenment to offer on this puzzle. This is because these theories tend to fall into one of two 
camps, each with their own narrow concerns. The modal realists, on the one hand, tend to focus 
on logical and semantic concerns, telling us that possible worlds are needed in our ontology to 
account for such things as the completeness and consistency of modal logic and to account for 
the meaning of various propositions concerning possibilities, counterfactuals, and the like. The 
modal idealists, on the other hand, tend to focus on psychological and epistemological concerns, 
telling us that modality is nothing more than a mental byproduct of our ordinary ways of thinking 
or talking about the world. I want to suggest that both of these approaches to modality are 
wrong-headed. If we are to hope to achieve a plausible metaphysical theory of modality, it must 
give equal consideration to the realm of language and to the realm of belief—to what we think 
we are saying when we use modal language and to the ways we are justified in our beliefs 
concerning modality. Thus, a major problem for developing a plausible metaphysical theory of 
modality is overcoming what has been called the integration challenge,1 which, broadly speaking 
is a challenge to integrate metaphysics into a more complete philosophical view that includes 
semantic and epistemological considerations. This dissertation will focus on developing such a 
theory. 
 
1 Christopher Peacocke seems to have coined the name “integration challenge.” While we agree on certain aspects 
of integration challenges, my presentation is not identical to his. See his Being Known. 
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The plan for the dissertation is as follows. Chapter one will explain the integration 
challenge for modality; chapter two will consider and reject various ways of suggesting that the 
integration challenge is not the deep philosophical problem that it may initially appear to be; 
chapter three will consider popular metaphysical theories of modality in order to discover which 
among them has the resources to offer a plausible response to the integration challenge; and 
chapter four will develop the lessons of chapter three into a unique theory of modality, which I 
will defend.
     5 
1 The Integration Challenge for Modality 
 
 To present the integration challenge for modality, I will first consider the locus classicus 
of integration challenges, Paul Benacerraf’s “Mathematical Truth.” Benacerraf’s integration 
challenge has become known, somewhat misleadingly, as Benacerraf’s Dilemma.2 Second, I will 
generalize Benacerraf’s dilemma, revealing what I think is the general structure of an integration 
challenge. Third, I will apply the generalized integration challenge to the field of modality, thus 
elucidating the integration challenge for modality. Fourth, I will give two examples, analogous to 
Benacerraf’s own examples, to help clarify the integration challenge and to display some of the 
difficulties involved in meeting it. 
1.1 Benacerraf’s Dilemma 
 
 According to Benacerraf, an adequate account of mathematical truth should be consistent 
with both a general account of truth and a general account of knowledge. Benacerraf contends 
that almost all theories of mathematical truth serve one of these theoretical masters at the 
expense of the other. 
 The trouble begins by noting that there is a syntactic similarity between quantified 
sentences in mathematics and quantified sentences of an ordinary, everyday sort. Here are 
Benacerraf’s examples:3 
 (1) There are at least three large cities older than New York. 
 (2) There are at least three perfect numbers greater than 17. 
 
2 Benacerraf did not really present the problem as a dilemma, and it is not clear that anything would really be gained 
by presenting the problem in that particular logical form. It is more like a two-pronged challenge than a dilemma. 
The weight of tradition, however, compels me to continue to refer to the problem as “Benacerraf’s dilemma.” 
3 “Mathematical Truth,” 405. 
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These two sentences appear to have the same syntactic structure: 
 (3) There are at least three FG’s that bear R to a. 
According to Benacerraf, the only adequate account of truth ever offered is Tarski’s referential 
theory of truth,4 according to which sentences with the syntactic structure of (3) are true just in 
case the object in the domain of discourse named by a bears relation R to at least three objects in 
the domain that all have the properties named by F and G (with “at least three” understood as 
eliminable in favor of quantifiers, variables, and identity). Applying this semantic treatment to 
(1), reveals that it is true just in case the object named “New York” stands as the second member 
in the relation “older than” to at least three objects that are all both large and cities (or, better, 
large for cities). This, in turn, implies that there are such things as cities, one of which is called 
“New York” and some of which are large. Benacerraf suggests that since (2) has the same 
syntactic structure as (1), we should expect it to receive the same semantic treatment. We should, 
therefore, expect that (2) is true just in case the object named “17” stands as the second member 
in the relation “greater than” to at least three objects that are all both perfect and numbers (or, 
perhaps, perfect for numbers), which implies that there are such things as numbers, one of which 
is called “17” and some of which are perfect. Therefore, according to Benacerraf, the only 
adequate account of truth available—Tarski’s—implies mathematical Platonism, the view that 
numbers are real existent objects. 
 Benacerraf’s train of thought seems to be something like the following. First, a plausible 
theory of mathematical truth should conform to a general theory of truth for the language as a 
whole. Second, the only plausible general theory of truth available is Tarski’s. Third, Tarski’s 
 
4 As presented in “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages,” and reiterated in “The Semantic Conception of 
Truth and the Foundations of Semantics.” 
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semantic theory, when applied to mathematical propositions, implies Platonism. Therefore, 
Platonism is the only plausible theory of mathematical truth. Benacerraf also suggests that 
syntactic structure is the appropriate guide to determining whether a given theory of 
mathematical truth is consistent with a general theory of truth for the language as a whole. This 
is made clear by his presentation of the examples (1) and (2). Because they have isomorphic 
syntactic structures, Benacerraf says that they should both be understood in accordance with the 
best available semantic theory for sentences with that shared structure. In other words, the 
names, predicates, variables, and quantifiers in each proposition should be understood to make 
the same contribution to the truth of each proposition.5 Additionally, because Tarski’s referential 
theory of truth is the best available theory of truth in general any purported account of 
mathematical truth should treat the names, predicates, variables, and quantifiers in mathematical 
propositions just as Tarski treats them for all propositions. Any account of mathematical truth 
that suggests otherwise is implausible because we would have no reason to think that the account 
of truth it offers is really an account of truth rather than an ad hoc invention to support a pet 
theory. For Benacerraf, there is no reason to accept an account of truth for a subset of 
propositions in a language that is not consistent with the best account of truth for the language as 
a whole. Therefore, any account of mathematical truth must be consistent with Tarskian 
semantics, at least until some better theory of truth comes along to replace Tarski’s. Benacerraf 
calls this the semantic constraint. 
 As illustrated above, taking this semantic constraint seriously seems to favor a Platonist 
account of mathematical truth, or “the standard account” as Benacerraf sometimes calls it. 
 
5 “The truth conditions assigned to two sentences containing quantifiers should reflect in relevantly similar ways the 
contribution made by the quantifiers.” (“Mathematical Truth,” 404.) 
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According to Platonism, mathematical entities, like numbers and sets, are abstract mind-
independent objects. As Benacerraf has shown, Platonism is consistent with Tarskian semantics, 
so it fairly obviously satisfies the semantic constraint. However, Benacerraf believes that 
Platonism suffers from a different problem. If Platonism is true, then it seems that we cannot 
know mathematical truths. Platonism suggests that mathematical objects, like numbers and sets, 
are abstract entities, but such things are causally inert, and we cannot know anything about 
entities that do not figure in the causes of our beliefs concerning them. Causal interaction with 
abstract, causally inert objects is impossible. So we cannot be justified in believing propositions 
about these abstract mathematical objects; the very idea of causally interacting with them is 
incoherent. Therefore, Platonism seems to imply that mathematical knowledge is impossible. 
In the background of this argument is a version of the causal theory of knowledge,6 
according to which “for X to know that S is true requires some causal relation to obtain between 
X and the referents of the names, predicates, and quantifiers of S.”7 The basic idea is that 
knowledge requires coming into possession of relevant evidence to support the truth of the 
belief, and coming into possession of the relevant evidence can only be accomplished if one 
comes into causal contact with the very things the belief is about. Without such a causal relation, 
there seems to be no reason to think that the belief’s formation was anything other than 
accidental, and a belief formed in such an accidental way cannot count as knowledge. For 
ordinary, everyday beliefs about objects in the external world, the causal requirement seems 
satisfied, since our senses presumably put us into causal contact with the objects of the ordinary, 
everyday world. For the mathematical objects posited by the standard Platonist account, the 
 
6 See Goldman, “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” 
7 “Mathematical Truth,” 412. 
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causal condition for knowledge is not obviously satisfied: there is no sense in which we are in 
casual contact with abstract mathematical objects. Worse yet, it does not even seem intelligible 
how there could be such a causal relation. If there are any abstract, mind-independent, causally 
inert, mathematical objects, then it seems quite beyond our epistemic abilities to know anything 
about them. Platonism manages to satisfy Benacerraf’s semantic constraint, but it does so at the 
expense of failing to satisfy an equally important epistemic constraint. 
 Platonism may have failed to satisfy Benacerraf’s epistemic constraint, but there are 
some accounts of mathematical truth that seem to manage to make mathematical knowledge 
intelligible. Benacerraf calls his examples of such accounts “combinatorial” because they 
account for mathematical truth in terms of the syntactic, or combinatorial, aspects of 
mathematical language. For example, a theory according to which mathematical truth consists 
entirely in provability from a set of axioms8 may satisfy the epistemic constraint because one 
need only be familiar with the axioms and to have actually come across a proof for a given 
mathematical proposition in order to have the causal contact necessary for knowledge of that 
proposition.9 
 But of course the combinatorial theories do not obviously satisfy the semantic constraint. 
They are simply not consistent with Tarskian semantics, which requires that the referents of the 
components of a mathematical sentence determine the overall truth of the sentence. Therefore, 
combinatorial theories will require some non-Tarskian semantic theory for the special case of 
 
8 Gödel’s incompleteness theorems have made the prospects for combinatorial theories rather dim, but perhaps there 
are ways to restore them by, for example, limiting the ideal of truth to something more modest, like truth-in-S, 
where S is the set of axioms in question. See Benacerraf’s comments on this point at “Mathematical Truth,” 406-7. 
9 This is probably not exactly right. Presumably combinatorial theories imply that it is a type of proof rather than a 
particular token of that type of proof that accounts for the truth of the proposition in question. So being in causal 
contact with a token of a proof may not be quite enough in the end to satisfy the epistemic constraint. Let us put 
aside this potential worry so that we do not get too far away from the main point. 
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mathematics, which will leave us with no reason to accept that the truth conditions required by 
the combinatorial theories actually result in true propositions when satisfied. There is no reason 
to believe that the combinatorial truth conditions result in true sentences when they are satisfied. 
 Generally speaking, Benacerraf’s dilemma is a challenge to create a theory of 
mathematical truth that is consistent with Tarski’s referential theory of truth and that does not 
imply that we have no mathematical knowledge by the lights of the causal theory of knowledge. 
According to Benacerraf, no theory of mathematical truth has ever managed to do this. Of all of 
the available theories that have been offered, they have all managed to satisfy one of the 
constraints, at the expense of failing to satisfy the other. The challenge of Benacerraf’s dilemma, 
therefore, is to discover a theory of mathematical truth that can satisfy both constraints 
simultaneously. 
1.2 The Structure of an Integration Challenge 
 
Now that Benacerraf’s dilemma has been elucidated, my task is to uncover the general 
structure of an integration challenge using Benacerraf’s dilemma both as a guide and as an 
illustration. Benacerraf’s dilemma will prove useful in this capacity not only because of its 
historical importance, but also because it is difficult to state an integration challenge in a clear 
way without a clear illustration. Integration challenges have been occasionally discussed in many 
different areas of philosophy, but the presentation and focus of these various challenges can be 
quite diverse.10 It is therefore, worth exploring the general structure of integration challenges 
before attempting to apply it to modality. This task will prove to be both harder and easier by 
using Benacerraf’s dilemma as our guide: harder because Benacerraf leans quite heavily on 
 
10 For some examples, see Christopher Peacocke’s Being Known, and Hartry Field’s Realism, Mathematics & 
Modality. 
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particular semantic and epistemological theories, which may or may not be crucial for a 
statement of the challenge; and easier because Benacerraf’s main insight, as I understand it, is 
often obscured in other presentations of an integration challenge. The first step toward the goal 
of uncovering the general structure of an integration challenge is to ask just what is the focus of 
the challenge: exactly what kind of theorizing is being constrained by the semantic and epistemic 
constraints?  
 The reason it is not clear just what kind of theorizing is being constrained by 
Benacerraf’s two constraints is that the term “mathematical truth” is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, it might refer to the truth conditions for mathematical propositions. On the other hand, it 
might refer to mathematical reality—to what satisfies the truth conditions. Benacerraf himself is 
not clear on this distinction. By “mathematical truth,” sometimes he means to indicate the 
semantic theory of mathematical truth conditions, and sometimes he means to indicate a 
metaphysical theory of mathematical reality. One particularly striking example of this ambiguity 
is Benacerraf’s somewhat inconsistent use of the name “the standard account.” When he first 
introduces the standard account, it is a purely semantic theory, which is typically, but not 
necessarily, conjoined with the metaphysical theory of Platonism.11 He later uses “the standard 
account” and “the Platonistic account” interchangeably.12 Consequently there is some confusion 
about just what is being constrained by the semantic and epistemological constraints. However, 
if we consider Benacerraf’s two examples, Platonism and the combinatorial accounts, we can see 
that these are not merely semantic theories of the truth conditions for mathematical propositions; 
they are metaphysical theories of the nature of mathematical reality. Clearly Platonism is a 
 
11 “Mathematical Truth,” 406. 
12 “Mathematical Truth,” 410. 
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metaphysical theory, since it holds that mathematical reality consists of a realm of abstract 
mathematical objects. The combinatorial accounts are less clearly metaphysical; for they seem to 
say nothing more than that a mathematical sentence is true if and only if there is a proof for it (or 
some other favored syntactic property). However, this semantic theory alone does not fully 
capture the complete picture of the combinatorial accounts. As I suggested in the introduction, I 
think that the division of philosophical labor between semantics and metaphysics should be 
understood as tracking the distinction between saying what the truth conditions are (semantics) 
and saying how those truth conditions are satisfied (metaphysics). If this is right, then there is a 
clear metaphysical component to the combinatorial accounts. They suggest that a mathematical 
sentence is true if and only if there is a proof for it; that is the semantic component. But it is still 
left unsaid just how this truth condition is to be satisfied. In other words, the question “What 
counts as a proof—how must the world be such that a proof is created?” is still an open question 
that any combinatorial theory will have to address. An answer to this question, and others like it, 
will distinguish between the different combinatorial accounts. Both Platonism and the 
combinatorial accounts, therefore, are metaphysical theories as well as semantic theories. It is the 
metaphysical component of each of them that is the target of the semantic and epistemic 
constraints. 
 The question now is: just how do the semantic and epistemic constraints actually provide 
a challenge for metaphysical theory? Benacerraf’s dilemma is essentially a puzzle to develop a 
theory of mathematical reality that shows how Tarskian-style referential truth conditions can be 
satisfied by mathematical sentences while also showing how we can come into causal contact 
with this mathematical reality in such as way as to generate justified beliefs about it. To put the 
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point more generally, an adequate metaphysical account of mathematical reality should describe 
that reality in such a way that neither mathematical semantics nor mathematical epistemology is 
rendered impossible: the metaphysical theory must leave it intelligible both how mathematical 
language can be meaningful and how mathematical beliefs can be justified. 
 The other main problem for generalizing the integration challenge is that Benacerraf’s 
constraints lean fairly heavily on particular theories of semantics and epistemology. His semantic 
constraint relies on Tarski’s referential theory of truth, and his epistemic constraint relies on a 
causal theory of knowledge. But perhaps one or both of these two theories is just wrong. Is the 
dilemma resolved by simply denying one of these, or does the problem remain even if one or 
both of these theories is false? Considering these questions for each of the constraints, while 
remembering that the overall problem is ultimately a challenge for metaphysical theorizing, will 
help in the formulation of generalized versions of the two constraints. I begin with the semantic 
constraint. 
1.2.1 The General Semantic Constraint 
 
 Benacerraf states his semantic constraint in three stages, each more specific than the 
previous stage. In the first (vaguest) stage, his suggestion is merely that there should be some 
reason to believe that a theory of mathematical truth is actually providing conditions of truth. 
According to this vague version, the semantic constraint is the “demand that any theory of 
mathematical truth…certifies that the property of sentences that the account calls ‘truth’ is 
indeed truth.”13 The second stage adds the assumption that the test for determining whether the 
truth conditions offered by a theory of mathematical truth are genuine conditions of truth is to 
 
13 “Mathematical Truth,” 408. 
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ensure that they are consistent with the truth conditions for propositions in the rest of the 
language as determined by our best available theory of truth in general. The third stage adds the 
assumption that Tarski’s referential theory of truth is the best available general theory of truth. 
The result is that Benacerraf’s ultimate version of the semantic constraint requires that a 
metaphysical theory of mathematical reality be consistent with Tarskian semantic theory. But 
what if Tarski’s theory is wrong? Or what if there is some other test for determining whether 
some purported truth conditions are genuine conditions of truth besides testing for consistency 
with truth for the rest of the language? Would Benacerraf’s dilemma thereby be resolved?14 
Let us first consider whether Tarski’s theory is required for the semantic constraint. 
Intuitively, it seems quite limiting to require that metaphysics always conform to a 
predetermined semantic theory. Tarski’s theory, for example, does not countenance the existence 
of facts, to which sentences can correspond, since his truth conditions are understood as 
functions from names and predicates to objects and properties respectively.15 So, a metaphysical 
theory, like logical atomism,16 which suggests that facts or states of affairs—not objects—are the 
constituents of the world, would be immediately ruled out under Benacerraf’s semantic 
constraint. This seems more like enslaving metaphysics rather than merely constraining it. 
Surely, there should be room for metaphysical theories to spur semantic reform. If we require 
that all metaphysical theories conform to a pre-established semantic theory, whether that 
 
14 Hartry Field has presented an integration challenge for mathematics by assuming a deflationary (or disquotational) 
theory of truth. However, even this theory of truth is not needed for the semantic constraint, as I understand it. See 
his Realism, Mathematics & Modality. 
15 W. D. Hart points this out in his introduction to The Philosophy of Mathematics, 2. 
16 As presented, for example, in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and in Bertrand Russell’s 
The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. 
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semantic theory is our best available theory or not, we significantly decrease the amount of 
creativity allowed to our metaphysicians, and that just seems too restrictive. 
 Still, it seems that Benacerraf is on to something. On the one hand, requiring metaphysics 
to conform to pre-established semantic theory seems limiting in a troubling way, but on the other 
hand, giving complete semantic freedom seems foolhardy. Semantics should constrain 
metaphysics in the sense that a metaphysical theory should be supported by reasons to believe 
that the truth conditions it offers are genuine conditions of truth, but semantics should not 
constrict metaphysics to the point that its results cannot be semantically innovative and 
surprising. 
Let us suppose, then, for the sake of argument, that Tarski’s theory is false. Is 
Benacerraf’s dilemma thereby resolved? I think not. Consider Benacerraf’s main complaint 
against the combinatorial theories: 
[I]t should be clear why “combinatorial” views fail on my account. They avoid what 
seems to me to be a necessary route to an account of truth: through the subject matter of 
the propositions whose truth is being defined. Motivated by epistemological 
considerations, they come up with truth conditions whose satisfaction or nonsatisfaction 
mere mortals can ascertain; but the price they pay is their inability to connect these so-
called “truth conditions” with the truth of the propositions for which they are 
conditions.17 
 
Benacerraf never even mentions Tarskian semantics. His complaint against the combinatorial 
theories of mathematical truth is not really that they are inconsistent with Tarski’s theory, or 
indeed with any other general theory of truth. His complaint is that combinatorial theories 
require a special semantics—an understanding of truth that is not applicable beyond the scope of 
the theory: “[We should] avoid…a double standard. If we reject the standard view, mathematical 
 
17 “Mathematical Truth,” 419. 
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inference will need a new and special account.”18 The problem with the combinatorial theories is 
that they require special semantic treatment for mathematical sentences; they require a semantic 
treatment that applies only to them and not to any non-mathematical sentences. As a result, we 
have no reason to accept that the truth conditions offered by those theories really are conditions 
of truth—conditions that, when satisfied, result in true sentences. Without linking the 
combinatorial theories’ purported truth conditions in some way to general truth conditions for the 
language as a whole, there seems to be no reason to accept that they are truth conditions at all. 
So, despite appearances to the contrary, no particular semantic theory of truth in general 
is required for the semantic constraint. However, we still have the question about the test for 
determining whether some purported truth conditions are genuine conditions of truth. It is very 
hard to see how metaphysicians can give reasons to think that their truth conditions are genuine 
conditions of truth if not by showing how these purported truth conditions are consistent with the 
best available theory of truth in general. We have already shown that it is not plausible to restrict 
metaphysics to any particular semantic theory, as Benacerraf seems to do, but we have also seen 
that Benacerraf seems correct to think that semantics should constrain metaphysics in some way. 
How do we semantically constrain metaphysics without thereby enslaving metaphysics to 
semantics? 
Obviously, every metaphysical theory will need an adjoining semantic theory; for it is not 
possible to say how truth conditions are to be satisfied without saying what those truth conditions 
are, but we should not let semantic considerations completely determine metaphysics. That way 
leads us headlong into a conflict with the epistemic constraint, as we have seen with the example 
of Platonism. Metaphysics should not be completely detached from semantics, which is not 
 
18 “Mathematical Truth,” 411. 
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possible anyway, but it should also not be completely determined by semantics. There must be 
room for semantic creativity in our metaphysical theorizing, while at the same time, there should 
be some basic semantic constraint to make sure that metaphysical theorizing remains 
semantically grounded. 
But how do we understand the semantic constraint if not by requiring that metaphysical 
theories adhere to some predetermined semantic theory? Looking at Benacerraf’s examples, one 
may get the impression that Benacerraf thinks that a theory of mathematical truth must pay due 
respect to the syntactic structure of mathematical propositions, since his mathematical examples 
have the same syntactic structure as his non-mathematical examples, and he seems to say that 
they should be given the same semantic treatment because of this. If so, then perhaps the 
semantic constraint is simply that sentences with like syntactic structures should be given like 
semantic treatment: “There are at least three perfect numbers greater than 17” looks like 
quantification over a set of entities—numbers—so maybe the point is that we cannot ignore this 
syntactic fact in our ultimate theory of mathematical truth. This way of looking at Benacerraf’s 
semantic constraint seems to suggest that since Platonism is the only theory that gives the same 
semantic treatment to quantified mathematical claims as to quantified non-mathematical claims, 
it is the only theory that satisfies the semantic constraint. Under this understanding of 
Benacerraf’s semantic constraint, the combinatorial theories require a special semantics because 
they require some sort of semantic interpretation of quantified mathematical propositions that 
does not respect their syntactic similarity to quantified propositions of a non-mathematical sort. 
But, again, what if that is just wrong? Why should we think that syntactic structure is any 
indication of semantic structure? Natural languages are notoriously misleading. The 
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conveniences of succinct communication are more often the prevailing guide to syntactic 
structure than the subtleties of meaning and truth. Moreover, there are often many different ways 
of expressing the same proposition with different syntactic structures. For example, “2 + 2 = 4” 
and “The result of adding two to itself is four” are different sentences with different syntactic 
structures, but presumably they are semantically equivalent. These considerations suggest that 
Benacerraf’s semantic constraint may be misguided because it seems to require that semantics 
must always follow syntax, and that just seems obviously wrong. 
But if syntactic similarity is not the guide for acceptable semantics, what is? How do we 
verify that the truth conditions are genuine conditions of truth (rather than special conditions) if 
not by comparing them with syntactically similar propositions in the rest of the language? The 
answer, I think, is that the basic underlying intuition of Benacerraf’s semantic constraint is 
simply that the purported truth conditions offered by a metaphysical theory must be applicable to 
propositions outside the scope of the theory. The reason that the combinatorial theories fail on 
semantic grounds is not because they are inconsistent with Tarskian semantics or even because 
they fail to require similar semantic treatment to syntactically similar sentences. They fail simply 
because the combinatorial theories themselves say that their truth conditions are special—that 
they do not apply to any non-mathematical propositions. If a theory requires such special truth 
conditions, then we have no reason to accept that the truth conditions it offers actually result in 
true propositions when satisfied. When there are so many theories on the market, why accept a 
theory that says that what it calls truth as it applies to its subject matter is not truth as it applies 
everywhere else? 
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One simple version of a combinatorial theory suggests that a mathematical proposition is 
true if and only if there is a proof for it. However, the existence of a proof is not a condition of 
truth for any non-mathematical propositions. We are, therefore, left with a pressing semantic 
question for the combinatorial theories, namely, “Why should we think that the existence of a 
proof is really a condition of truth for mathematical propositions since, according to your own 
theory, it is not a condition of truth for any other propositions? Unless you can show how the 
existence of proof results in a true mathematical proposition—how truth applies differently in 
this case—there seems to be no reason at all to accept your truth conditions.” This is the basic 
semantic challenge to the combinatorial theories, and it has absolutely nothing to do with 
Tarski’s theory of truth or with the syntactic form of mathematical propositions. 
Platonism clearly satisfies this requirement because it has no need of special truth 
conditions that apply only to mathematical propositions. A Platonist can say something like “A 
mathematical proposition is true in pretty much the same way that a non-mathematical 
proposition is true: when the constants and quantified variables actually refer to entities that 
really have the indicated properties and relations.” This is how the Platonists can show that their 
truth conditions “fit in” to a more general understanding of truth, and it did not require any 
particular theory of truth or any particular syntactic tests. Combinatorial theories cannot pull off 
this trick simply because those theories themselves say that mathematical propositions are true in 
a special way. This kind of special truth condition is what the semantic constraint blocks. 
I am now in position to present what I take to be basic underlying issue of the semantic 
constraint. As I have indicated, I think that Benacerraf is correct to think that there should be 
some semantic constraint placed on metaphysics for the simple reason that we need some reasons 
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to believe that the truth conditions offered by a metaphysical theory are genuine conditions of 
truth—conditions that when satisfied result in true propositions. However, I think Benacerraf 
constrains metaphysics too much when he requires conformity to specific semantic theories or 
even when he requires a specific syntactic test. We need to leave more room for metaphysics to 
surprise us and even to elicit semantic reforms. Therefore, what we need is an expression of the 
semantic constraint that restricts what sorts of truth conditions metaphysics can offer while not 
restricting metaphysics to any particular semantic theory. I believe that the simple requirement 
that the truth conditions be applicable beyond the scope of the theory captures the essence of the 
semantic constraint in such a way that metaphysics is not overly restricted by it.  
Therefore, the general semantic constraint of the integration challenge, as I understand 
it,19 is that metaphysical theories should not require special semantics. In other words, whatever 
metaphysical theory is offered should not require a brand of truth that applies only to the subject 
matter of the theory. I, therefore, state the general semantic constraint as follows: 
General Semantic Constraint: A metaphysical theory must provide an account of truth 
such that the truth conditions for propositions concerning the subject matter of the theory 
are also applicable to some propositions that do not concern the subject matter of the 
theory. 
 
The semantic constraint is meant to constraint what kinds of truth conditions will be allowed by 
metaphysical theories without restricting metaphysics to any particular semantic theory or saying 
exactly what those truth conditions must be. Instead, metaphysics is constrained by semantics 
only in the sense that the metaphysical theory must link the truth conditions that apply within the 
theory to truth conditions that apply outside the theory. 
 
19 I am not suggesting that Benacerraf would accept my interpretation of the semantic constraint.
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 Platonism fairly clearly satisfies the semantic constraint, not because it is consistent with 
Tarski’s theory or even because it passes some syntactic test for acceptable semantics, but simply 
because it provides truth conditions that are clearly applicable to mathematical propositions and 
non-mathematical propositions alike. By contrast, combinatorial theories fail the semantic 
constraint not because they are inconsistent with Tarski’s theory or even because they fail some 
syntactic test for acceptable semantics, but simply because their truth conditions only apply to 
mathematical propositions. Such a result makes the semantics of mathematics mysterious. That is 
the problem that the semantic constraint uncovers. 
1.2.2 The General Epistemic Constraint 
 
I now turn to the epistemic constraint. Unfortunately, this constraint is a bit more 
complicated, but Benacerraf’s presentation shares some things in common with his presentation 
of the semantic constraint, which should help to make it somewhat easier to understand and 
generalize. Just like the semantic constraint, Benacerraf states his epistemic constraint in three 
stages, each more specific than the previous. In the first (vaguest) stage, his suggestion is merely 
that there should be some way to know whether the truth conditions offered by a theory of 
mathematical truth have been satisfied. According to this vague version, the epistemic constraint 
requires that “an account of mathematical truth…must be consistent with the possibility of 
having mathematical knowledge: the conditions of the truth of mathematical propositions cannot 
make it impossible for us to know that they are satisfied.”20 The second stage adds the 
assumption that whether or not it is possible to know that any purported truth conditions are 
satisfied should be determined by our best available general theory of knowledge. The third stage 
 
20 “Mathematical Truth,” 409. 
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adds the assumption that the causal theory of knowledge is our best available general theory of 
knowledge. The result is that Benacerraf’s epistemic constraint requires that any metaphysical 
theory of mathematical reality be consistent with the causal theory of knowledge. But, once 
again, what if the causal theory is wrong? Or what if there is some other way to determine 
whether some truth conditions can be known to be satisfied? Would Benacerraf’s dilemma 
thereby be resolved? Once again, I propose to work backwards from Benacerraf’s specific 
version of the epistemic constraint to the vague general version in order to uncover which of the 
stages of his presentation of the constraint are crucial to it. 
According to Benacerraf’s version of the causal theory of knowledge, S knows that P 
only if a causal relation obtains between S and the referents of the constituent names, predicates, 
and quantifiers of P. But why accept such a view? Once again, it seems that metaphysics is being 
restricted rather than constrained by this requirement. Just like with the semantic constraint, we 
should leave enough epistemological wiggle room in our metaphysical theorizing that the 
resulting theories can instigate epistemological insight and reform. If we insist on an 
epistemological theory at the outset, even if we are certain that it is the best available theory we 
have, we limit metaphysics unnecessarily. 
So, let us suppose for the sake of argument, that the causal theory is false. Is Benacerraf’s 
dilemma thereby resolved? I don’t think so. For some historical evidence, consider the fact that 
support for the causal theory of knowledge has steadily waned since Benacerraf’s paper was first 
published in 1973, but the influence of the challenge of Benacerraf’s dilemma to the philosophy 
of mathematics (and to metaphysics and epistemology more generally) has not had the same 
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sharp decline in interest.21 This suggests that there is something deeper at issue in the epistemic 
constraint than simply the causal condition. It is not easy to say exactly what the problem is 
supposed to be, but if we look at Benacerraf’s exact criticism of Platonism, it turns out that, just 
as we saw in Benacerraf’s semantic criticism of the combinatorial theories, we again see no 
direct mention of any specific theory of knowledge: 
It must be possible to establish an appropriate sort of connection between the truth 
conditions of p…and the grounds on which P is said to be known…. In the absence of 
this, no connection has been established between having those grounds and believing a 
proposition which is true. Having those grounds cannot be fitted into an explanation of 
knowing p. The link between P and justifying a belief in P on those grounds cannot be 
made. But for that knowledge which is properly regarded as justified true belief, then the 
link must be made.22 
 
Here Benacerraf only requires “an appropriate sort of connection” between the truth conditions 
and a justified belief. To be justified, according to this way of thinking, one must have some sort 
of “grounds” for one’s belief, and those “grounds” have to be connected in the right sort of way 
with the truth conditions of that belief. But what sort of connection will do this job if not a causal 
connection? What will provide the link? Benacerraf’s suggestion is that if the link is not causal, 
then the theory will require some mysterious “special faculty through which we ‘interact’ with 
[mathematical] objects.”23 Once again, Benacerraf is concerned with avoiding special-ness in 
theories of mathematical truth. The semantic constraint outlawed special truth conditions, and 
the epistemic constraint is meant to block special justification conditions. As we have seen, 
though, requiring a respect for the causal theory of knowledge seems unnecessarily limiting to 
metaphysics. So, perhaps we can understand the link between truth conditions and justification 
conditions in a more general way that does not require the link to be causal. In other words, 
 
21 As reported in Penelope Maddy, “The Legacy of ‘Mathematical Truth’,” 62. 
22 “Mathematical Truth,” 414 
23 “Mathematical Truth,” 416. 
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maybe we can specify the special-ness of the justification conditions without specifically 
requiring some sort of causal contact with whatever satisfies the truth conditions. 
 Since Benacerraf’s epistemic constraint is focused on justification conditions (the 
“grounds” of belief), I think it will be more illuminating if we focus our discussion on 
justification in particular rather than on knowledge in general. It will also help to state in clear 
terms what Benacerraf’s linking idea is supposed to be. How are truth conditions and 
justification conditions supposed to be related? I think the main idea is what I will call the 
linking thesis, which establishes a necessary condition for justification: 
The Linking Thesis: S is justified in believing that P only if there is a reason for S to 
believe that the truth conditions for P are satisfied. 
 
The linking thesis captures two main ideas implicit in Benacerraf’s epistemic criticism of 
Platonism. The first idea is the basic epistemic assumption that some reasons to believe (the 
grounds of belief) are required for justification. The second idea is that the reasons to believe 
must be linked to the truth conditions—there must be reasons to believe that the truth conditions 
are satisfied. The linking thesis does not put any further requirements on the form that the 
reasons to believe must take. In particular, it does not require that a causal connection exist 
between truth and knower. It only requires that there be some reasons to believe that the truth 
conditions are satisfied without saying exactly what form those reasons must take. It is also 
worth noting that the linking thesis is neutral on the internalism/externalism debate in 
epistemology. It does not say whether S must be aware of the reason or whether they simply 
have to exist. It says that there must be some reasons without putting restrictions on what form 
those reasons must take or to whom they must be available. It simply says that whatever the 
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reasons are for a proposition they must be reasons to believe that the truth conditions for that 
proposition are in fact satisfied. This links the justification conditions to the truth conditions. 
 But now generating the epistemic constraint from the linking thesis, without a specific 
theory of knowledge in our pockets, is not obvious. As a first crack at it, maybe it should go 
something like this: a metaphysical theory cannot require truth conditions for which there are no 
reasons to believe they are ever satisfied. That sounds about right, but it will not do. The problem 
is that a metaphysician can always easily provide some reasons. This way of presenting the 
constraint does not block recourse to a special faculty to generate the reasons to believe. It does 
not really do the job of epistemically constraining metaphysics. If we do not constrain what 
reasons metaphysicians can offer for beliefs concerning the content of the theories they offer, 
they will have no clear way to defend their theory against the epistemic objection implicit in the 
epistemic constraint. Still, we do not want to require that the reasons conform to any particular 
theory of knowledge, since, as I have said, that would restrict metaphysics rather than constrain 
it. 
The challenge of the epistemic constraint is for a metaphysical theory to show how 
knowledge of the realm covered by the theory is possible. So far, I have suggested that this 
means that the theory must provide truth conditions such that there are non-special reasons to 
believe that those truth conditions are sometimes satisfied. So, now we need to specify what will 
qualify the reasons to believe as non-special: what test must a metaphysical theory pass in order 
to qualify as having given reasons to believe that the truth conditions are satisfied that are clearly 
not special reasons? Just as with the semantic constraint, it is very hard to see how 
metaphysicians are going to be able to do this if not by showing how the reasons they offer are 
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consistent with the best available theory of justification in general. Once again, we want an 
epistemic constraint on metaphysics, so that the results of metaphysics will be epistemologically 
plausible, but we do not want to tie metaphysics down with a pre-ordained epistemological 
theory that will not give metaphysicians the creative freedom to be epistemologically innovative 
and surprising. 
So, what is the test for determining whether the reasons offered for thinking that truth 
conditions have been satisfied are not special reasons? In order to answer this question, we must 
first consider a different question: is the epistemic challenge of Benacerraf’s dilemma as it 
applies to Platonism supposed to be a challenge for Platonists to explain how they know their 
theory is true,24 or is it a challenge for them to explain how we know mathematical truths given 
that Platonism is true?25 Neither one of these options seems like much of a problem. If the 
former, then the epistemic constraint is simply asking Platonists for an argument for their theory, 
since it would only be asking for a reason to think that the theory itself is true. That is more than 
a reasonable request, but surely there is a much more polite and direct way to ask than by 
presenting convoluted dilemmas. If the latter, then the epistemic constraint does not seem fair, 
since it asks the Platonists to do epistemology rather than metaphysics. So, it seems that the 
epistemic constraint is either trivial or unfair. An answer to this problem will show the way 
forward to a statement of the epistemic constraint that blocks special justification conditions. 
 
24 This seems to be the interpretation of the epistemic constraint among those who think that Benacerraf’s dilemma 
is solved by Quine’s indispensability argument. I think this is a misunderstanding of the main thrust of Benacerraf’s 
epistemic constraint, which is focused on justification for belief concerning the content of the theory, not beliefs 
concerning the theory itself. See Quine, “On What There is,” and Putnam, “What is Mathematical Truth.” 
25 David Lewis seems to interpret Benacerraf’s epistemic constraint in this way. See On the Plurality of Worlds, 
108-109. 
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The answer is that the focus of the epistemic constraint is both on belief in the theory 
itself and on beliefs concerning the content of the theory. The issue is that believing that a 
metaphysical theory is true may prevent one from being justified in one’s beliefs concerning 
propositions concerning the subject matter of the theory. I do not know if Benacerraf would 
agree with this formulation, but I think that the ultimate underlying problem that the epistemic 
constraint presents for theories of mathematical truth could be put as follows. If someone, call 
that person S, believes that the theory is true, S thereby takes on a commitment to the truth 
conditions for mathematical propositions that the theory accepts; given this commitment, it must 
be shown how S has reasons to believe that those truth conditions are satisfied for S’s justified 
mathematical beliefs. In this way, the epistemic constraint neither requires a reason to believe 
that the theory on offer is true, nor does it require an explanation for how beliefs covered by that 
theory are known. Instead it asks for an explanation for how it is possible simultaneously to 
believe the metaphysical theory and to have justified beliefs concerning the content of that 
theory. For a concrete example, my interpretation of Benacerraf’s challenge to Platonism could 
be put as follows. Suppose that S is a Platonist, and that S believes, say, that there are at least 
three perfect numbers greater than 17. If S believes that Platonism is true, then S thereby believes 
that the truth conditions for the proposition that there are at least three perfect numbers greater 
than 17 is that there are at least three abstract mathematical objects that have the property of 
being perfect and that bear the relationship greater than to the abstract object named 17. That is 
to say that, by accepting Platonism, S is accepting the Tarskian semantic rendering of 
mathematical propositions. But if S believes that this is the truth condition for the belief in 
question, then it seems that S has no obvious reason to believe that this truth condition is 
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satisfied, since S has no means of determining whether these abstract objects actually have the 
indicated properties and bear the indicated relations. Direct inspection is obviously ruled out, and 
there is no obvious alternative means. If we think instead of what S’s reasons probably are, we 
discover a much different source—counting, mathematical proof, and the like. Whatever the 
virtues these mathematical procedures might have for convincing S to accept the belief, they are 
not reasons to think that the Platonistic truth conditions are satisfied, because they do not provide 
a reason to think that some abstract objects have the indicated properties and relations. 
Generalizing, the result is that anyone who believes that Platonism is true cannot also be justified 
in their mathematical beliefs—the belief in Platonism defeats any justification they may have 
otherwise had.26 Or at least, a Platonist should explain how there is a reason for someone who 
accepts the theory to believe that the Tarskian truth conditions are satisfied. Lacking this, 
Platonism is an implausible theory on epistemic grounds. 
I take it that the description in the foregoing paragraph expresses the underlying intuition 
of the epistemic constraint.27 Therefore, I will understand the import of the epistemic constraint 
to be to constrain metaphysical theorizing to those theories that one can believe without 
defeating one’s own justification for beliefs concerning the propositions covered by that very 
metaphysical theory. In other words, whatever truth conditions a metaphysical theory requires 
had better be the sorts of truth conditions that someone who accepts them can have a reason to 
believe have been satisfied in at least some cases. The challenge for a metaphysician is not “Tell 
us how you are justified in believing that your theory is correct;” it is “Tell us how we have 
reasons to believe that your truth conditions are sometimes satisfied.” The combinatorialist can 
 
26 For a similar treatment of Benacerraf’s epistemic constraint, see Laurence BonJour’s presentation in In Defense of 
Pure Reason, 156-157. 
27 But, again, I am not at all certain that Benacerraf would accept my formulation. 
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say “we can tell that the truth conditions have been satisfied by simply seeing a proof, since the 
proof just is the truth condition.” However, the Platonist has no plausible response; the Platonist 
seems reduced to positing the existence of some special epistemic faculty for the purpose of 
determining when the truth conditions offered by Platonism are satisfied. 
Now I can state the generalized epistemic constraint. We put the linking thesis together 
with the assumption that we have some justified beliefs concerning the propositions covered by a 
metaphysical theory: 
General Epistemic Constraint: A metaphysical theory must provide an account of truth 
such that there are reasons to believe that the truth conditions for propositions concerning 
the subject matter of the theory are satisfied in at least some cases. 
 
It must be possible for someone who believes that the so-called truth conditions are indeed 
conditions of truth also to have reasons to believe that those conditions are satisfied in at least 
some cases. 
It might now be questioned why we should assume that we have any justified beliefs 
concerning the content of a metaphysical theory at the outset. Why not remain skeptical while we 
do our metaphysics? The problem with this thinking is that we generally only go in search of a 
metaphysical theory after we are reasonably convinced that knowledge of propositions 
concerning the subject matter of that theory is possible. If our intuitions have guided us far 
enough to send us in search of a metaphysical theory, then the intuition that knowledge within 
that realm is possible is already well established. A theory that undercuts the very intuitions that 
began the search for the theory in the first place is fairly implausible. This is not to say, of 
course, that we could not discover or decide that our initial intuitions were misguided or that we 
did not know what we thought we did, but we should do so only after a thoroughly extensive 
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search for a theory that does as little violence as possible to the intuition that knowledge is 
possible. 
When I covered the semantic constraint, I indicated that what we need from a 
metaphysical theory is a reason to believe that the truth conditions are of an appropriate sort, that 
they are indeed conditions of truth rather than conditions of some other sort. For the epistemic 
constraint, we need a reason to believe that the truth conditions have been satisfied in at least 
some cases. The overall result of both of the constraints together, and so the main thrust of an 
integration challenge, is that a metaphysical theory is implausible if it requires truth conditions 
either that we have no reason to believe are actually conditions of truth or that we have no reason 
to believe have been satisfied in at least some cases. 
It may be worth noting that applying the epistemic constraint to the justificatory aspect of 
knowledge rather than to knowledge in general results in a much more satisfying rendition of the 
epistemic constraint, according to which metaphysical theorizing is limited to those truth 
conditions that we have reason to believe are satisfied in at least some cases. But there is another 
benefit to applying the epistemic constraint to the justificatory aspect of knowledge rather than to 
knowledge itself: it makes it clearer how the semantic and epistemic constraints work together to 
constrain metaphysical theorizing. They work together because both of the constraints focus 
strongly on the notions of truth conditions and having reasons to believe. The semantic constraint 
limits metaphysical theorizing to presenting truth conditions that we have reason to believe are 
actually conditions of truth rather than conditions of another kind, and the epistemic constraint 
limits metaphysical theorizing to presenting truth conditions that we have reason to believe are 
satisfied in at least some cases. In so far as metaphysics is interested in describing how truth 
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conditions are satisfied, it must present those truth conditions so that they are clearly conditions 
of truth and so that we can clearly have reasons to believe that they have been satisfied. If the 
theory fails to satisfy the first condition, then it is implausible on the grounds that there are no 
reasons to accept the truth conditions it offers, and if it fails to satisfy the second condition, then 
it is implausible because it implies that we have no knowledge of the subject matter covered by 
the theory. 
1.3 Applying the Integration Challenge to Modality 
 
 The constraints of the integration challenge as they apply to modality are now easy to 
state.  
Semantic Constraint for Modality: A metaphysical theory of modality must provide an 
account of modal truth such that the truth conditions for modal propositions are also 
applicable to some non-modal propositions. 
 
Epistemic Constraint for Modality: A metaphysical theory of modality must provide an 
account of modal truth such that there are reasons to believe that the truth conditions for 
modal propositions are satisfied in at least some cases. 
 
The integration challenge requires those who would offer metaphysical theories of modality to 
do so in such a way that both modal semantics and modal epistemology are not rendered 
mysterious. As with mathematics, this dual constraint is by no means clearly satisfied by any 
popular metaphysical theory of modality. 
It is important to note, however, that there are some assumptions implied by the 
integration challenge. If the following two-part assumptions are not true, then the integration 
challenge for modality is not really a genuine problem for modal metaphysics after all. 
 Semantic Assumption: Some modal sentences are both meaningful and true. 
 
 Epistemic Assumption: Some modal beliefs are both justified and true. 
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If it turns out that all modal sentences are meaningless, then the semantic constraint will not 
apply. If it turns out that no modal beliefs are justified, then the epistemic constraint will not 
apply. If it turns out that neither modal sentences nor modal beliefs are true, then the whole 
business of searching for a plausible metaphysical theory is hopeless to begin with. 
 Before moving on, though, I think it is worth noting that, in a sense, I am considering a 
more general version of Benacerraf’s dilemma by tackling the integration challenge for modality, 
since mathematical propositions are usually understood to be a subset of the necessary truths. If I 
can resolve the integration challenge for modality, I may be in a position to resolve Benacerraf’s 
dilemma as well, since, presumably, the theory will cover all mathematical truths as a subset of 
the necessary truths. In fact, I will present some ideas in the direction of resolving Benacerraf’s 
dilemma in an appendix at the end of this dissertation. 
1.4 Two Examples 
 
Like Benacerraf, I will provide two examples, which should serve to illustrate the 
integration challenge for modality while also displaying some of the difficulties it presents to 
metaphysical theories of modality in general. These examples parallel Benacerraf’s examples in 
two important ways: first, they are examples of theories that satisfy one of the constraints fairly 
easily but do not satisfy the other in any clear way; and second, one is a realist theory, and the 
other is an idealist theory. After presenting the examples, I will remark on the importance of 
these facts. 
1.4.1 Possible World Realism 
 
Like the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of modality has a clear champion to 
the title “the standard account.” Unsurprisingly, it is also a realist account. According to possible 
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world realism, there are possible worlds, and these possible worlds account for modal truth. The 
accompanying semantics for possible world realism is possible world semantics: 
“Possibly P” is true if and only if P is true in some possible world. 
“Necessarily P” is true if and only if P is true in all possible worlds. 
This semantic theory has been, and continues to be, extremely valuable to philosophers. It has 
been useful for elucidating modal, temporal, deontic, locative, and other intensional logics; it 
makes an appearance in philosophical explanations for such diverse phenomena as causation, 
time, morality, and personal identity. And its popularity is not difficult to understand. It fairly 
clearly establishes truth conditions for modal sentences that fit very nicely within an already 
established understanding of truth conditions in general. We could not ask for a clearer example 
of a theory that provides exactly what the semantic constraint requires. It does this by suggesting 
that truth just is truth in possible worlds. Modal truth is determined by the possible worlds that a 
proposition is true in, and true in applies to all truths, modal or otherwise. A proposition is true 
just in case it is true in the actual world, which is one of the worlds among all the possible 
worlds. Therefore, metaphysical theories of modality that rely on possible worlds semantics 
satisfy the semantic constraint fairly clearly.  
 The epistemic constraint will be the harder hurdle for possible world realism, and it is not 
hard to see why. All theories of possible world realism accept possible world semantics, but they 
are divided on how exactly to characterize possible worlds. However, no matter how one 
understands possible worlds, there is going to be an epistemic problem. To see why, suppose that 
S is a possible world realist. Now we ask, what reason can S have for believing that any 
particular modal belief is true? For example, consider the proposition “It is possible that talking 
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donkeys exist.” If S is a possible world realist, then S believes that this proposition is true if and 
only if “talking donkeys exist” is true in some possible world. How, though, can S have a reason 
to think that there is such a world? Unless there are talking donkeys in the actual world, direct 
inspection is ruled out, and there are no other obvious candidates to fill the role. If we ask about 
what S’s actual reasons are for thinking that talking donkeys could exist, we will likely hear a 
story about being able to conceive of or imagine such a thing, but conceiving and imagining of 
something do not seem like good reasons to think that something exists (whether in this world or 
any other). So, the reasons S actually has to believe that talking donkeys exist do not really 
provide reasons to think that the truth conditions supplied by possible world semantics have been 
satisfied. This violates the epistemic constraint. 
 These comments are not decisive, of course, but hopefully they give some idea of the 
difficulties that possible world realists have to confront in order to satisfy the epistemic 
constraint. We will return to possible world realism in chapter three, where I will take a look at 
what the possible world realists have said or could say about the epistemology of possible 
worlds. 
1.4.2 Classical Conventionalism 
 
For an example of a theory of modal truth that clearly satisfies the epistemic constraint 
but not the semantic constraint, we have classical conventionalism. There are many views that 
might be called broadly conventionalist, and I will have occasion to consider other such views in 
various places in this dissertation, but the view that I will call classical conventionalism is the 
view that was popular among the logical positivists and gets its best expression in A. J. Ayer’s 
classic Language, Truth and Logic. Ayer writes, 
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The principles of logic and mathematics are true universally simply because we never 
allow them to be anything else. And the reason for this is that we cannot abandon them 
without contradicting ourselves, without sinning against the rules that govern the use of 
language, and so making our utterances self-stultifying. In other words, the truths of logic 
and mathematics are analytic propositions or tautologies.28 
 
For Ayer, an analytic (or, more accurately, an analytically true29) proposition is simply one 
whose truth “depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains,” whereas a synthetic 
proposition is one whose truth (or, to be accurate, falsity) “is determined by the facts of 
experience.”30 The result is that the necessity (universality) of a true proposition is determined 
entirely by the rules of language use. As Ayer puts the main point of the classical conventionalist 
view, “We cannot deny [analytically true propositions] without infringing the conventions which 
are presupposed by our very denial, and so falling into contradiction. And this is the sole ground 
of their necessity.” For a classical conventionalist, necessary propositions are just the analytically 
true propositions, those whose true is determined entirely by the conventions of language use. 
Just like with the combinatorial theories, this is a metaphysical theory as well as a semantic 
theory. The semantic theory says, 
 “Necessarily P” is true if and only if P is analytically true 
  “Possibly P” is true if and only if not-P is not analytically true. 
The metaphysical component of classical conventionalism is the bit that explains how these truth 
conditions (analyticity) connect to reality, in this case, through the rules of language use. At least 
this is my understanding of the relationship between semantics and metaphysics. Ayer himself 
would surely disagree. Ayer was at pains to eliminate metaphysics all together. So, if my view of 
metaphysics is correct, his cause was probably hopeless. I see Ayer, not as a denier of 
 
28 Language, Truth, and Logic, 77. 
29 Analytically false propositions are impossible rather than necessary. 
30 Language, Truth, and Logic, 78. 
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metaphysics, but as a rival metaphysician with an alternative theory. In any case, this is not the 
place to debate meta-metaphysics. 
  The epistemic constraint is fairly easily satisfied by classical conventionalism: one need 
only be familiar in the right sort of way with the conventions of the language in which P is 
uttered in order to have reasons to believe that the truth conditions for “Necessarily P” and 
“Possibly P” have been satisfied. In fact, accepting classical conventionalism seems to make 
modal epistemology into a rather trivial matter: understanding modal truth within a language 
amounts to nothing more or less than understanding what language is being spoken. Once one 
knows the rules of the language, one automatically knows what the rules allow and what they do 
not. The sentences that must come out true under the rules of language use are analytically true 
and are, therefore, necessary; the sentences whose negations do not come out true under the rules 
of language use are not analytically true and are, therefore, possible. 
 But, of course, classical conventionalism does not obviously satisfy the semantic 
constraint because truth conditions understood as the conventions of language are not applicable 
to non-modal propositions. Ayer makes this point himself, 
[T]he criterion by which we determine the validity of an a priori or analytic proposition 
is not sufficient to determine the validity of an empirical or synthetic proposition. For it is 
characteristic of empirical propositions that their validity is not purely formal. To say that 
a geometrical proposition, or a system of geometrical propositions, is false is to say that it 
is self-contradictory. But an empirical proposition, or a system of empirical propositions, 
may be free from contradiction, and still be false. It is said to be false, not because it is 
formally defective, but because it fails to satisfy some material criterion.31 
 
The truth conditions for modal propositions required by classical conventionalism are special 
truth conditions because they are a completely different understanding of truth than truth 
conditions outside of modal contexts. It will be useful to compare classical conventionalism to 
 
31 Language, Truth, and Logic, 90. 
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possible worlds realism. We have seen that possible worlds realism fairly clearly satisfies the 
semantic constraint because it does not require a special semantics. The truth conditions offered 
by possible worlds semantics apply also to non-modal sentences because it introduces the 
relation true in that holds between propositions and worlds and then reinterprets truth in general 
as truth in the actual world. So, possible world realism fairly clearly shows how the truth 
conditions for modal sentences fit within a more general theory of truth. Classical 
conventionalism does not so obviously satisfy the semantic constraint because it requires a 
special kind of truth that applies only to modal propositions. The truth conditions for non-modal 
propositions (some “material criterion”) are something quite different from those required for 
modal propositions (analyticity). So, classical conventionalism has a semantic problem. We can 
fairly ask, “Why should we accept these as conditions of truth?” to which we can expect that the 
classical conventionalist will have no useful reasons to offer since they cannot show how their 
truth conditions fall within a more general account of truth. 
1.5 Conclusion: The Semantic Point of View Versus the Epistemic Point of View  
 
 So long as a metaphysical theory of modality fails to satisfy one or the other of the 
constraints, it cannot be regarded as an adequate theory. A theory that fails to satisfy the 
semantic constraint will be immediately faced with a semantic objection: why should we think 
that the theory is correct when there is no reason to think that the truth conditions it requires for 
modal sentences actually result in true sentences when satisfied? And a theory that fails to satisfy 
the epistemic constraint will be immediately faced with an epistemic objection: why should we 
think that the theory is correct when the theory itself seems to imply that knowledge of modality 
is in principle impossible for those that accept the theory? 
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An important overall lesson that we can learn from the integration challenge and these 
examples is that when a metaphysician begins with semantic considerations mainly in mind, the 
resulting theory will likely lean toward a realist point of view, like possible worlds realism, but 
when a metaphysician begins with epistemological considerations mainly in mind, the resulting 
theory will more likely lean toward an idealist point of view, like classical conventionalism. 
There is nothing wrong with either of these approaches per se, but one likely result is that the 
realist theories that develop will not pay due attention to epistemological concerns, and the 
idealist theories that develop will not pay due attention to semantic concerns. So, the realist 
theories are likely to turn out to be implausible on epistemological grounds, and the idealist 
theories are likely to turn out to be implausible on semantic grounds. 
As a corrective, metaphysics must give equal consideration to semantic and 
epistemological concerns from the very start. If it does not, we will be faced eventually with one 
or the other of the objections implied by the constraints of the integration challenge. So, we must 
aim our metaphysical theories directly at both constraints from the very start. As for modality in 
particular, if we are to have any hope of achieving a plausible metaphysical theory, then we had 
better pay close attention both to modal language and to modal belief. Whatever modal truth 
amounts to, it had better turn out to be the sort of thing that can be informatively spoken of and 
justifiably believed in.
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2 Dissolutions of the Integration Challenge 
 
In this chapter, I will look at theories of modality that suggest that the integration 
challenge is misguided because it is founded on a faulty assumption. As a reminder, the 
assumptions required by the integration challenge for modality are: 
 Semantic Assumption: Some modal propositions are both meaningful and true. 
 
 Epistemic Assumption: Some modal beliefs are both justified and true. 
 
If either of these assumptions is false, then the integration challenge is not a genuine problem for 
modal metaphysics. I will call theories that entail a denial of one or both of these assumptions 
dissolutions of the integration challenge. There are three families of such theories. The first 
family, which I will call modal eliminativism, includes theories that entail the denial of the 
semantic assumption because they suggest that all modal sentences are meaningless—that when 
we use modal language, we are just speaking non-sense because there are really no modal 
distinctions at all. The second family, which I will call modal skepticism, includes theories that 
entail a denial of the epistemic constraint because they suggest that no modal beliefs are 
justified—that we can only know how things are, not how they might be or must be. And the 
third family, which I will call modal expressivism, includes theories that entail the denial of both 
the semantic and the epistemic constraints because they suggest that no modal sentences or 
beliefs are true—that modal sentences and beliefs are not evaluable as either true or false 
because there are no modal facts at all. The aim of this chapter is to consider the main arguments 
in favor of these theories and to show that they are all implausible. The result will be to further 
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support the claim that the integration challenge is a genuine challenge for metaphysical theories 
of modality that is worth attempting to resolve. 
2.1 Modal Eliminativism: Denying the Semantic Assumption 
 
While many theorists are suspicious or skeptical about modality, very few have been so hostile 
as to hold modal eliminativism—the theory that modal language is meaningless. Ted Sider called 
it “a position of last resort, given the embedding of modality in ordinary and philosophical talk 
and practice.”32 Yet it is a position that some have taken. So it will prove worthwhile to consider 
it. 
2.1.1 A Verificationist Argument 
 
Verificationism seems like a good place to begin exploring the possibilities for modal 
eliminativism, since the verification criterion of meaning implies that any sentence that is 
unverifiable through observation is meaningless, and it is plausible to maintain that sentences 
containing modal language are unverifiable, for there are no obvious empirical methods for 
detecting the possibility of talking donkeys or the necessity of 2 + 2 = 4. Historically, however, 
this has not been the argument of the verificationists. They have tended to be conventionalists 
about modality, preferring to maintain modal distinctions by finding them in the conventions of 
language rather than in the domain of the empirically verifiable. We have already encountered 
this classical conventionalist view in chapter one. Still, let us imagine an atypical verificationist, 
unimpressed by the analytic/synthetic distinction, who holds that statements with modal content 
are meaningless because they cannot be empirically verified. The benefit of imagining this 
position will, I hope, become clear. 
 
32 “Reductive Theories of Modality,” 6. 
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Some standard objections to verificationism are now legendary, but the most legendary of 
all is that the verificationist principle is itself meaningless by its own criterion. In other words, 
we can sensibly ask whether the theory itself is verifiable, and the answer seems to be that it is 
not, for no observations could possibly give reasons for or against it. But if the theory is not 
verifiable, then by its own standards, it is meaningless. So goes the standard objection. But 
things are even worse than this for our imagined atypical verificationist because the 
verificationist principle has modal content. Verificationists distinguish between practical 
verifiability and verifiability in principle. Some sentences are not verifiable to anyone right now 
simply because of limited technology or lack of time. For example, “There are at least 1,000 
inhabited planets in the Milky Way” cannot be verified simply because we lack the technology to 
check on all the other planets in the Milky Way, and even if we had the technology, the 
procedure required would take many lifetimes to actually accomplish. Such a sentence is not, 
therefore, practically verifiable. Still, the sentence is verifiable in principle, since it could be 
verified if we had the appropriate technology and enough time to carry out an appropriate 
method of verification.33 With this clarification in place, the verificationist principle amounts to 
the claim that a sentence is meaningful if and only if it is possible for the sentence to be verified 
(by persons with the requisite technology, time, patience, etc.).34 Hence, our atypical 
verificationist’s claim that statements with modal content are meaningless because unverifiable 
 
33 Language, Truth and Logic, 36. 
34 Ayer’s initial statement of the verificationist principle in Language, Truth, and Logic does not contain any overt 
modal content. One might think, then, that a version of the principle that avoided all modal language could be 
formulated. But this is not the case. The needed distinction between practical verifiability and verifiability in 
principle cannot be formulated without modal content, and so a verificationist argument for modal eliminativism 
fails. See Language, Truth, and Logic, 35. 
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has fallen prey to his own theory, since the verification principle is itself a statement with modal 
content and is, therefore, meaningless by its own lights. 
Considering this argument for modal eliminativism has been so far a purely academic 
exercise, since no verificationist has ever (to my knowledge) put forward such an obviously 
flimsy argument. Still I hope that the exercise will prove valuable in so far as it helps to show us 
in what direction a more promising argument for modal eliminativism might be found. To see 
what I mean, consider a one-time popular response from the verificationists to the charge that the 
verificationist principle cannot explain its own meaningfulness, since it appears unverifiable. The 
response is that the principle is analytically true, and analytic truths require no verifiability to be 
meaningful: the question of its verifiability simply does not arise. Whatever the merits and 
demerits of this response, the analogous response to the charge that the modal content (rather 
than the truth) of the verificationist principle cannot be explained simply will not do. The trouble 
is that our imagined verificationist cannot appeal to the analytic/synthetic distinction, since doing 
so admits that there is some sense to modal distinctions. The response is only plausible if the 
appeal to the analytic/synthetic distinction is meant to show not only that the verificationist 
principle is true, but also that it is necessarily true. Such a response, though, is not available to 
the verificationist eliminativist. There seems to be, then, no way to account for the modal content 
of the verification principle itself without the analytic/synthetic distinction. But once one accepts 
that distinction, it is hard to see how to deny modal distinctions. 
It seems, then, very unlikely that a modal eliminativist will hold the analytic/synthetic 
distinction. Of course, it is not as though the analytic/synthetic distinction and the 
necessary/contingent distinction must stand or fall together, but it is hard to see why one would 
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want to grant sense to the venerable analytic/synthetic distinction and also hold that modal 
language is meaningless, since part of what is supposed to be of interest in the analytic/synthetic 
distinction is that all analytically true statements are supposed to be necessarily true (in virtue of 
meaning alone) and all synthetic statements are supposed to be merely contingent (if true). The 
result is that any plausible line of argument for modal eliminativism will likely have to deny the 
analytic/synthetic distinction. We turn now to this line of argument. 
2.1.2 Quine’s Argument 
 
No one has waged the war against modality more fervently than Quine. It is difficult to 
pin Quine down to a definite argument for the conclusion that modal language is meaningless, 
because his animosity toward modality built up slowly over time. I will, therefore, try to cobble 
together a complete argument for modal eliminativism from the various battlegrounds on which 
Quine fought for it.  
I look first to “Three Grades of Modal Involvement” (1953). Here Quine divides the 
various ways modal language might be understood to contribute to the meaning of the overall 
sentence in which it occurs. According to Quine there are two different ways we could 
understand the contribution of modal language to meaning. One of these ways can be further 
divided into two different applications (Hence, the three grades). While Quine focuses his 
attention on uses of “necessarily,” he believes that his criticisms can be easily modified for other 
modalities.35 
Let us begin with a straightforward example to help illustrate Quine’s three possible 
interpretations. 
 
35 “Three Grades of Modal Involvement,” 156. 
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(1) 	 Necessarily,	8	>	7.	
Under one of Quine’s interpretations of “necessarily,” it functions as a predicate of statement 
names. Under this interpretation (1) could be rephrased as (2) 		 “8	>	7”	is	necessary,		
where “8 > 7” is a name for the statement that 8 is greater than 7, and “is necessary” is a 
predicate that attaches to that name. So, (2) is true if and only if “8 > 7” has a certain property 
called necessity. 
Another way to understand “necessarily” in (1) is as a logical operator. Under this 
reading (1) could be rephrased as (3) 		 c(8	>	7),	
where c is a non-truth-functional necessity operator on the statement 8 > 7. Quine, however, 
thinks that there are two different flavors to this interpretation of necessity. First, the logical 
operator might be understood as a statement operator, attachable to complete statements only. 
Second, the operator might be understood as a sentence operator, attachable to complete 
statements as well as to open sentences. The important difference is that if necessity is a sentence 
operator, then it is possible to quantify into its scope, but if it is a statement operator, then this is 
not possible. For example, if necessity is understood as a sentence operator, then from (3), by 
exchanging ‘8’ for a free variable, we can obtain (4) 		 c(x	>	7).	
Then by existential quantification, we could obtain (5) 	 ($x)c(x	>	7).	
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But if necessity is understood as a statement operator, this is not possible because the scope of 
the necessity operator in (4) contains a free variable—it is not a complete statement—so the 
necessity operator does not properly apply to it. If necessity is understood as a sentence operator, 
then free variables are allowed within its scope, but if it is understood as a statement operator, 
then free variables are not allowed within its scope. 
 The overall strategy of Quine’s argument for modal eliminativism is to show that none of 
these interpretations manages to properly define “necessarily,” and since these three 
interpretations are the only plausible interpretations available, we must conclude that modal 
language is meaningless. The rest of Quine’s argument, therefore, can be given in three stages, 
one for each of the interpretations. 
Let us return to our example. Under the first interpretation of “necessarily,” (1) 		 Necessarily,	8	>	7,	
means (2) 		 “8	>	7”	is	necessary.	
(2) is true so long as the statement name “8 > 7” actually names a statement with a certain 
property—the property of necessity. But what is this property? Quine seems to take it for 
granted—in keeping with the philosophical climate of his time, perhaps—that the only plausible 
way to understand the predicate “is necessary” is as a synonym for “is analytically true.” Quine 
writes, “A statement of the form ‘Necessarily …’ is true if and only if the component statement 
which ‘necessarily’ governs is analytic,”36 and “[N]ecessity [as a statement predicate] tends to be 
identified with what philosophers call analyticity; and analyticity, I have argued elsewhere, is a 
 
36 “Reference and Modality” 143. 
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pseudo-concept which philosophy would be better off without.”37 And so we must look to 
Quine’s argument against analyticity to complete this stage of his argument. 
This brings us to Quine’s famous circle of terms argument from “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism.” According to Quine, the analytic/synthetic distinction is not tenable unless it can 
be appropriately defined, but any attempt to properly define it must rely on other terms whose 
definitions are equally mysterious; each could just as easily have been defined by analyticity.38 
In other words, any plausible definition of analyticity relies upon other terms whose definitions 
will rely on some already understood notion of analyticity. For example, one popular gloss of 
analyticity, essentially Frege’s,39 is that a statement is analytically true if and only if it either is a 
truth of logic or can be transformed into a truth of logic by replacing words or phrases with their 
synonyms: (3) 		 All	and	only	bachelors	are	unmarried	men	
is analytically true under this understanding of analyticity because it can be transformed into a 
truth of logic by replacing the word “bachelors” by its synonym “unmarried men”: (4) 		 All	and	only	unmarried	men	are	unmarried	men.	
The problem with such a suggestion, according to Quine, is the appeal to synonymy. One might 
think that to say that two linguistic forms are synonymous is simply to say that they can be 
exchanged for each other in any statement salve veritate, without altering the truth-value of the 
statement. However, if this is what synonymy amounts to, then any two linguistic forms with the 
same extension—“creature with a heart” and “creature with kidneys,” to use Quine’s example—
will be synonyms, but they clearly do not have the same meaning. To fix this problem, Quine 
 
37 “Three Grades of Modal Involvement,” 169. 
38 “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” 30-31. 
39 In The Foundations of Arithmetic. 
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claims that we must understand synonymy in such a way that to say that “bachelors” and 
“unmarried men” are synonyms is not just to say that they can be exchanged for each other salve 
veritate in any statement, but rather to say that they can be exchanged for each other in 
statements governed by the adverb “necessarily.” The reason that “creature with a heart” and 
“creature with kidneys” are not synonymous is because “creatures with a heart” cannot be 
replaced salve veritate either iteration of “creatures with kidneys” in (5) 		 Necessarily,	all	and	only	creatures	with	a	heart	are	creatures	with	a	heart.	Even	if	it	is	true	that	there	are	no	creatures	with	a	heart	that	do	not	also	have	kidneys	and	vice	versa,	this	is	surely	only	a	contingent	fact.	However,	in	statements	like,	(6) 		 Necessarily,	all	and	only	bachelors	are	unmarried	men,	
‘bachelors” and “unmarried men” can still be replaced for one another salve veritate. Analyticity 
is definable by synonymy; synonymy is definable by necessity; and necessity is definable by 
analyticity. The circle closes. 
Therefore, if “necessarily” is understood as a predicate of sentence names, then it is 
meaningless on the grounds that it cannot be properly defined, since it is only definable in such a 
way that “analytic” will appear in the definiens of the definition and analyticity itself is not 
properly definable. After all, if the circle of terms argument works to show that the 
analytic/synthetic distinction is untenable, then it should work equally well to show that any of 
the other distinctions that find their way into the circle are just as bad off, and “necessarily” does 
appear in the circle. This completes the first stage of Quine’s argument for modal eliminativism. 
The second way that “necessarily” might be understood is as a statement operator. Using 
“c“ as the necessity operator, 
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(1) 		 Necessarily,	8	>	7	
becomes (3) 		 c(8	>	7).	We	must	remember,	though,	that	this	version	of	the	necessity	operator	applies	only	to	statements	and	not	to	open	sentences.	Under	this	interpretation,	no	free	variables	can	appear	within	the	scope	of	the	operator.	
Quine’s argument against this operator is quite straightforward and direct. He argues that 
if we allow this operator, we must deny the principle of the substitutivity of identity in modal 
contexts, for while (3) is true, the following is not (9) 		 c(The	number	of	planets	>	7).	
The number of planets is indeed greater than 7 but surely this is a contingent fact only. However, 
since the number of planets is identical to 8,40 the principle of substitutivity implies that “the 
number of planets” and “8” can be substituted for each other salve veritate. According to Quine 
this shows that c is referentially opaque: the terms within the scope of the operator cannot be 
taken as referential. Noting that quotation contexts are also referentially opaque—“9 > 7” is 
necessarily true, but “the number of planets > 7” is not—Quine’s final analysis of necessity 
understood as a statement operator is, “[I]f we do not propose to quantify across the necessity 
operator, the use of that operator ceases to have any clear advantage over merely quoting a 
sentence and saying that it is analytic.”41 Quine’s opinion here seems to be a popular one among 
logicians. As Rudolph Carnap wrote, “Any system of modal logic without quantification is of 
 
40 I have updated Quine’s argument to reflect the current definition of “planet’. In Quine’s time, the definition of 
“planet” together with the available astronomical data suggested that there were nine planets. Of course the 
flexibility in the referent of “the number of planets” without a corresponding flexibility in the referent of “8” is 
precisely Quine’s point. 
41“Reference and Modality,” 156. 
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interest only as a basis for a wider system including quantification. If such a wider system were 
found to be impossible, logicians would probably abandon modal logic altogether.”42 This 
completes the second stage of the argument. 
The third possibility is that necessity is a logical operator applicable both to statements 
and to open sentences. Unlike the statement operator just discussed, this operator would allow 
free variables within the scope of the operator.  
 Quine’s argument against this operator is a great deal more complex and subtle than his 
argument against the statement operator. Let us consider again our previous example 
(4)   ($x)c(x > 7) 
The necessity operator in (4) is a sentence operator because “x” appears free within its scope; the 
quantifier governing “x” is outside the scope of the necessity operator. Quine has two main 
objections to this operator. The first objection is that this operator requires a dubious 
metaphysical doctrine, Aristotelian essentialism, according to which some attributes of a thing 
are essential to it and other attributes are merely accidental. Quine offers very little by way of 
actual argument against this view, but he very clearly finds it to be intuitively implausible. In one 
place he calls it a “metaphysical jungle”43 and in another place he claims that defending the view 
is “not a part of [his] plan. Such a philosophy is …unreasonable.”44 
 Quine seems to put more weight on his second objection. Let us modify our example. 
Consider the open sentences 
(10) x = 8, 
and 
 
42 Meaning and Necessity, 196. 
43 “Three Grades of Modal Involvement,” 174. 
44 “Reference and Modality,” 156. 
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(11) There are exactly x planets. 
These are two different ways of specifying the same number, namely 8. The problem is that 
replacing the x in 
(12)  ($x)c(x > 7) 
with one of them results in a true statement, while replacing the x with the other results in a false 
statement. For while it is true that 8 is necessarily greater than 7, it is false that the number of 
planets is necessarily greater than 7. As Quine puts the point, “Necessary greaterness than 7 
makes no sense as applied to a number x; necessity attaches only to the connection between ‘x > 
7’ and a particular method…of specifying x.”45 
 There may, however, be a solution to this problem. Quine contends, “we can legitimize 
quantification into modal position by postulating that whenever each of two open sentences 
uniquely determines one and the same object x, the sentences are equivalent by necessity.”46 We 
could require that “x = 8” and “There are exactly x planets” are necessarily equivalent. In other 
words, we could require that all objects x conform to the following open sentence. (13) 	[(y)(Fy	º	x	=	y)	•	(y)(Gy	º	x	=	y)]	É	c(y)(Fy	º	Gy).47	
This says that if two predicates apply to the same object, then those predicates are necessarily 
equivalent. With this assumption in place, Quine argues that the necessity operator once again 
becomes meaningless. The argument is quite technical and proceeds as follows. Assume for the 
sake of argument that P is some true proposition and that x = y. The following are both obviously 
true. 
 
45 “Reference and Modality,” 149. 
46 Word and Object, 197. 
47 I borrow this formulation from Dagfinn Føllesdal, “Quine on Modality,” 148. Quine himself did not put the matter 
as neatly. 
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(14) 	(y)((P	•	x	=	y)	º	x	=	y).	(15) 	(y)(x	=	y	º	x	=	y).	
However, by substitution in (13), putting “(P • x = y)” for “Fy” and putting “x = y” for “Gy’, we 
get the following. (16) {(y)[(P	•	x	=	y)	º	x	=	y]	&	(y)(x	=	y	º	x	=	y)}	É	c(y)[(P	•	x	=	y)	º	x	=	y].	
From (14), (15), and (16) we get (17) c(y)((P	•	x	=	y)	º	x	=	y)	
by universal instantiation, putting “x” for “y,” we get (18) c((P	•	x	=	x)	º	x	=	x),	
which is logically equivalent to (19) cP.	
From the assumption of P, we have now derived cP, and since cP É P is an obvious truth of 
modal logic, the result is (20) cP	º	P.	
In other words, the necessity operator is meaningless; it adds nothing to the meaning of a 
statement.48 This concludes the third stage of the argument. 
The result of Quine’s overall argument is that no matter how we take necessity, either as 
a predicate of a sentence or as a logical operator, it is meaningless. This result extends easily to 
any other modal language since all modal language is interdefinable. To make this clear, suppose 
we take “à“ as our possibility operator. We can define “c“ as “~à~’. By running the third stage 
of Quine’s argument with “~P” instead of “P,” we get 
 
48 Perhaps this is too quick on Quine’s part. “~~P º P” is a truth of logic, but do we really want to say that “~~” is 
meaningless? 
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(21) c~P	º	~P,	
which, by definition, becomes (22) ~à~~P	º	~P,	
which is logically equivalent to (23) àP	º	P.	
Similar considerations hold for the other stages of the argument. So, if Quine’s argument is 
successful, then all modal language is meaningless. 
There is a lot to complain about in Quine’s argument. In the first stage of the argument, 
Quine assumes that the only sense to be made of necessity is in terms of analyticity, which is 
highly questionable and not supported by any arguments. In the second stage of the argument, it 
is not clear why denying the principle of substitutivity in modal contexts is a problem. All this 
shows is that singular terms behave differently in modal contexts than they do in non-modal 
contexts. In any event, I do not propose to engage with these two stages of Quine’s argument 
since I believe, along with most other theorists about modality these days, that the appropriate 
interpretation of modality is as a sentence operator. So, the third stage of Quine’s argument is 
what I will focus on. 
 It seems that Quine himself came to regard the third of stage of the argument as flawed 
less than a year after he wrote the argument in Word and Object.49 The problem is that if the 
argument goes through, then not only is quantified modal logic doomed but so is any logical 
system that focuses on dividing the class of true sentences into proper subclasses. For example, if 
we interpret “c” as the epistemic operator “S knows that…” rather than the necessity operator, 
 
49 Reported by Føllesdal in “Quine on Modality”, 209. 
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the result is that S knows every true sentence—knowledge is meaningless. Similar consideration 
hold for deontic distinctions, temporal distinctions, and many others. So, if this particular 
argument shows that modal distinctions collapse, then these other, more obviously plausible 
distinctions, collapse as well. As Dagfin Føllesdal put it, “Quine’s argument leading up to the 
collapse of the modal distinctions is simply too disastrous to be right.”50  
 I therefore conclude that denying the semantic constraint on the grounds that modal 
distinctions are meaningless is an implausible view. The verificationist argument I considered is 
extremely flimsy at best, which shows that denying modal distinctions while maintaining the 
analytic/synthetic distinction is implausible, and Quine was unable to show, despite heroic 
efforts, that there are no modal distinctions. 
2.2 Modal Skepticism: Denying the Epistemic Assumption 
 
I turn now to a different kind of dissolution strategy. The dissolution strategy that entails 
a denial of the epistemic constraint holds that there are no justified modal beliefs. I will call this 
view modal skepticism. Modal skepticism obviously follows from modal eliminativism, since we 
surely cannot be justified in believing that something is possible or necessary if there are no 
distinctions between the possible, the actual, and the necessary to be made in the fist place. But, I 
have already dealt with modal eliminativism in the previous section, so in this section I will be 
concerned with arguments for modal skepticism that do not rely on eliminativist sympathies. 
Also, I will not be concerned in this section with any version of modal skepticism that follows 
from a global skeptical view. The global skeptic holds that no beliefs at all are justified, so 
obviously modal beliefs are also unjustified if global skepticism is correct. However, this is not 
 
50 “Quine on Modality,” 179. 
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the place to consider such a view, since doing so would be better dealt with in a more complete 
discussion of skepticism in general.51 So, to be precise, the view that I am calling modal 
skepticism, and with which this section will be concerned, is the view that modal distinctions 
exist but that none of our beliefs about them are justified (even though some of our non-modal 
beliefs are justified). 
 Modal skepticism, understood in this way, is an extremely implausible view. One way to 
see its implausibility is to consider the work of David Hume. One of Hume’s main lessons is that 
nomological (causal) necessity is to be understood as a byproduct of our customs and habits. 
This has led some Hume interpreters to suggest that Hume’s view amounts to a kind of 
skepticism about nomological necessity.52 Whether Hume is a skeptic in this sense or not is of 
course a matter of considerable debate, which I have no intentions of trying to settle here. My 
point is just that if one wants to argue for nomological skepticism along Humean lines, then it 
seems a natural progression from there to skepticism regarding all modalities.53 In fact, some 
have suggested that something like this is actually Hume’s considered opinion, pointing to the 
following passage from the Treatise. “[T]here is but one kind of necessity, as there is but one 
kind of cause, and…the common distinction betwixt moral and physical necessity is without any 
foundation in nature.”54 Hume is most likely referring in this passage to the purported distinction 
between deontic and nomological necessity rather than a distinction between metaphysical and 
nomological necessity, but one might be tempted to read Hume as saying that his conclusions 
 
51 Just as I assumed in the previous section that there was no need to consider global eliminativism—the view that 
all language is meaningless—in order to give adequate treatment to modal eliminativism.  
52 For the record, I think this reading of Hume is mistaken, but this is not the place to enter into that debate. 
53 As Wilfred Sellar’s has written: “It should be noted that unqualified concept empiricism equally entails that we 
have no concept of logical necessity, not to mention conjunction, disjunction, negation and class-membership, 
though concept empiricists have not been quite as assiduous in pointing this out as they have been in scoffing at real 
connection.” From “Is There a Synthetic A Priori?” 129. 
54 At 1.3.14.33. Italics in original. 
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regarding nomological necessity apply to all “kinds” of necessity, since there is really no 
distinction between the various “kinds”.55 It is tempting, therefore, for one who reads Hume as a 
skeptic about nomological necessity, and is impressed by Hume’s custom-and-habit theory, to 
extend that thinking to all modalities. A major problem for reading Hume in this manner, 
however, is that, for Hume, part of what is supposed to distinguish relations of ideas from 
matters of fact is modal: the relations of ideas are necessary, and the matters of fact are 
contingent. If Hume’s considered view is that custom and habit are the source of all knowledge 
concerning modalities of all kinds, then his distinction between relations of ideas and matters of 
fact collapses, taking the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori along with it. 
Again, the point here is not to suggest an interpretation of Hume, but just to show that if 
we accept modal skepticism, perhaps for Humean-type reasons, then we are giving up on an 
awful lot: we cannot be justified in believing that there is a difference between what appear to be 
obviously necessary truths, like “all bachelors are unmarried”—Hume’s relations of ideas—and 
what appear to be obviously contingent truths like “some bachelors are lonely”—Hume’s matters 
of fact. Moreover, it is also hard to see how to maintain a distinction between the a priori and the 
a posteriori. If these points have merit, then it seems that modal skepticism will likely collapse 
into modal eliminativism. It is unlikely that modal skepticism will be acceptable to anyone; 
unless that person already has a prior commitment to modal eliminativism and wishes to see all 
modal distinctions collapse anyway. 
 
55 Robert Imlay reads Hume this way. See his “Hume on Intuitive and Demonstrative Inference.” For what it is 
worth, I do not find Imlay’s reading of Hume very plausible, mainly because Hume draws his distinction between 
relations of ideas and matters of fact partly in terms of logical modalities: the former are logically necessary and the 
latter are logically contingent. It seems that if belief in logical necessity were just as much a matter of custom and 
habit as belief in nomological necessity, then the distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact could 
only be a difference in degrees rather than a difference in kind, despite what Hume says. 
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There is another potential problem with modal skepticism; it puts us in an awkward 
dialectical position. On the one hand, it is hard to see how one could give reasons to accept the 
view without begging the question. Deductive validity is usually understood as a modal concept: 
an argument is valid if and only if it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion 
false.56 So, it looks like the proponent of modal skepticism will not be able accept the validity of 
any argument at all. If we cannot be justified in our beliefs concerning modality, then we cannot 
be justified in our beliefs concerning the validity of arguments. Inductive arguments appear to be 
no better off here, since inductive strength is also plausibly understood as a modal concept: an 
argument is strong if and only if it is improbable that the premises are true and the conclusion 
false. It is equally hard to see how one could argue against modal skepticism for similar reasons: 
any argument given against it would fall on deaf ears. If modal skepticism is true, then, it seems 
that the entire business of giving reasons—the centerpiece of philosophical inquiry—is in 
jeopardy. I suggest, then, that we look elsewhere for a plausible dissolution or resolution to the 
integration challenge, and return to modal skepticism only if nothing else works out. Nothing I 
have said here amounts to a conclusive objection to modal skepticism, of course, but I hope that 
it at least helps to make it clear why the view is, as John Hawthorne has put it, “offensive…to 
common sense.”57 
2.2.1 Moderate Modal Skepticism 
 
 But perhaps the above assessment of modal skepticism is too quick. Peter van Inwagen 
has put forward a view that he calls modal skepticism but which differs in important ways from 
 
56 There may be some understandings of validity that do not have this consequence (if validity is reducible to 
rationality, for example). 
57 “The Epistemology of Possible Worlds: A Guided Tour,” 186. 
  57 
the skeptical view I have been considering thus far. He has admitted that the name was a poor 
choice, since he does not think that we have absolutely no modal knowledge. Actually he 
believes that we have a great deal of modal knowledge; it is just that the modal knowledge that 
we have is tied to the affairs of everyday life instead of manufactured in the mind of some 
philosopher. In other words, he is skeptical about knowledge of modal propositions common in 
philosophical discourse like “It is possible for there to be a perfect being” and “It is possible for 
zombies to exist” but not about knowledge of modal propositions that are more mundane like “It 
is possible that the furniture in the hall be rearranged” and “It is impossible for there to be liquid 
wine bottles.”58 To distinguish van Inwagen’s view from the more extreme view canvassed in the 
last few paragraphs, I will call his view moderate modal skepticism. 
The difficulty for moderate modal skepticism of course is drawing the distinction 
between those modal propositions for which justification is possible from those for which 
justification is not possible. Van Inwagen writes, 
One way to get an intuitive grasp of what I mean…is to consider the analogy of distance. 
In my view, many of our modal judgments are analogous to judgments of distance made 
by eye. That is, they are analogous to judgments of the sort that we make when—just on 
the basis of how things look to us—we say things like, “That mountain is about thirty 
miles away” or “It’s about three hundred yards from that tall pine to the foot of the cliff.” 
Such judgments are not, of course, infallible, but in a wide range of circumstances they 
can be pretty accurate. There are, however, circumstances—circumstances remote from 
the practical business of everyday life—in which they are not accurate at all….[W]e are 
able to discern the modal status of some propositions in a way that, like our intuitive 
judgment of distance, is “non-inferential.59 
 
For van Inwagen, the modal propositions that cannot be known are “remote from the practical 
business of everyday life,” but this does not give us much to go on. If this just means “those that 
have no impact on the way we live our lives,” then van Inwagen does not get the result he needs, 
 
58 “Modal Epistemology,” 67. 
59 “Modal Epistemology,” 69-70. 
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since one of the propositions that is supposed to be unknowable is that the existence of a perfect 
being is possible. But clearly such a belief has a great deal of impact on the lives of those who 
believe in God. So, if the distinction is to be drawn in this way, then the possible existence of a 
perfect being turns out to be knowable after all since it is certainly a belief that has an impact on 
the way believers live their lives. Unfortunately, van Inwagen does not give us much more to go 
on to determine how the distinction is to be drawn. 
 Fortunately, Peter Hawke has taken up van Inwagen’s banner and provided something 
that looks more like a sharp line between justified and unjustified modal beliefs. According to 
Hawke, the modal beliefs that are justified—the “basic modal beliefs”—are those that follow 
from two principles: the actuality principle and the similarity principle.60 The actuality principle 
is the intuitively obvious principle that if P is true, then P is possible. The similarity principle is: 
“If two things (situations, objects) are similar in some respects, then the possibilities (relevant to 
the similarities) concerning those things are likely to be the same.”61 According to Hawke, then, 
our basic modal beliefs are those that are justified either by direct appeal to actual experience or 
by analogy with actual experience. In this sense, the basic modal beliefs are close to the 
“practical business of everyday life.”62 
If van Inwagen/Hawke-style moderate modal skepticism is true, then the integration 
challenge is not completely dissolved, but it may count as a satisfactory answer to the integration 
challenge, depending on what we expect a metaphysical theory of modality to explain. 
 
60 “Van Inwagen’s Modal Skepticism,” 360. I use “follow from” rather loosely here. Both Hawke and van Inwagen 
accept an account of Modal Epistemology inspired by Stephen Yablo’s “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?” 
according to which some specific imaginative procedures have justificatory force for possibility claims. The details 
of this theory are interesting, but not relevant here. 
61 “Van Inwagen’s Modal Skepticism,” 360. 
62 Curiously, Hawke’s two principles only justify beliefs concerning possibility, not beliefs concerning necessity. 
Does moderate modal skepticism imply that no beliefs of necessary truths are justified? 
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Obviously, moderate modal skepticism does not really deny the epistemic assumption in its 
fullest generality, since it holds that some of our modal beliefs are true and justified. It just turns 
out that there are fewer of them than we might have pre-theoretically expected. On the one hand, 
if our reason for taking the integration challenge seriously in the first place is a concern over the 
status of modal propositions typically made by philosophers, perhaps those dealing with the 
possibility of zombies or the necessity of a perfect being, then we might accept moderate modal 
skepticism as a dissolution to the integration challenge. It dissolves the challenge for the 
propositions that we care about without the implausible result that we have no modal knowledge 
at all. On the other hand, if our reason for taking the integration challenge seriously is that we are 
concerned to discover a complete metaphysical account of modality in general, then moderate 
modal skepticism is not a dissolution to the integration challenge. For my part, I am interested in 
the integration challenge in its fullest generality. It may turn out to be a pipe dream to expect to 
find a completely general account for modality, but that remains to be seen. 
 Still, moderate modal skepticism may be a step in the right direction, since it at least has 
the potential to ameliorate the integration challenge even if it cannot completely resolve it. The 
problem, though, is that it is very hard to see how even to do the business of philosophy without 
a great many modal claims. Perhaps we can save knowledge of validity so that at least some of 
the business of philosophy can proceed, but what, for example, is the status of thought 
experiments if moderate modal skepticism is true? What can a thought experiment show us if 
there are doubts about whether or not what the scenario depicts is even possible? Even someone 
as hostile toward modality as Quine did not completely avoid modal language in his philosophy. 
A quick perusal of Quine’s Word and Object reveals a great many uses of modally-loaded 
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language: at one point Quine states his famous thesis of the indeterminacy of translation thusly, 
“manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all 
compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another” (italics 
added for emphasis).63 Quine probably has an explanation for this, but this just shows how 
deeply entrenched modal language is in philosophical as well as in everyday discourse. 
Therefore, I claim that it is just as offensive to philosophical sense to deny modal knowledge in 
philosophical contexts, as it is offensive to common sense to deny it in common contexts. 
Therefore, moderate modal skepticism is implausible. 
2.3 Modal Expressivism: Denying Both the Semantic and Epistemic Assumptions 
 
I come now to the response that denies both of the two assumptions of the integration 
challenge on the grounds either that there are no true modal propositions or beliefs (i.e., they are 
all literally false) or that modal propositions and beliefs are not the sorts of things that can even 
be evaluated as either true or false (i.e., they are not truth-apt). The former strategy is nonexistent 
in the literature on modality although such a strategy has been suggested as solutions for 
integration challenges in other domains of investigation, most notably Hartry Field’s 
instrumentalist account of mathematics.64 The latter strategy, however, has enjoyed a 
distinguished career in the philosophy of modality. According to this direction of thinking, the 
integration challenge is mistaken at its very foundation because it assumes that modal 
propositions are truth apt—subject to evaluation as either true or false—when they are not. For 
views in this family, instead of describing some fact, modal language only expresses something 
 
63 Word and Object, 27. 
64 In Realism, Mathematics, and Modality. 
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about the person who uses it. Therefore, I will call this view modal expressivism, although it has 
sometimes gone by the names non-factualism and non-cognitivism. 
One immediate problem for modal expressivism presents itself. If modal propositions are 
not evaluable as either true of false, what are we to make of obviously valid arguments with 
modal content? For example, the argument “Necessarily, P; therefore, P” seems to be fairly 
obviously valid, but this makes no clear sense if the premise is not even the sort of thing that can 
be evaluated as either true or false. We should remember also that validity itself is plausibly a 
modal concept, so if modal expressivism is right, then it seems that claims about the validity of 
arguments cannot be evaluated as either true or false. One must wonder, then, what the status of 
modal logic, as well as logic in general, is going to be if modal expressivism is right. This seems 
to me to be a serious issue, and I have not seen an advocate of modal expressivism address it 
directly. However, let us put this issue aside for now and look more directly at the expressivist 
complaint against the semantic and epistemic assumptions of the integration challenge. 
Modal expressivism can be roughly divided into two major camps. One camp thinks that 
modality is an expression of certain belief states and the other camp thinks that modality is an 
expression of certain rules of language. The former could be called projectivism, since it 
suggests roughly that modal belief is nothing more than projections of our own beliefs or belief-
forming processes onto the world. The latter Amie Thomasson has recently65 given the name 
normativism since it suggests roughly that modal language is nothing more than expressions of 
the norms of language use. Let me briefly describe each of these views before looking at a 
specific argument against modal truth. 
 
65 In “Norms and Necessity.” 
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Modal normativism has several supporters, including Robert Brandom66 and Amie 
Thomasson.67 The main motivation for the theory seems to be to maintain the spirit of 
conventionalism but purge it of some of its major problems. We have already encountered 
conventionalism in chapter one. I noted there that a major problem for conventionalism is that 
the conventions of language are obviously contingent, so conventions do not seem like the kind 
of thing that can be the truth conditions for necessary truths. So a proposition like “all bachelors 
are unmarried” seems to come out to be contingent rather than necessary. It may be true that the 
conventions of language dictate that “all bachelors are unmarried” turns out to be necessary, but 
the conventions themselves are not necessary—we could have picked other conventions. 
As I see it, theorists who are attracted to the basic thrust of conventionalism but who are 
also impressed with the objection to the classical conventionalist view basically split into two 
camps as a reaction to the objection. The classical conventionalist view held the following two 
claims: (1) modal propositions are factual propositions, and so can be evaluated as either true or 
false, and (2) the truth or falsity of a modal proposition is determined by the conventional rules 
of language use. Some have preferred to deny both (1) and (2), but still maintain that language is 
important to understanding what modality is all about, and other theorists have preferred to 
maintain (1), but deny (2). The former strand is normativism, and the latter strand is a view that 
we will consider in the next chapter that Ted Sider has recently called Humeanism.68 The 
normativists hold that modal sentences are neither true nor false. They are expressions of the 
norms of language use. Humeans hold that modal sentences have truth-values but that their truth-
 
66 In Between Saying and Doing: Toward an Analytic Pragmatism. 
67 In “Norms and Necessity.” 
68 In Writing the Book of the World. 
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values are not determined by the conventions of language; their modal status is determined by 
the conventions of language. 
The other expressivist view is projectivism. Modal projectivism is not a very common 
view in the literature on modality. Simon Blackburn has almost single-handedly promoted its 
cause. According to Blackburn, modal beliefs are projections of our own inner states, our 
“habits, dispositions, [and] attitudes,”69 onto the world. This view is obviously inspired by 
Hume’s dictum that causal or nomological necessity is nothing more than our natural tendency to 
project our own customs and habits onto the world. For Blackburn, it seems that these customs 
and habits are also responsible for other modalities as well. 
I have already considered in a sketchy way a similar approach to modality in the 
discussion of modal skepticism above. I suggested that by considering an extension of Hume’s 
view according to which all modal beliefs, and not just nomological beliefs, are a result of 
“spreading oneself onto the world,” we can see that modal skepticism is an implausible theory, 
but what I did not consider there is whether extending Hume’s custom-and-habit theory of 
nomological necessity to other kinds of modality might be taken to be a complete theory of 
modality in its own right rather than as a motivation for modal skepticism. This seems to be what 
Blackburn has in mind: modal language merely expresses one’s habits and dispositions, it does 
not describe any fact; it is therefore, not evaluable as either true or false. 
But this is not exactly Blackburn’s view. Blackburn does think that modal propositions 
are evaluable as either true or false: “Their truth corresponds to correctness in [the habits, 
dispositions, and attitudes they express] by whichever standards they have to meet.”70 This is a 
 
69 “Morals and Modals,” 55. 
70 “Morals and Modals,” 55. 
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second stage of Blackburn’s view, which he calls quasi-realism. Quasi-realism attempts to 
explain how modal (and other) propositions become the bearers of truth-values, the objects of 
knowledge, etc. even though they do not describe any facts. While quasi-realism is interesting in 
its own right, only the first stage of Blackburn’s view is relevant for my purposes, since it is 
critical of the approach to modality that leads us to the integration challenge. If projectivist 
expressivism is correct, then the integration challenge is dissolved whether or not the details of 
quasi-realism can be worked out. Therefore, I will focus on the projectivist component of 
Blackburn’s view and ignore the quasi-realist component.  
What are the arguments in favor of expressivism? There are a few different ones,71 but I 
want to focus on the one I take to be the most direct and powerful. It has become known as 
Blackburn’s dilemma. According to Blackburn, the usual ways of thinking about modality 
succumb to a dilemma as follows. Suppose that a modal theory provides an explanation, Q, for a 
necessary truth, P. Now either Q will itself be a necessary truth, or it will not be a necessary 
truth. On the one hand, if Q is a necessary truth, then the explanation seems adequate, since a 
necessary truth can follow from a necessary truth, but in this case Q would not actually explain 
the necessity of P, since the necessity remains. On the other hand, if Q is not a necessary truth, 
then it seems that P is not really necessary after all, since it is fully accounted for by a contingent 
truth.72 
 This dilemma suggests that the usual approach to the metaphysics of modality, which 
Blackburn calls the truth-conditions approach, is misguided. According to the truth-conditions 
approach, modal propositions are either true or false, and metaphysicians do their business by 
 
71 Brandom presents a very complicated one in Between Saying and Doing: Toward and Analytic Pragmatism. 
72 “Morals and Modals” 53. 
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searching around for what makes them true or false. But this procedure leads inexorably into the 
dilemma. If the truth conditions are themselves modally loaded, so to speak, then they do not 
help us understand modality, and if they are not modally loaded, then modality is actually 
undermined, not explained. 
The expressivist solution to Blackburn’s dilemma is to go between the horns. 
Expressivists give up on the truth-conditions approach and reinterpret modal language in a way 
that makes it clear that no assertion of a fact is actually being made. If Blackburn is right, then it 
looks like the truth-conditions approach to modality is misguided, and it should be clear that the 
integration challenge is based on the truth-conditions approach to modality. If modal sentences 
are not truth apt, then there is no sense in asking about the truth conditions for them. 
 What can be said in response to Blackburn’s dilemma? First we should notice that not all 
explanations with modal content in the explanandum and no modal content in the explanans are 
objectionable. Consider the following explanations. 
It is not necessary that 2 + 2 = 5 because it is false that 2 + 2 = 5. 
It is possible that 2 + 2 = 4 because it is true that 2 + 2 = 4. 
These seem like perfectly adequate explanations, and there is no modal content in the explanans 
of either one. But this seems too easy. Still, it suggests something important: if P is false, then 
cP is automatically false, and if P is true, then àP is automatically true. Obviously, a truth 
condition for cP can only exist if there is also a truth condition for P, and no further truth 
condition is required for àP when P is true. 
 I want to suggest that there is something wrong with the way that Blackburn has stated 
the dilemma. He asks for the truth conditions for cP, but this is not really the question that 
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metaphysicians of modality are looking for, or at least it is not what they should be looking for. 
Rather the metaphysics of modality is, or should be, focused on these two questions: (1) given 
that P is true, what accounts for the necessity of P, and (2) given that P is false, what accounts for 
the possibility of P? There is no real question about the truth conditions for the necessity of false 
propositions because there are none, and there is no real question about the truth conditions for 
the possibility of true propositions because these are just the truth conditions of P itself. So, what 
we should be after in a metaphysical theory of modality is an explanation for what accounts for 
some truths being necessary and for some falsehood being possible. 
 With this in mind, let us restate Blackburn’s dilemma. The truth-conditions approach 
does not ask for the truth conditions of cP; it asks for the truth conditions for cP given that P. 
Borrowing from probability theory, let us express “cP given that P” as (cP | P). So, the truth-
conditions approach asks for an explanation for (cP | P). Consider what happens to Blackburn’s 
dilemma now when we look at a particular example. Let us take an easy and familiar example 
from mathematics: “7 + 5 =12.” Suppose that we have a plausible story about the truth condition 
for this proposition so that the metaphysicians of mathematics are satisfied. Still the 
metaphysicians of modality might not be satisfied; they might agree that we have established the 
truth condition for the mathematical proposition, but they might still be puzzled about the 
necessity of the proposition. They might still want to know what accounts for the necessity of “7 
+ 5 = 12” even after we have established what accounts for its truth. In other words, they want to 
know the truth condition for (c7 + 5 = 12 | 7 + 5 = 12). How can we try to answer them? 
One answer seems to jump right out; the metaphysicians of modality are just being 
obstinate. The truth condition for c7 + 5 = 12 is just the very same truth condition for 7 + 5 = 
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12. In symbols: (c7 + 5 = 12 | 7 + 5 = 12) because 7 + 5 = 12. Whatever it is that makes 7 + 5 = 
12 true is the same thing that makes it necessary. But this will not do. The problem is that the 
form of this explanation—(cP | P) because P—will clearly not hold in general. So, the 
explanation offered here has not yet explained what is special about the mathematical case such 
that an explanation of this form holds in general. It seems that the proposition is true because it is 
a certain kind of proposition: it is a mathematical proposition, and all mathematical propositions 
are necessary. As a first stab at a solution to the problem, then, we might put the explanation this 
way: (c7 + 5 = 12 | 7 + 5 = 12) because “7 + 5 = 12” is a mathematical truth, and all 
mathematical truths are necessary. If this is an adequate explanation, then what accounts for the 
necessity here is a fact about the proposition (or the state-of-affairs, or the fact, or what-have-
you) itself—that it has a certain property—it is mathematical. This establishes a general truth 
condition for cP: cP is true if and only if P is true and P has a necessity-making property. 
What the metaphysician of modality is after is a description of this necessity-making property. 
 What about the truth conditions for the possibilities of false contingencies? We need a 
new example: “The number of planets is 12.” This is false, but it seems that it could have been 
true and not just because we could redefine “planet” (yet again). It is possible because the world 
could have been such that there are 12 planets in our solar system. Blackburn would say the 
explanation must take the form “àP because Q,” but actually, if we are more careful, we should 
say that the explanation should take the form “(àP | ~P) because Q,” where Q gives the 
explanation for the possibility of P given the falsity of P. So to use our example, the question is: 
given that it is false that there are 12 planets in our solar system, what explains its possibility? 
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The answer is that we determine whether the truth condition for P has a certain possibility-
making property. If it has that property, then P is possible. 
The problem now is that when we ask whether the truth condition for P has a certain 
property we are asking once again for a truth condition: we are asking for the truth conditions for 
FQ, where F is the necessity-making property (or possibility-making property if we take 
possibility as the more primitive of the two), and Q is the truth condition for P. If we restate 
Blackburn’s complaint with this new understanding of what sort of explanation the truth 
conditions approach is looking for, then we get something like this 
(cP | P) because FQ  and  (àP | ~P) because ~FQ 
Now the question is: does Blackburn’s dilemma occur all over again? It looks like the 
explanandum has modal content and the explanans does not, so would an explanation in this 
form undermine modality? I think not. Consider the answer given by conventionalism: (cP | P) 
because P is analytically true, and all analytically true propositions are necessary. For this theory, 
the necessity making property is analyticity; the truth of the proposition is established by the 
definition of the terms it contains, and then one appeals to the theory that all such propositions 
are necessary. In other words, P is true because it is analytically true, and it is necessary because 
necessity is a property of all analytically true propositions. For another example, consider the 
answer given by a certain kind of modal conceptualist: (àP | ~P) because P is conceivable, and 
all conceivable propositions are possible. Here conceivability is the possibility-making property. 
Therefore, Blackburn’s Dilemma does not show that the truth-conditions approach to 
modality is hopeless. The truth-conditions approach is not undermined by such expressivist 
scruples. This of course does not mean that modal expressivism is not a viable option. But if 
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modal expressivism is chiefly motivated by a criticism of the truth-conditions approach, along 
the lines of Blackburn’s dilemma, then it is simply not well motivated. For expressivist scruples 
do not do as much damage to the truth-conditions approach to modality as they initially appear. 
We are, as yet, given no reason to abandon the truth-conditions approach in favor of 
expressivism. 
2.4 Conclusion: Taking the Integration Challenge Seriously 
 
 One of the main goals of this chapter has been to try to motivate the idea that the 
integration challenge for modality is a genuine problem that should be taken seriously by all 
metaphysicians of modality. I have considered some powerful reasons to abandon it from 
Quinean eliminativism to modal skepticism to Blackburn’s dilemma. In each case, I hope that I 
have given enough reason to doubt that those strategies are plausible. Of course, many 
philosophers have accepted these views for a variety of reasons, so what I have offered in this 
chapter should be construed merely as suggestive of ways to respond to these views. I hope, 
however, that the comments in this chapter have helped to make the integration challenge seem 
like a serious problem, worthy of attempting to resolve.
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3 Resolutions to the Integration Challenge 
 
In this chapter I survey popular metaphysical theories of modality that potentially can 
satisfy the constraints, while maintaining the assumptions, of the integration challenge. The 
discussion up to this point has been almost entirely negative. I have tried to show both that the 
integration challenge is a serious challenge (chapter one) and that it cannot plausibly be 
dissolved (chapter two). This chapter will survey the landscape of theories of modality looking 
for those that have the potential to resolve the integration challenge. The goal will be to cull the 
theories that are implausible—from the perspective of the integration challenge—from the more 
plausible ones. In the next chapter, I will take the lessons learned from this chapter and begin to 
further develop what I take to be the most plausible metaphysical theory of modality that 
resolves the integration challenge. 
I argued in chapter one that to avoid the integration challenge we must give equal weight 
and concern to both semantics and epistemology in our metaphysics. However, one cannot do 
everything all at once, so I will have to work back and forth between the semantic constraint and 
the epistemic constraint as I examine the resolution strategies in this chapter. I must be careful 
with this, of course, because, as I also argued in chapter one, metaphysical theories of modality 
that start from semantic concerns tend to be realist theories that minimize epistemological 
concerns, and theories that start from epistemological concerns tend to be idealist theories that 
minimize semantic concerns. Therefore, I must start from either a semantic point of view or an 
epistemological point of view, while remaining cognizant of the dangers of letting that point of 
view bear too much of the metaphysical load. But before I turn to those theories, a few words are 
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in order about what exactly I will be looking for in these theories vis-à-vis the constraints of the 
integration challenge and how I will go about looking for it. 
3.1 Satisfying the Constraints 
 
First, let us remember the constraint of the integration challenge as they apply to 
modality. 
Semantic Constraint for Modality: A metaphysical theory of modality must provide an 
account of modal truth such that the truth conditions for modal propositions are also 
applicable to some non-modal propositions. 
 
Epistemic Constraint for Modality: A metaphysical theory of modality must provide an 
account of modal truth such that there are reasons to believe that the truth conditions for 
modal propositions are satisfied in at least some cases. 
 
How will we go about seeking a theory that simultaneously satisfies both of these constraints? 
For the semantic constraint, the answer is fairly straightforward; every metaphysical theory has a 
semantic adjunct to tell us what the truth conditions are. So, we will simply look at that adjoining 
semantic theory and apply the semantic constraint to it. 
 Unfortunately, the epistemic constraint is not so easy. As I suggested in my response to 
Blackburn’s dilemma in the last chapter, the two crucial questions of modality are: (1) Given that 
P is true, what accounts for the truth of ¨P, and (2) Given that P is false, what accounts for the 
truth of àP? Obviously no false propositions are necessary, so there is no sense in asking about 
their necessity; and obviously all true propositions are automatically possible, so there is no 
sense in asking about their possibility. We want to focus our attention on false contingencies—
propositions that are false but still possible, and on necessities, which obviously must be true. 
Therefore, as we consider the epistemic constraint, we need to ensure that we are focusing our 
attention in the right place. So, let us suppose that we already have a reason to believe that the 
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possibility propositions in question are false, and the necessity propositions in question are true. 
In other words, let us not ask simply, “How are we justified in believing that P is possible or that 
P is necessary?” Instead we should ask, “Given that we are already (somehow) justified in 
believing that P is false, how are we justified in believing that P is possible?” and “Given that we 
are already (somehow) justified in believing that P is true, how are we justified in believing that 
P is necessary?” In what follows, I will take it for granted that we already have a reason to 
believe the truth or falsity of the propositions in question; modal epistemology asks what, if any, 
are the additional reasons we have to believe that some of the false propositions are possible and 
some of the true propositions are necessary. 
 We must remember also that the epistemic constraint does not require a metaphysical 
theory of modality to provide a complete epistemology; it only requires that the purported truth 
conditions of a metaphysical theory are the sort of truth conditions that we can have reasons to 
believe have been satisfied. If we focus on possibility, the challenge that the epistemic constraint 
puts to a modal metaphysician can be stated like this: “We will grant that we are justified in 
believing that some propositions are false, and we will grant that some of these propositions are 
in fact possible. Now tell us what reasons we have to believe that the truth conditions you 
provide for these false-but-possible propositions are in fact satisfied?” And when we focus on 
necessity, the challenge can be stated this way: “We will grant that we are justified in believing 
that some propositions are true, and we will grant that some of these propositions are in fact 
necessary. Now tell us what reasons we have to believe that the truth conditions you provide for 
these true-and-necessary propositions are in fact satisfied?” 
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Now that we know what we are after, it will prove convenient to divide the resolution 
theories into two separate camps, the modal realists and the modal idealists. However, the term 
“modal realism” is somewhat ambiguous, so let me be clear about how I am using the term. 
“Modal realism” is sometimes used in a fairly broad sense to refer to any view that opposes 
modal expressivism (or modal non-cognitivism), which I considered in chapter two. Modal 
realism, in this sense, is simply the view that there are modal facts—that modal propositions are 
evaluable as either true or false—that they are something more than mere expressions of our own 
desires, or of the rules of language use, or some other such thing. But “modal realism” is also 
used in a narrower sense to refer to the family of views that hold that not only are there modal 
facts, but also that the relevant facts are mind-independent—they are not facts about minds. I 
will use “modal idealism” to refer to the family of views that maintain that there are modal facts, 
but that the relevant facts are mind-dependent—they are facts about minds. Both modal idealism 
and modal realism in the narrow sense are modal realist views in the more broad sense, since 
they both hold that there are modal facts. Where the modal realists (in the narrow sense) and the 
modal idealists disagree is on the nature of those facts: the modal realists say that they are mind-
independent, and the modal idealists say that they are mind-dependent. This is the divide that I 
will be considering in this chapter. As we have already seen, idealists tend to lean heavily on 
epistemological concerns at the expense of semantics, while realists tend to do the opposite. To 
solve the integration challenge, we need to equalize the theoretical weight on both pillars. So, I 
will be on the lookout for theories with the potential to do this.  
3.2 Modal Idealism 
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I begin with modal idealism. According to modal idealism, the truth conditions for modal 
propositions are entirely mind-dependent: the truth of modal propositions is determined entirely 
by minds. A colorful way to put modal idealism is that if there were no minds in the world, there 
would be no modality in the world either: without minds there would just be the way things are; 
there would not be the way things could be or the way things must be. Modal reality is part of 
mental reality. 
I already briefly considered one idealist account in chapter one—the classical 
conventionalist theory, which few or none accept anymore. In this section, I want to examine 
some of the more plausible idealist views. There are three major strands of modal idealistic 
thought that I will consider: the first is a view sometimes called conceptualism; the second is a 
view that Ted Sider has recently named Humeanism;73 and the third is a view I will call 
Leibnizianism after its main proponent. All of these views suggest that the truth conditions for 
modal propositions are mind-dependent. The difference between these views can be captured by 
considering which minds each finds relevant to the determination of modal truth. For 
conceptualists, all minds (considered collectively), or as Nicholas Rescher put it, “mind-in-
general,”74 determines modal truth; for Humeans, any group of minds at all can agree to 
determine modal truth in their own way; and for Leibnizians, there is only one relevant mind—
the mind of God. 
3.2.1 Conceptualism 
 
It is important at the outset to distinguish conceptualism from other theories with which it 
might be confused. In particular, there are many epistemological theories of modality that 
 
73 Writing the Book of the World, 268. 
74 “The Ontology of the Possible,” 171. 
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suggest that conceiving of a proposition implies, or is evidence for, or otherwise acts as a guide, 
to its possibility.75 But modal conceptualism is a metaphysical theory rather than an 
epistemological theory. According to modal conceptualism, conceiving of propositions indeed 
guides our understanding of modal matters, but this is because possibility just is conceiving. 
Modal conceptualism holds that àP is made true by our conceiving of P. 
According to modal conceptualism, when one manages to conceive of a proposition, that 
proposition is a fortiori possible. But there is a problem; surely there are more possibilities than 
have been conceived in the history of the world. Perhaps conceiving of a proposition is a 
sufficient condition for its possibility, but it is clearly not a necessary condition of its possibility. 
So, conceiving cannot fully constitute possibility. Modal conceptualism’s answer to this problem 
is that it is not the actual conceiving of a proposition that accounts for its possibility. Rather it is 
its conceivability, fact that the proposition could be conceived. Hence, the semantics required for 
conceptualism is something like: 
“Possibly P” is true iff P is conceivable 
“Necessarily P” is true iff not-P is not conceivable. 
It is possible that talking donkeys exist because it is conceivable that they do, and it is necessary 
that nothing is both round and square because it in not conceivable that anything could share 
those properties. We will return to this semantic theory in a moment, because, of course, this is 
where this idealist theory is going to struggle to satisfy the semantic constraint. For now, let us 
consider the epistemology of conceptualism. 
 
75 See for examples, Yablo, “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?” and Chalmers, “Does Conceivability Entail 
Possibility?” 
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 If conceptualism is correct, then modal epistemology may seem like an extremely 
straightforward matter. What we manage to conceive is automatically possible. So, obviously we 
have a reason to think that the truth conditions established by conceptualism for modal 
propositions have been satisfied. There can be no clearer evidence of a proposition’s 
conceivability than the actual conceiving of it. If we have managed to conceive of a proposition, 
then it is conceivable, and therefore possible according to modal conceptualism.76 But things are 
not as straightforward as all that, for what exactly does it take to conceive of a proposition? Does 
one have to imagine witnessing the evidence for the truth of the proposition? Does one have to 
engage in conceptual analysis? Moreover, why should we accept that a report of having 
conceived of a proposition actually counts as a conceiving of that proposition? These are good 
questions, and fortunately we do not have to settle them here. Remember that the epistemic 
constraint does not require that a metaphysical theory of modality present a complete modal 
epistemology; the theory need only imply that we have some plausible reason to think that the 
truth conditions it offers for at least some modal propositions have been satisfied. Conceiving 
can be understood in a variety of ways that could potentially satisfy this requirement; imagining 
and conceptual analysis are just two. If we manage to actually conceive of a proposition, 
whatever that might mean, then that provides a reason to believe that that proposition is possible 
because actually conceiving if clear evidence of conceivability. Therefore, it looks like 
conceptualism will have little trouble satisfying the epistemic constraint. 
 
76 Accounting for justified beliefs concerning necessity, however, is a little trickier. It will not do simply to say that 
when we fail to conceive of a proposition, we are thereby justified in believing that the negation of that proposition 
is necessary. Perhaps we have just not thought it through enough; or perhaps we are just not clever enough to 
conceive of the proposition. Someone cleverer or more attentive might have better luck. 
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Now let us go back to the semantics of conceptualism. The main semantic problem with 
conceptualism is that conceivability is modally loaded, so to speak. It indicates an ability that 
may or may not actually be being used at any particular time by any particular person.77 
Whatever conceivability ultimately amounts to, the conceivability of a proposition is not 
determined by any particular person’s actual conceiving; it is determined by the possibility of 
some particular person’s actually conceiving of it. But this just sends us around in a circle: 
possibility is definitionally prior to conceivability but also metaphysically identical to it. The 
semantic theory, then, (partially) reduces to: 
“Possibly P” is true iff P can be conceived. 
“Necessarily P” is true iff not-P cannot be conceived. 
Since there are modal concepts on both sides, this is a circular semantic theory, and a circular 
semantic theory has no hope against the semantic constraint. The semantic constraint requires 
truth conditions for which there are plausible reasons to believe are genuine conditions of truth. 
A circular semantics cannot provide any reasons to think that the truth conditions result in true 
sentences when satisfied simply because it cannot say what it takes to satisfy the conditions in 
the first place. 
Nicholas Rescher has a response to this objection. He writes, 
But are we not involved in a circle of some kind in saying that possibility resides in 
conceivability, something which in turn requires reference to the possible—to what can 
be conceived? Is not the qualification of possibility in terms of possibilities a 
nonproductive circumambulation? Not really. What we are saying is that the “reality” of 
certain possible states of affairs and things (that is, nonexistent possibilities) resides in the 
reality of possibility-involving processes….We are saying that, when the-possibility-of-
the-thing is its only “reality,” this “reality” inheres in a possibilistic intellectual process. 
 
77 One might suggest that God is conceiving of all possible propositions all the time, but this will not solve the 
epistemic problem for conceptualism, because the epistemic constraint requires a non-special epistemic faculty that 
we finite beings can actually use to justify our modal beliefs. God’s knowledge of modality is not the issue. 
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Here actuality is indeed prior to possibility—the actuality of one category of things, 
namely, minds with their characteristic modes of functioning, underwrites the 
construction of the totality of nonexistent possibles that can be contemplated.78 
 
For Rescher the mental process of conceiving is the source of the “reality” of possibles. And this 
puts the actual existence of minds in its rightful place, metaphysically prior to possibilities. But, 
this does not really solve the semantic problem. There seems to be no way to remove the 
offending modal content from the semantic theory along the lines that Rescher’s remarks seem to 
indicate. Here is an attempt. Perhaps we modify the semantic theory to: 
“Possibly P” is true iff there is a mental process that, when used, results in conceiving 
that P. 
 
“Necessarily P" is true iff there is no mental process that, when used, results in 
conceiving that not-P. 
 
Now there is no obvious modal content on the right-hand side. Still, this will not do. The 
problem now is with that term “when used.” What if some particular process is never actually 
used? Is the proposition that would have been conceived as the result of using that process not 
possible? That seems unlikely. So, the semantic theory, once again, has to be remodeled to say 
something more along the lines of 
“Possibly P” is true iff there is a mental process that can be used to conceive that P. 
 
“Necessarily P" is true iff there is no mental process that can be used to conceive that 
not-P. 
 
And we are stuck in the circle again. It looks like getting out of this circle is hopeless. I therefore, 
conclude that conceptualism is not a plausible resolution of the integration challenge because it 
has no plausible way to satisfy the semantic constraint. 
 
78 “The Ontology of the Possible,” 174. Italics in original. 
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3.2.2 Humeanism 
 
Humeanism is—obviously—another view inspired by Hume. There are many different 
ways that Humeanism has been developed. It is more like a family of theories than one definite 
theory. Sider has expressed it most clearly and directly,79 but Sidelle,80 and Peacocke,81 among 
others, probably accept something very much like it. The commonality among these theories is 
that they agree with the classical conventionalist view that modal truth is determined by facts 
about language. Remember, though, that classical conventionalism has a serious problem. The 
conventionalist says that a proposition is necessary if and only if it is analytically true. In other 
words, when a proposition’s truth is entirely determined by the conventional meanings of the 
terms in the proposition rather than by the state of the world, then that proposition is analytically 
true, and therefore necessary. The main objection that has been directed at this theory is that 
linguistic conventions are themselves contingent. So it appears that conventionalism ultimately 
makes necessary truths into contingent truths. 
The Humeans want to avoid this result but still maintain that the conventions of language 
determine modal truth. How, then, does Humeanism account for the conventional aspect of 
modal truth without falling prey to the argument that the selection of conventions turns necessary 
truths into contingent truths? Sider writes, “To say that a proposition is necessary, according to 
the Humean, is to say that the proposition is i) true; and ii) of a certain sort. A crude Humean 
view, for example, would say that a proposition is necessary iff it is either a logical or a 
 
79 Writing the Book of the World. 
80 In Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism and in “Conventionalism and the 
Contingency of Conventions.” 
81 In “Metaphysical Necessity: Understanding, Truth, and Epistemology,” and in Being Known. 
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mathematical truth.”82 The proposition “2 + 3 = 5,” for example, is necessary according to this 
crude version of Humeanism, but not because the conventions of language dictate that it is true; 
its truth is independent of linguistic conventions. Instead, “2 + 3 = 5” is necessary on this view 
because it is a truth of a mathematical sort, and the conventions dictate that the mathematical 
truths are necessary. In other words, what distinguishes Humeanism from the classical 
conventionalist view is that convention plays no part in determining truth; the conventions 
determine the modality, not the truth, of propositions. It is important to note, however, that 
Humeanism is open to many variations on what dictates our choice of members of the “certain 
sort” of propositions that will count as necessary. Perhaps the choice is merely conventional, but 
maybe the choice reflects something about the way that humans must conceptualize the world. In 
any case, we determine modality through the conventions of language. 
The objection that the linguistic conventions are themselves contingent has no force 
against Humeanism because all that a selection of alternate linguistic conventions can 
accomplish is to change the set of sentences that the members of the linguistic community 
consider to be necessary. No selection of alternate conventions will bring it about that there is a 
married bachelor. All a change in conventions can do is bring it about that we no longer consider 
the truth that all bachelors are unmarried to be a necessary truth. The truth remains untouched by 
convention change, according to Humeanism. Convention change only results in modal change, 
not truth change. 
The epistemology of Humeanism is fairly straightforward. We are justified in believing 
that nothing is a round square because we are familiar with the conventions of our language and 
those conventions dictate that nothing can have these two shapes at once. We are justified in 
 
82 Writing the Book of the World, 269. 
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believing that talking donkeys could exist, because we are familiar with the conventions of our 
language, and those conventions do not rule out talking donkeys. Just like with the classical 
conventionalist view, knowledge of modality turns out to be knowledge of language. So, 
Humeanism fairly obviously satisfies the epistemic constraint. 
How about the semantic constraint? Humeanism is a little bit harder to analyze 
semantically, as its accompanying semantic theory is not an easy one to figure. This is mainly 
because Humeanism comes in so many different varieties. Consider Sider, 
The core idea of the Humean account, then, is that necessary truths are truths of certain 
more or less arbitrarily selected kinds. More carefully: begin with a set of modal axioms 
and a set of modal rules. Modal axioms are simply certain chosen true sentences; modal 
rules are certain chosen truth-preserving relations between sets of sentences and 
sentences. To any chosen modal axioms and rules there corresponds a set of modal 
theorems: the closure of the set of modal axioms under the rules. Any chosen set of 
modal axioms and modal rules, and thus of modal theorems, results in a version of 
Humeanism: to be necessary is to be a modal theorem thus understood.83 
 
So, any set of true sentences can be a set of necessary truths according to Humeanism. The 
choice between sets is arbitrary. Therefore, there is no specific semantic theory to pin on 
Humeanism. Still, Sider’s presentation does suggest a kind of meta-semantic theory for all 
versions of Humeanism: 
“Necessarily P” is true iff P follows from some arbitrarily selected set of axioms 
according to some arbitrarily selected set of rules. 
 
“Possibly P” is true iff not-P does not follow from some arbitrarily selected set of axioms 
according to some arbitrarily selected set of rules. 
 
The specific axioms and rules needed to give a complete semantic theory will be established by 
each specific version of Humeanism. 
 
83 Writing the Book of the World, 271. 
  82 
 If this is an adequate representation of the form of the semantic theory accompanying any 
particular version of Humeanism, then the theory does not satisfy the semantic constraint. Take 
any version of Humeanism, for example the crude version that holds that P is necessary if and 
only if P is either a mathematical or a logical truth. The modal axioms and rules in this case are 
the axioms and rules of logic and mathematics. The modal theorems, then, are just the members 
of the set of sentences that follow from these axioms in accordance with these rules; i.e., the set 
of logical and mathematical truths. The problem, of course, is that arbitrariness is built right in to 
the truth conditions. There cannot be reasons to believe that satisfying these truth conditions 
results in true modal propositions because the truth conditions themselves say that there are no 
reasons to choose the set of axioms and rules it suggests rather than some other set of axioms and 
rules. It seems that the very arbitrariness of Humean truth conditions for modal propositions 
leaves very little hope that any version of Humeanism will satisfy the semantic constraint. The 
semantic constraint requires that the truth conditions be applicable beyond the scope of the 
theory. The problem that the semantic constraint presents for Humeanism is that an arbitrarily 
selected set is, by definition, selected for no reason at all. This is central to the Humean strategy; 
if there were some reason to select one set of axioms or rules over another, then presumably 
those reasons would actually do the work of determining modal distinctions rather than the set of 
axioms and rules. But these truth conditions are not obviously applicable to any non-modal 
propositions. Therefore, Humeanism is not a plausible resolution to the integration challenge 
because it does not satisfy the semantic constraint. 
3.2.3 Leibnizianism 
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We now turn to the final idealists theory, Leibnizianism. According to Leibniz, the truth 
conditions for modal propositions are determined by a single mind—the mind of God. All 
possible worlds exist in the mind of God, and God selects one of these possible worlds to be the 
actual world based on the criterion that the selected world be the best of all the possible worlds.84 
How does this theory fair against the integration challenge? 
One thing to notice about Leibnizianism is that there is a sense in which it is a realist, 
rather than an idealist, view because even though it suggests that modal truth is mind-dependent, 
it is still independent of our minds. For this reason, Leibnizianism is unusual among the idealist 
views because it has very little problem satisfying the semantic constraint. Its troubles are instead 
with the epistemic constraint. 
Leibnizianism satisfies the semantic constraint fairly straightforwardly because it relies 
on the familiar possible world semantics: 
“Possibly P” is true iff P is true in some possible world. 
“Necessarily P” is true iff P is true in all possible worlds. 
As we already seen, any theory that relies on possible world semantics will fairly 
straightforwardly satisfy the semantic constraint. It is fairly clear how there are reasons to 
believe that these truth conditions will result in true sentences, because for those who accept 
possible world semantics, truth just is truth in a world: to be true is just to be true in the actual 
world, which is one among the members of the set of possible worlds. 
So, let us move on to the epistemic constraint. The trouble for Leibnizianism is that “the 
actual world” is an ambiguous term. On the one hand, the actual world is just one among the 
other possible worlds in the mind of God. On the other hand, the actual world is the world 
 
84 Philosophical Texts, 275. 
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selected by God to be the special world that is actualized. The question is: what happens when 
the actual world is selected? Does it remain an idea in the mind of God that just takes on a 
special status, or does it become something else outside of the mind of God? In either case, the 
view has serious epistemic problems. 
First consider the case in which the actual world is simply one among the other possible 
worlds, and God’s choice is nothing more than to pick it out as special without anything really 
happening to it. In this case, Leibnizianism implies that the actual world, and everything in it, 
literally exists as an idea in the mind of God. But if so, then how are we to know that we are in 
the actual world rather than in some merely possible world? On this understanding of 
Leibnizianism, God’s choice of one of these worlds to be the actual world makes no qualitative 
difference to the things (including us) that inhabit these worlds.85 Whether we are in the actual 
world or in one of the other possible worlds is indistinguishable from our perspective. Robert M. 
Adams considers a response that tries to avoid this objection to Leibnizianism by suggesting that 
we might always be immediately acquainted with our own actuality,86 but I must agree with 
David Lewis’s assessment of this argument: the people in all those other possible worlds existing 
in God’s mind have just as much evidence for their own actuality as we do.87 From their point of 
view, they are in the actual world, and from our point of view, we are in the actual world. A 
theory that saves modal knowledge by sacrificing knowledge of actuality is very implausible. 
Suppose instead that a Leibnizian suggests that the idea becomes something else through 
the process of actualization. The most plausible suggestion along these lines would be that the 
 
85 Donald Williams was probably the first to spot this difficulty for Leibniz. He writes, “[Leibniz] never intimates, 
for example, how he can tell that he is a member of the existent world and not a mere possible monad on the shelf of 
essence.” “Dispensing with Existence,” 752. Italics in original. 
86 “Theories of Actuality,” 203. 
87 On the Plurality of Worlds, 93. 
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idea becomes something like a blueprint for an external creation—a world existing outside the 
mind of God based on the idea. In this case, the epistemological problem is that the other 
possible worlds are in the mind of God, and we are not in the mind of God. Presumably, we are 
in the external creation, not in the idea. So, it seems that to be justified in believing anything 
about these other possible worlds, we would have to be justified in believing that some idea is in 
the mind of God. If we are to be justified in believing, say, that it is possible that talking donkeys 
exist, under this interpretation of Leibnizianism, then we need a reason to believe that the idea of 
a talking donkey exists in the mind of God. How can we have a reason to believe that? 
One possible answer might be that our minds are very much like the mind of God to a 
limited extent, and we have some ideas concerning possibilities in our minds. It is not exactly 
clear what it means for an idea to be in a mind for Leibnizians, but if it is possible for God to 
have ideas in His mind, then it seems that it should be possible for humans also to have ideas in 
our minds (whatever that might mean). So suppose that for some epistemic agent, S, there is an 
idea of a talking donkey in S’s mind. A Leibnizian might suggest that the existence of this idea 
in S’s mind counts as evidence that the very same idea exists in the mind of God, because any 
idea we can have must have been an idea that God has already had. The problem with this is that 
it is not at all clear that having an idea is a reason in general to think that an idea is possible, 
much less that it exists in the mind of God. Does S have an idea of a round square? It seems that 
even to be able to reject the possibility of a round square, one would have to have an idea of one. 
So it is plausible to think that the idea of a round square can exist in S’s mind. If so, then having 
an idea in one’s mind is not by itself evidence that the idea is possible, much less that the idea 
exists in the mind of God. If this version of Leibnizianism is going to satisfy the epistemic 
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constraint, much more will have to be said about what it takes for an idea to be in the mind (of 
God and of a person). The explanation will have to make it clear how only possible things are in 
the mind of God, and how ideas can be in our minds in a similar way such that they can count as 
evidence that the same ideas are also in the mind of God. Lacking such an explanation, this 
version of Leibnizianism fails to satisfy the epistemic constraint. 
Hence, Leibnizianism is implausible. On the one hand, if the actual world (including us) 
is literally in the mind of God, then we have no reason to believe that we are in the actual world 
instead of some other possible world. On the other hand, if the actual world is something other 
than an idea of the actual world that exists in the mind of God, then we have no reason to believe 
that any of our ideas are contained in the mind of God, so we have no modal knowledge. In 
either case, Leibnizianism fails to satisfy the epistemic constraint. 
Conceptualism, Humeanism, and Leibnizianism all failed to satisfy one of the constraints 
of the integration challenge. Conceptualism and Humeanism both fail to satisfy the semantic 
constraint, and Leibnizianism fails to satisfy the epistemic constraint. This is not to say, of 
course, that one of these theories could not be worked out to satisfy the constraints. But I hope 
that I have said enough about these theories to support my claim that the prospects for these 
theories in relation to the integration challenge are bleak. Let us, therefore, leave behind the 
idealist theories and turn our attention to realism. 
3.3 Possible World Realism 
 
We have already briefly encountered possible world realism in chapter one. I argued 
there that possible world realism easily satisfies the semantic constraint because possible world 
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semantics does not require special truth conditions for modal sentences. Here, again, is possible 
world semantics: 
“Possibly P” is true if and only if P is true in at least one possible world. 
“Necessarily P” is true if and only if P is true in all possible worlds. 
It is easy to see how these truth conditions apply to non-modal sentences. In fact, possible world 
semantics is often stated with a qualification for the use of the word “actual:” 
 “Actually P” is true if and only if P is true in the actual world. 
This is supposed to make it clear that truth in a possible world is not a special kind of truth 
condition. For a proposition to be actually true is just for it to be true in the actual world. For 
most possible world realists, “actually P” is just a variant way to say P,88 so it will turn out that 
being true is just the same as being true in the actual world.  
The epistemic constraint, however, is another matter entirely. To see what can be said 
about the epistemology of possible worlds, we will need to consider the two different varieties of 
possible world realism: possibilism and actualism. The possibilists and the actualists are divided 
on the question of the relationship between the actual world and the other possible worlds. The 
possibilists believe that the actual world is just one among the many different possible worlds; 
the actualists believe that there is really only one world—the actual world—but that possible 
worlds exist as some sort of abstract objects that are ultimately just part of the actual world. Each 
of these has a different epistemic problem brought out by considering the epistemic constraint. 
3.3.1 Possibilism 
 
 
88 David Lewis is the notable exception here. For Lewis, the word “actual” is an indexical that refers to the world in 
which it is uttered. It is not simply a variant way to say “true.” 
  88 
According to possibilism, possible worlds are worlds just like the actual world. David 
Lewis’s specific version of possibilism, which is by far the most developed, suggests that 
possible worlds are worlds full of talking donkeys and even more fantastical (as well as 
mundane) things, all of which exist in the same sense that you and I and all our surroundings 
exist. For possibilists, there is no difference in kind between the other possible worlds and the 
actual world. The other possible worlds are just spatiotemporally isolated from us; we cannot 
interact with the things in those worlds, but they are no less real because of that. Since this is the 
most full-blooded version of modal realism, I will call it, following John Divers, genuine 
realism.89 
It is the spatiotemporal isolation of the other possible worlds that causes the epistemic 
problem for genuine realism. Since the other possible worlds are spatiotemporally isolated from 
the actual world—the world we inhabit—any epistemic agent in the actual world has no clear 
means of discovering what is happening in these other possible worlds. The epistemic problem 
presented to genuine realism by the epistemic constraint is that there are no reasons to believe 
that the truth conditions established by the theory are ever satisfied. There are no talking donkeys 
in the actual world, but surely there could have been. So, it should turn out that we are justified 
in believing that it is possible that talking donkeys exist. If genuine realism is true, though, the 
truth conditions for “it is possible that talking donkeys exist” involve the goings-on in other 
spatiotemporally isolated possible worlds. How can we tell whether or not there are talking 
donkeys in some other spatiotemporally isolated possible world? It seems that the isolation 
between the other worlds and us prohibits having any such reason. We certainly cannot inspect 
 
89 Sometimes Lewis’s view is called concrete modal realism or extreme modal realism. Lewis himself just called his 
view modal realism, but this does not clearly distinguish it from other realist views. 
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those worlds: as Kripke is fond of putting it, possible worlds cannot be viewed through powerful 
telescopes.90 
If the other possible worlds are similar in kind to the actual world, we should expect that 
the justification conditions for modal beliefs are similar in kind to the justification conditions for 
non-modal beliefs. But our ways of knowing about the actual world involve a great deal of 
perceptual inspection, which is obviously not possible with spatiotemporally isolated possible 
worlds. So, it looks like Lewis will need some kind of special justification conditions for modal 
beliefs. 
Lewis has a response to the epistemic objection. He is concerned mainly with the causal 
construal of the epistemic constraint, which I have shown in chapter one to be inessential to the 
main thrust of the integration challenge, but it is worth considering his response nonetheless. 
Lewis writes, 
I think it is true that causal acquaintance is required for some sorts of knowledge but not 
for others. However, the department of knowledge that requires causal acquaintance is 
not demarcated by its concrete subject matter. It is determined instead by its 
contingency….Our knowledge can be divided into two quite different parts. As best we 
can, I think by seeking a theory that will be systematic and devoid of arbitrariness, we 
arrive at a conception of what there is altogether: the possible worlds, the possible 
individuals that are their parts, and the mathematical objects, even if those should turn out 
to be pure sets not made out of the parts of the world. This conception, to the extent that 
it is true, comprises our modal and mathematical knowledge. But a conception of the 
entire space of possibilities leaves it entirely open where in that space we ourselves are 
situated. To know that, it is necessary to observe ourselves and our surroundings….Our 
contingent knowledge…requires causal acquaintance….Our necessary knowledge…does 
not require causal acquaintance…. It requires no observation of our surroundings, 
because it is no part of our knowledge of which possible world is ours and which possible 
individuals are we.91 
 
 
90 Naming and Necessity, 44. 
91 On the Plurality of Worlds, 111-112. 
  90 
Lewis’s suggestion seems to be this: Our modal (and mathematical) beliefs are justified by a 
process of theory-seeking that is intent on systematicity and devoid of arbitrariness; our non-
modal (and non-mathematical) beliefs are justified by observation. This amounts to a denial of 
the epistemic constraint, which requires that the justification of modal beliefs involve the truth 
conditions for those beliefs. Lewis’s suggested justificatory process does not refer to those truth 
conditions at all. So, we can take Lewis’s response as a potential reason to reject the epistemic 
constraint. If Lewis’s response is successful, then the integration challenge has been misguided 
from the start. Our modal beliefs can be justified independently of a reason to believe that the 
truth conditions for those beliefs have been satisfied. 
The problem with Lewis’s response is that the justification conditions he is suggesting do 
not do the work that he needs them to do. He claims that discovering a theory of modality that 
satisfies certain theoretical virtues is what justifies our modal knowledge. But this is at the wrong 
level of knowledge, so the speak, to meet the integration challenge. Lewis seems to suggest that 
having a reason to believe that a theory of modality is true amounts to having a reason to believe 
that all modal beliefs implied by that theory are true. Fair enough, but genuine realism does not 
imply any particular modal claims. Accepting that there are possible worlds does not imply 
anything like the proposition that there are talking donkeys in some of these possible worlds. 
Essentially, Lewis conflates knowledge of a theory with knowledge of the subject matter of a 
theory. Perhaps genuine realism’s ability to systematize and avoid arbitrariness in the desired 
way (if true) counts as a reason to accept that other possible worlds exist, but it does not count as 
a reason to believe that any of those worlds contain talking donkeys or anything like that. To 
think otherwise is to assume that our modal beliefs are already somehow justified and are 
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included in the data that we wish to systematize with metaphysical theory, which begs the 
question against the integration challenge. Therefore, Lewis’s response does not constitute a 
reason to reject the epistemic constraint, and it seems unlikely that genuine realism has any other 
plausible way to satisfy it. We simply have no reasons for believing anything about the 
happenings in other spatiotemporally isolated possible worlds. 
3.3.2 Actualism 
 
This brings us to the other, more popular, tradition of possible world realism, actualism. 
According to the actualists, there is only one world: the actual world. However, actualists are still 
realists about possible worlds; they hold that possible worlds are some kind of abstract entities. 
So, they are a different kind of thing than the actual world. 
Before we look at the actualist views in detail, however, I think it will be instructive to 
consider what Lewis himself considers to be the realist alternatives to his view. Lewis identifies 
three different realist competitors to his own theory. He calls them ersatz theories of possible 
worlds. According to ersatz versions of possible world realism, there is only one world, the 
actual world. Possible worlds are abstract entities that exist as a part of the actual world. The 
problem with this, though, from Lewis’s point of view, is that the actual world is supposed to be 
among the members of the set of possible worlds. To account for this, ersatzers must show how 
it is that one among these ersatz possible worlds manages to represent (or substitute for) this 
world, while the others merely misrepresent this world. Lewis divides the ersatz theories into 
three categories according to how each explains how a possible world represents (or 
misrepresents) the actual world.  
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The first of Lewis’s ersatz views is what he calls linguistic ersatzism, according to which 
possible worlds are maximally consistent sets of sentences or similar semantic constructions. 
According to Lewis the linguistic ersatzist views treat representation as a function of meaning. A 
maximally consistent set of sentences (or propositions, or states of affairs, etc.) represents a 
world via the meanings of the sentences (or propositions, etc.) in the set: they represent a world 
by describing it.92 The second of Lewis’s ersatz theories is the pictorial theory. According to this 
theory, possible worlds represent a world in the same way that a picture or a statue represents the 
object depicted. They represent the world through isomorphism or resemblance.93 The third 
ersatz view is the magical theory, according to which possible worlds represent in some 
primitive way that cannot be explained by reducing this form of representation to something 
else.94 
For each of these ersatz theories, Lewis complains that it cannot explain representation in 
a satisfactory manner: none of them can explain how it is that one possible world manages to get 
the world right while all the others get the world wrong. The details of his specific complaints 
against each of these different understandings of world representation are not relevant here, but I 
want to point out that no matter which of these different ersatz theories of world representation 
an actualist takes, “the actual world” turns out to be an ambiguous term. It could mean “the one 
and only existing world—everything that exists, considered in totality,” or it could mean “the 
one and only representation, among all the available representations, that manages to get the 
world right.”  
 
92 On the Plurality of Worlds, 142. 
93 On the Plurality of Worlds, 166. 
94 On the Plurality of Worlds, 174. 
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To avoid confusions and to facilitate discussion, I propose a change in terminology. 
Believers in possible worlds are fond of describing possible worlds as “ways the world could 
have been.” Here are two examples, which are by no means atypical. Lewis writes, “I therefore 
believe in the existence of ‘ways things could have been’. I prefer to call them ‘possible 
worlds’.”95 Plantinga writes, “A possible world is a way things could have been—a total way.”96 
Therefore, let us say that the term “way things could have been” captures the idea of the ersatz 
worlds the actualists require. To avoid the long-winded name “way things could have been,” I 
will simply call these “possible ways.” Actualists also believe that among these ways things 
could have been there is one special way things are that represents the actual world. Therefore, I 
will continue to use the term “actual world” to refer to the totality of all that exists, and I will use 
the term “way things are,” or “actual way” to refer to the representation of the actual world—the 
one and only possible way that represents the actual world however that may be understood by 
whatever brand of actualism happens to be under consideration.  
These changes in terminology will, I hope, help to disambiguate the term “actual world.” 
It also has the added advantage of highlighting the actualist idea that possible worlds are not 
really worlds at all in the same sense that the actual world is a world. Why call them “possible 
worlds” if they are not really worlds? So, I should think that this change in terminology would be 
welcome to actualists. 
To recast Lewis’s problem for actualist theories, he is concerned that the relationship 
between the actual way and the actual world cannot be worked out in a satisfactory manner. 
What will distinguish the various versions of actualism is its unique understanding of the 
 
95 “Possible Worlds,” 182. 
96 “Actualism and Possible Worlds,” 254. Italics in original. 
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relationship between the actual world and the actual way. According to John Divers, who has 
given us an impressive and exhaustive study of the literature on possible worlds, there are four 
main families of actualism, each with a different understanding of the relationship between the 
actual world and the actual way: Plantingan realism, book realism, nature realism, and 
combinatorial realism.97 I will consider each of these theories in turn.  
3.3.2.1 Plantingan Realism 
 
According to Plantingan realism, named for its major proponent, Alvin Plantinga, 
possible ways are maximal and possible states of affairs. Some states of affairs obtain, such as 
Quine’s being a distinguished philosopher, and some do not obtain, such as 9’s being a prime 
number. Even those states of affairs that do not obtain still exist, according to Plantinga. These 
non-obtaining-but-still-existing states of affairs account for modal truth. 
To say that a state of affairs, S, is maximal is just to say that, for every state of affairs, R, 
R is either included or precluded from S.98 So the state of affairs, Quine’s being a distinguished 
philosopher, is not maximal since there are many states of affairs that are neither included nor 
precluded from it; for example, 9’s being a prime number. However, Quine’s being a 
distinguished philosopher is possible, since it is included in at least one maximal and possible 
state of affairs, whereas 9’s being a prime number is precluded from all maximal and possible 
states of affairs and is, therefore, impossible. It is, of course, impossible to completely specify a 
complete state of affairs, but that is what a possible world is, according to Plantingan realism. 
For Plantinga, the relationship between the actual way and the actual world is identity. 
They are the same thing: “A possible world, therefore, is a state of affairs, and is hence an 
 
97 Possible Worlds, 172. 
98 “Actualism and Possible Worlds,” 258. 
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abstract object. So…the actual world…is an abstract object.”99 For Plantinga, it seems that the 
actual world just is the one and only possible and maximal state of affairs that obtains. 
The epistemic question for Plantingan realism is: how can we have any reason to believe 
that some non-actual maximal state of affairs exists? Presumably, we are justified in believing 
certain things about the maximal state of affairs that obtains because that is just the actual world, 
and presumably our ordinary justificatory methods provide us with justified beliefs about that. 
The actual world/way does not include the state of affairs some donkey’s talking, but, if 
Plantingan realism is correct, there is a non-obtaining maximal state of affairs that includes it. 
But what reason can we have for believing that there is any such maximal state of affairs? 
Maximal-ness seems to block having any such reason. In order to have a reason to believe that it 
is possible for talking donkeys to exist, we need some reason to believe that there is some non-
obtaining maximal state of affairs consisting in some donkey’s talking. However we might cash 
out this requirement, the need to have a reason to believe that the state of affairs is maximal 
seems to rule out ever being able to actually have such a reason. In order to have a reason to 
believe that Plantinga’s truth conditions are satisfied, one needs to have a reason to believe that 
some non-actual maximal state of affairs exists, and any reason we might have to believe that 
some state of affairs exists, that state of affairs cannot help but come short of being maximal. We 
simply cannot think a whole world all at once. 
But perhaps this is too quick. Maybe Plantinga can say that all we need is a reason to 
believe that the state of affairs itself exists in order to be justified in believing that it is possible. 
Forget about maximal-ness: a state of affairs can only exist as part of a maximal state of affairs, 
but that does not mean that we have to know which one it is a part of in order to know that it 
 
99 “Actualism and Possible Worlds,” 258. 
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exists. Instead, all we might need is a reason to believe that it exists (as part of some maximal 
state of affairs). After all, in order to be possible, a state of affairs need only exist. 
Unfortunately, this does not really seem much better for Plantingan realism. What 
reasons could we have to believe that some state of affairs exists if it does not obtain. Whatever 
reasons to believe we have for our contingent beliefs concerning the actual world/way will be of 
no obvious help, since they only justify our beliefs concerning which states of affairs obtain 
rather than which states of affairs exist but do not obtain? In other words, these familiar 
justificatory methods can only help us distinguish the obtaining states of affairs from the non-
obtaining states of affairs. What we need for modal epistemology is some reasons to distinguish 
the existent states of affairs from the non-existent. It is hard to see what those reasons could be. 
3.3.2.2 Book Realism 
 
Probably the most popular actualist theory of all is book realism. According to book 
realism, espoused by Carnap,100 Jeffrey,101 Adams,102 and others, the actual way is a set of 
sentences or propositions that is both consistent and complete.103 The actual way is the one and 
only complete and consistent set of sentences (or propositions, or statements, etc.) that accurately 
describes the actual world; the non-actual possible ways are all consistent and complete 
descriptions that fail to accurately describe the actual world. Consequently, the relationship 
between the actual way and the actual world, according to book realism, is the relationship 
between description and thing described. The actual way correctly describes the actual world and 
the other possible ways incorrectly describe it. 
 
100 In Meaning and Necessity. 
101 In The Logic of Decision. 
102 In “Theories of Actuality.” 
103 Terminology varies widely among book realists. In Carnap’s terminology, possible ways are state descriptions; in 
Jeffrey’s terminology, they are complete consistent novels; and in Adams’s terminology, they are world-stories.  
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Now let us consider book realisms chances against the epistemic constraint. According to 
book realism, P is possible if and only if there is at least one complete and consistent description 
of the actual world according to which P is true. So, to use the talking donkey example, book 
realism satisfies the epistemic constraint only if there is a reason to believe that a talking donkey 
exists in at least one complete and consistent description of the actual world. How could we have 
such a reason? 
One answer immediately presents itself. We could just actually supply the needed 
description. The problem of course is that any actual description will not be complete, as 
complete descriptions are quite beyond human abilities to express. But this suggests a 
modification to the strategy. Perhaps providing a partial description will be enough to satisfy the 
epistemic constraint. As Kripke writes, 
A possible world isn’t a distant country that we are coming across, or viewing through a 
telescope. Generally speaking, another possible world is too far away. Even if we travel 
faster than light, we won’t get to it. A possible world is given by the descriptive condition 
we associate with it. What do we mean when we say, “In some possible world I would 
not have given this lecture today?” We just imagine the situation where I didn’t decide to 
give this lecture or decided to give it on some other day. Of course, we don’t imagine 
everything that is true or false, but only those things relevant to my giving the lecture; 
but, in theory, everything needs to be decided to make a total description of the world. 
We can’t really imagine that except in part; that, then, is a “possible world’….Possible 
worlds are stipulated, not discovered by powerful telescopes.104 
 
Kripke is not keeping modal semantics and modal epistemology clearly separated here,105 so it is 
not entirely clear what he is getting at. Part of the main idea, however, seems to be that we are 
justified in our beliefs concerning possibilities to the extent that we can stipulate a partial 
 
104 Naming and Necessity, 44. Italics in original. 
105 In the fifth sentence, instead of saying, “What do we mean when we say…” perhaps Kripke’s point would have 
be clearer if he had said, “What justifies our belief that…” I take it that all of Kripke’s talk about what we imagine is 
meant to be epistemological (elucidating how modal beliefs are justified) rather than semantic (elucidating the 
meaning of “possible world”). 
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description of such a world: stipulation, rather than discovery (through sense perception) is the 
justifying mechanism of modal beliefs. Suppose, then, that I tell a story in which my protagonist 
is a genetic engineer who has managed to genetically alter donkeys in such a way that a new 
breed of talking donkey is created. This imaginative little tale is a partial description according to 
which a talking donkey exists. Even though the story is not a complete description of the world 
(no actual story could be that), perhaps this story counts as evidence that there is a complete 
description according to which a talking donkey exists. After all, there does not seem to be any 
obvious reason to think that the partial description offered by my story could not be filled out to 
form a complete and consistent story. I cannot actually fill out the story in complete detail, but 
this does not mean that it could not be theoretically done. In fact, it is easy enough to capture the 
theoretical possibility of completing a partial description. I simply present the propositions that 
are to form the partial description (my story), and then I say “for all other propositions, P 
(besides those in the partial description), either P or not-P, but not both.” First I just stipulate my 
story; then I stipulate that the story is part of a complete description. Perhaps these stipulations 
together justify the belief that it is possible that talking donkeys exist. 
Unfortunately, this resolution to the integration challenge will not do. The major 
difficulty is that there are no restrictions on stipulation to keep us from stipulating 
impossibilities. Even if stipulation were enough to provide a reason to believe that a partial 
description is part of a complete description, it is not a reason to believe that the complete 
description is consistent. As John Divers puts the point, “What is not in the gift of my 
stipulation…is that…a world is a possible world.”106 If book realism is to satisfy the epistemic 
constraint, we need some reason to think that at least one of the completions of the partial story 
 
106 Possible Worlds, 273. 
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is consistent, and any reason we could have to believe that such a description exists presupposes 
that we are already justified in believing that the partial description is possible. This is because, 
according to book realism, possible ways are sets of propositions (or states of affairs, or some 
other such thing). So to have a reason to believe that a possible way is consistent is just to have a 
reason to believe that all of the members of the set are compossible. Therefore, in order to be 
justified in believing that a proposition is true according to some consistent complete description, 
one must already be justified in believing that the proposition is possible.  
We cannot in general have a reason to believe that any given statement is a component 
statement in a complete and consistent world-story. This would require that we already have 
reason to believe that the story is a consistent story, which in turn presupposes the very thing at 
issue—that the proposition is possible. So book realism fails to satisfy the epistemic constraint, 
and is therefore not a plausible resolution theory. 
3.3.2.3 Nature Realism 
 
Another brand of modal realism is nature realism, espoused by Robert Stalnaker,107 Peter 
Forrest,108 and Bigelow and Pargetter.109 According to nature realism, possible ways are world 
properties. The actual way is the one and only unique world-property that is instantiated, and the 
non-actual possible ways are non-instantiated world-properties. So, the relationship between the 
actual way and the actual world, according to nature realism, is the relationship between a 
property and a particular that instantiates that property. 
 
107 In “Possible Worlds,” and in Inquiry. 
108 In “Ways Worlds Could Be,” and in “Neither Magic nor Mereology: A Reply to Lewis.” 
109 In Science and Necessity. 
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According to nature realism, possible ways are world properties. Do we have any reason 
to believe anything concerning non-actual world properties? Surprisingly, I think it is plausible 
to answer this question in the affirmative. Let us suppose, what is plausible, that through familiar 
justificatory methods—sense experience, introspection, deduction, induction, etc.—we are 
provided with reasons to believe that the world is a certain “way.” For example, I see a brownish 
patch in my visual field when looking a certain direction while standing in my living room, and 
this (partially) provides me with a reason to believe that there is a tree outside my window 
(according to the actual way). Here then is a model (an extremely sketchy one, but still a model) 
of justified beliefs concerning a world nature; the actual way is a world nature just like the other 
possible ways, and we are agreeing that these familiar justificatory methods provide some reason 
to believe that certain things about part of the actual way are true. 
The problem of course is that the actual way is actual, and the other possible ways are not 
actual. Perhaps these familiar justificatory methods have some epistemic force for beliefs 
concerning actuality, but they are seemingly of no value for justifying beliefs concerning 
uninstantiated world properties (the non-actual possible ways), since these are quite beyond the 
realm of immediate human experience. But maybe there is a way around this. It is plausible to 
suppose that these familiar justificatory methods together justify beliefs concerning portions of 
the actual way that are also quite beyond immediate human experience; beliefs concerning 
unobservables, and beliefs concerning generalizations, for example. So why can’t they also 
justify beliefs concerning portions of possible ways, which are by definition extra-experiential. 
Remember that according to nature realism, possible ways exists as part of the actual world. So, 
perhaps our beliefs concerning them can be justified by some kind of induction or other 
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reasoning process similar to justification for beliefs concerning unobservables and 
generalizations. 
To see how this might work, let us try it out on the example “talking donkeys exist.” 
According to nature realism, this is possible if and only if there is at least one world property 
according to which talking donkeys exist. But what reasons do we have to think that there is such 
a world property? Well, presumably we have a reason to think that donkeys exist (through 
familiar justificatory processes), and we have a reason to think that talking exists (again through 
those familiar processes), so we have a reason to think that both talking and donkeys separately 
figure into the actual world property. We do not have a reason to think that donkeys and talking 
together figure into the actual world property, but what if we mentally put these two things 
together: the concept of a donkey, and the concept of talking? Does that help justify the belief? 
The answer to this question might be affirmative if we add the following plausible assumption to 
nature realism: world properties are divisible into their constituent properties. If this is right, then 
the mental recombination of the concept of talking and the concept of donkey can provide a 
reason to think that the properties talking and being a donkey do indeed come together in part of 
a possible world property. If the actual world property is divisible into the properties talking and 
being a donkey and as long as this set of properties can coexist in the same thing, then 
presumably there is a possible world nature according to which they do coexist in the same thing. 
The act of succeeding in mentally recombining the concepts may provide a reason to think that 
the actual way could be so recombined. This is just a rough sketch of course, but I hope it is it 
clear enough for now that some sort of epistemological theory along these lines could be worked 
out. Hence, nature realism can potentially satisfy the epistemic constraint. 
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3.3.2.4 Combinatorial Realism 
 
The final version of actualism is combinatorial realism, presented in Creswell,110 and 
Bigelow.111 Surprisingly, even Quine toyed with the view at one point.112 According to this view, 
possible ways are constructs composed of constituents of the actual world. It is hard to say just 
what possible ways are on this view. The main idea is that possible ways are composed of 
combinations of constituents of the actual world, but it is hard to know what to make of the 
combinatorial aspect of this account. Presumably, the possibility of, for example, talking 
donkeys is supposed to be accounted for by combining “talking” with “donkey.” Unless someone 
or something actually combines “talking” with “donkey” (How?!), there is nothing in the mind-
independent world answering to the description “talking donkey”. The combinatorialist can go 
one of two directions. First, the combinatorialist might say that one need not actually combine 
the elements of the actual world, but only combine the elements mentally. But this is to give up 
on realism all together, so that will not do for combinatorial realism.113 I suggested something 
along these lines as a way to satisfy the epistemic constraint for nature realism. But in this case, 
it is being used as a metaphysical theory in its own right, which would end up giving up on 
realism. Second, the combinatorialist might say that it is not the actual combining of the 
constituents of the actual world, but the combinability of those elements that accounts for 
possibility. This at least still sounds like realism. The problem, though, is that there doesn’t seem 
to be a clear way to describe combinability without invoking the very matter at issue: it 
obviously begs the question to explain the combinability of “talking” and “donkey” by saying 
 
110 In “The World is Everything that is the Case.” 
111 In “Real Possibilities.” 
112 In “Propositional Objects.” 
113 There is indeed a fictionalist version of combinatorialism. See Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, 
and Skyrms, “Tractarian Nominalism.” 
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that “talking” and “donkey” can coexist. But let us put aside these concerns. Combinatorial 
realism has an even bigger problem. 
The problem with combinatorial realism is that it is not at all obvious what the 
relationship between the actual way and the actual world is supposed to be. On the one hand, 
perhaps the actual way is supposed to be identified with the actual world; perhaps possible ways 
are literally recombinations of the constituents of the actual world. But if this is the correct 
interpretation of combinatorialism, then it is really a variety of either genuine realism (if the 
actual world is composed of objects) or Plantingan realism (if the actual world is composed of 
states of affairs), since—to stay realist—combinatorialism would have to hold that for each 
combination of the constituents of the actual world, there is a world just like the actual world that 
is that way. In fact, Lewis himself sometimes seems to accept this brand of combinatorialism. I 
have already argued against both genuine realism and Plantingan realism. Adding a 
combinatorial element to it does not make it any more plausible. On the other hand, perhaps the 
actual way is related to the actual world in some other way besides identity. But if so, then either 
it will be one of the relationships already encountered in the elucidation of book realism and 
nature realism, and will therefore be a variation of one of those theories, or it will be some other 
relationship not already encountered, in which case an explanation of this relationship is needed 
if combinatorialism is going to be a viable alternative to the other actualist views. So we have a 
dilemma—combinatorialism is either a variation on one of the other actualist alternatives or an 
inadequate theory because the relationship between the actual way and the actual world is not 
fully explained. In either case, combinatorial realism does not satisfy the constraints of the 
integration challenge. 
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3.4 Conclusion: From Sketch to Theory 
 
I conclude, therefore, that nature realism is the only plausible resolution to the integration 
challenge. The trouble with genuine realism is that the other possible worlds are spatiotemporally 
inaccessible to us, so we cannot tell what is going on in them. The trouble with Plantingan 
realism is that we have no way to distinguish non-existent states of affairs from existing ones, so 
we have no reasons for distinguishing between the possible and the impossible. The trouble with 
book realism is that it requires us to know when a proposition is part of a complete and 
consistent set, which is beyond anyone’s ability to achieve. The trouble with combinatorial 
realism is that it does not distinguish itself from the other brands of realism to make it clearly a 
separate theory. 
Of course there is a lot still to be said about exactly how the sketchy comments I have 
made in this chapter about nature realism will be worked out into a full metaphysical theory. So 
the task of the next chapter is to develop nature realism into a robust metaphysical theory of 
modality that clearly satisfies the requirements of the integration challenge. Satisfying the 
integration challenge in a clear way will thus count as a strong argument in favor of the view that 
will develop. 
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4 The Structure of the World and the Structure of Thought 
 
It is time to stop playing defense and to start playing offense. In this chapter, I make good 
on my promise to develop a theory of modality that resolves the integration challenge. In the last 
chapter, I argued that a version of actualism called nature realism is the most promising theory of 
modality for resolving the integration challenge. So the theory that I will develop in this chapter 
will be a version of that theory. The trick will be to develop the theory in such a way that the 
problems of the other versions of actualism are avoided, and then to show that the resulting 
theory satisfies the constraints of the integration challenge. 
4.1 The History of Nature Realism 
 
As John Divers has pointed out, nature realism is the least developed of the realist 
views.114 How it gets developed will depend in large part on what we take world properties to be. 
I will develop my theory by first reviewing the short history of nature realism as it was 
developed in the literature. I will then point out the difficulties for the theory that emerge from 
the history and show how to avoid these problems by making a few changes of my own. My 
resulting theory will maintain much of the spirit of nature realism as it was developed in the 
literature, but it will diverge dramatically enough from that theory to deserve a name all its own. 
I will call it constructionism. 
4.1.1 Robert Stalnaker 
 
 
114 Possible Worlds, 177. 
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Robert Stalnaker was the first to suggest a specific version of nature realism.115 However, 
Stalnaker’s version is not very detailed. He begins to develop the view as a response to Lewis’s 
genuine realism. According to Stalnaker, Lewis gets some things right about possible worlds but 
other things wrong. To develop his view, Stalnaker finds four theses in Lewis’s view, three of 
which Stalnaker agrees with but one of which he does not. The four theses are as follows. 
(1) Possible worlds exist. 
(2) Other possible worlds are things of the same sort as the actual world. 
(3) The indexical analysis of the adjective “actual” is the correct analysis. 
(4) Possible worlds cannot be reduced to something more basic. 
According to Stalnaker, these four theses taken together imply Lewis’s genuine modal realism, 
but we need not accept them all to develop a plausible theory of modality. Stalnaker himself 
accepts theses (1), (3), and (4), but denies thesis (2). The major mistake that Lewis has made, 
according to Stalnaker, has been to think that possible worlds are the same kind of thing as the 
actual world, which, as I have already pointed out, is the main move of the actualist. So, nature 
realism can be developed out of an attempt to maintain (1), (3), and (4), while denying (2). 
Stalnaker’s version of the theory that maintains (1), (3), and (4), while denying (2) is 
simply to make one change to Lewis’s view. Stalnaker writes, “If possible worlds are ways that 
things might have been, then the actual world ought to be the way things are rather than I and all 
my surroundings. The way things are is a property or state of the world, not the world itself.”116 
This is precisely the reason that I have used the terminology of possible ways, to try to avoid the 
confusion caused by calling them possible worlds. If the actual world is one world among the 
 
115 Although Peter Forrest claims that he sees glimpses of nature realism in Leibniz. “Ways Worlds Could Be,” 15. 
116 “Possible Worlds,” 228. 
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possible worlds, then it is very natural to think that the possible worlds are the same kind of thing 
as the actual world, which then leads naturally into Lewis’s genuine realism. Instead Stalnaker 
suggests that we maintain theses (1), (3), and (4), but deny that possible worlds are the same kind 
of thing as the actual world. Stalnaker also suggests here that the actual world (the actual way in 
my idiom) “is a property or state of the world,” but again, he doesn’t have much more to say 
about it. Fleshing out the theory from this point will require that we figure out what a property or 
state of the world is. 
Hence, the major problem with Stalnaker’s view is simply that it lacks detail. He tells us 
that these things called ways the world could be exist, but does not give us much information 
about what sort of things these are. Of course, Stalnaker believes that they cannot be reduced to 
something else (thesis 4), so we cannot complain that he has not reduced them to something 
more familiar, but it still seems that he could make them better understood. Lewis also thinks 
that possible worlds cannot be reduced, but to those who demand further clarification, Lewis 
says, “If asked what sort of thing they are, I cannot give the kind of reply my questioner probably 
expects: that is, a proposal to reduce possible worlds to something else. I can only ask him to 
admit that he knows what sort of thing our actual world is, and then explain that possible worlds 
are more things of that sort.”117 Whatever we might think of Lewis’s explanatory strategy here, it 
is not a strategy available to Stalnaker. He cannot say, “I ask him to admit that he knows what 
sort of thing the way the world is is, and then explain that the ways the world could have been are 
more things of that sort.” This is completely unhelpful since the way the world is is no better 
understood than the ways the world could be are. Therefore, to make Stalnaker’s view plausible, 
we must develop a better understanding of what the way the world is (the actual way) is. 
 
117 Counterfactuals, 85. 
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We can start with what the actual way is not. Whatever it is, it is neither a set of 
sentences, nor a state of affairs. If it were either of these, the resulting theory would be a version 
of book realism or Plantingan realism, neither of which, as I argued in the previous chapter, 
satisfies the epistemic constraint. So, if nature realism is to be a unique and plausible theory, then 
the actual way is neither a set of sentences nor a state of affairs. So what is it? Stalnaker simply 
says that it is “a property or state of the world.” That is not especially enlightening. 
4.1.2 Peter Forrest 
 
Peter Forrest has a more specific answer. Drawing on the work of David Armstrong,118 
Forrest has developed Stalnaker’s rough ideas into a more robust theory. Forrest develops his 
theory by suggesting modifications to Lewis’s genuine realism. He suggests that for every 
Lewisian possible world, there is what he calls a world nature, by which he means “the property 
which is the conjunction of all its (natural) non-relational properties.”119 Therefore, the actual 
world nature, according to Forrest’s theory, is the conjunction of all of the natural, non-relational 
properties that the actual world instantiates. But Forrest says that a single set of natural, non-
relational properties and relations can be conjoined in many different ways each of which forms 
a different property, some of which may be world natures and others of which may not be. So, 
for Forrest, there is more to the actual world nature than just the conjunction of all of the natural, 
non-relational properties of the actual world; these properties must also be conjoined in the right 
way. Therefore, understanding the actual world nature will also require a theory of structural 
composition for properties together with a means for determining which of these structural 
compositions counts as a world nature and which do not. 
 
118 In A Theory of Universals. 
119 “Ways Worlds Could Be,” 15. 
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According to Forrest, world natures are composed of natural, simple properties and 
relations. The properties and relations are simple in the sense that they are not reducible to other 
properties and relations. Although Forrest does not explain in detail what he means by a natural 
property, presumably he has in mind something like Lewis’s notion of natural properties and 
relations as the properties and relations that “carve at the joints” of reality.120 Forrest writes, 
“Vermillion, or rather some determinate shade of vermillion, might turn out to be a natural 
property. So might being a proton. But being grue and similar hybrids are not.” Being grue 
(being green before the year 2100 and being blue afterwards)121 is not a natural property because 
it presumably fails to “carve at the joints” of reality, and being (some determinate shade of) 
vermillion is a natural property because it presumably does “carve at the joints.” 
The meat of Forrest’s theory is what he calls primitive operations of composition. These 
are intended to explain the way in which the simple, natural properties and relations can be 
composed into more complex properties and relations in a structural (non-mereological) way. 
The first operation Forrest calls taking the product. Forrest explains it as follows. 
If R is an m-adic property or relation and S is an n-adic one, then R x S is the (m+n)-adic 
relation which holds between x1,…, xm, y1,…,yn just in case R holds between x1,…,xm 
and S holds between y1,…,yn.122 
 
To use Forrest’s example, suppose that G is some determinate shade of green and that H is some 
determinate shade of blue. The product G x H will be the determinate relation of color contrast 
that holds between x and y just in case x is that determinate shade of green and y is that 
 
120 Ways Worlds Could Be,” 15. See also Lewis, “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” and Ted Sider, Writing 
the Book of the World. 
121 A popular example from Nelson Goodman. See Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. 
122 Ways Worlds Could Be,” 17. 
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determinate shade of blue.123 So the product of any two properties results in a relation—that 
unique relation that holds between two objects whenever they instantiate these two properties. It 
should be carefully noted, however, that the product operation is not symmetric; R x S is not the 
same relation as S x R, but its converse.  
The next operation is contraction. The idea behind contraction is that two or more relata 
in a single relation can be identified with one another.124 Again to use one of Forrest’s examples, 
knowing oneself is a property, but it is the contraction of the knowing relation. It is a contraction 
in the sense that in the relation knowing, the two places of the relata are identified with one 
another to produce the property self-knowing. In other words, S has self-knowledge can be 
understood as S knows S with the two relata contracted into one. More generally, to form a 
contraction of a relation, one just identifies two or more of the relata with one another. 
The last operation is projection. Forrest writes, “Consider an n-adic relation R. Suppose 
a1,…an are related by R. Then as a consequence, the sum of a1+…+an has a property, namely 
being the sum of parts related by R. I call this the (monadic) projection of R.”125 The (monadic) 
projection of a complex relation is the property of being the mereological sum of parts related by 
that relation. For example, suppose that B is the property of being a ball, and R is the property of 
being red. The product B x R is the relation that holds between any ball and any red thing. By 
contraction, the two relata are identified, and the projection of the resulting contraction is the 
property of being a red ball. 
To see how all of these operations work together to demonstrate a form of structural 
composition, I will add a few more symbols to Forrest’s. First, to express that a relation is n-adic, 
 
123 Ways Worlds Could Be,” 17. 
124 Ways Worlds Could Be,” 18. 
125 Ways Worlds Could Be,” 18. Italics in original. 
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I will use n different numbers in subscript after the capital letter representing the relation. For 
example, O1 might be the property being an oxygen atom, and B1,2 might be the dyadic relation 
being bonded to. The point of the numbers is not just to show how many relata are in the 
relation, but they will also prove to be a convenient way to express the operation of contraction, 
which should be apparent from the following examples. 
Step 1: Start with natural properties and relations (ones that “carve at the joints”). 
 O1 is the natural property being an oxygen atom. 
 C1 is the natural property being a carbon atom. 
 B1,2 is the natural dyadic relation being bonded to. 
Step 2: Form a product of the natural properties and relations. 
 O1 x O2 x C3 x B4,5 x B6,7  
(The seven different numbers show that this is a heptadic relation.) 
Step 3: Contract some (or all) of the relata. 
 O1 x O2 x C3 x B1,3 x B2,3 
(Changing the subscript numbers indicates that relata with the same number are 
identical. In this example, the relation has been contracted from a heptadic 
relation to a triadic one.) 
Step 4: Project the resulting product into a single property. 
The sum (1+2+3) has the property being carbon dioxide (O—C—O). 
To see how different properties can be structurally composed of the same natural properties and 
relations, consider an alternative to Steps 3 and 4. 
Step 3a: Contract some (or all) of the relata. 
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 O1 x O2 x C3 x B1,2 x B2,3 
(The only difference between this and the previous Step 3 is that the contraction 
has been done in a slightly different way—the second and fifth relata in the 
heptadic relation have been identified instead of the third and fifth relata.) 
Step 4a: Project the resulting product into a single property. 
 The sum (1+2+3) has the property being (unstable) C—O—O. 
By contracting the products in various ways, we can demonstrate how the same properties and 
relations can be structurally composed in different ways. The very same properties and relations 
are involved in both being carbon dioxide and in being (unstable) C—O—O, but the way they are 
composed is not. Forrest’s operations give us a means by which to understand and to 
demonstrate such structural differences in complex properties and relations. 
Forrest needs more than this, though, because not all structural properties that can be 
defined by the operations are world natures. For example, the projection of the property C1 x S1, 
where C1 is the property being cubic and S1 is the property being spheroid, had better not be a 
world nature, since it is clearly not possible for any single thing to have the property being both 
cubic and spheroid. Forrest needs a way to divide the structural properties into world natures and 
non-world natures.  
According to Forrest, world natures are those structural properties that are capable of 
instantiation by themselves. That is to say that a world nature needs no further properties added 
to it in order for it to be instantiated. This, by itself, is not an adequate way to make the needed 
distinction, since it includes the modally loaded word “capable.” So Forrest needs a modally 
neutral way to indicate which structural properties are capable of instantiation by themselves and 
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which are not. Forrest’s solution is to introduce the concept of a completion.126 The completion 
of a property, P, is the property having no other properties other than P and itself. As an 
example, the completion of being blue is the property being blue and having no other property. 
This turns out not to be a world nature because it cannot be instantiated: anything that is blue 
must, at least, also have some shape or other. Still, being blue is a conjunct of many complex 
properties that have completions, like, say, the property being a blue box that weighs 1 pound, 
has square sides, has a hinged lid, has…etc. Impossible properties, like being completely blue 
and completely red, have no completions and are not conjuncts of any complex properties that 
have completions. For Forrest, a world nature is simply a completion—any completion. 
Properties that are not completions are not world natures. 
Forrest needs one more bit of machinery to make his theory work. Lewis’s semantics for 
modal propositions requires a relation between propositions and worlds called true in (or 
sometimes true at). For example, P is possible, according to Lewis, if and only if, there is at least 
one possible world such that P is true in that world. For Forrest’s theory to offer a plausible 
alternative to Lewis’s theory, then Forrest must replace this relationship because there are no 
worlds for Forrest’s proposition to be true in. Forrest’s solution is simple. He merely changes the 
terminology from true in to true under. If a proposition is true in a world, then it is also true 
under the nature of that world. So, possible world semantics is reinterpreted as world nature 
semantics: 
(i) “Possibly P” is true if and only if P is true under some world nature. 
(ii) “Necessarily P” is true if and only if P is true under all world natures. 
 
126 Ways Worlds Could Be,” 19. 
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But of course, if true under is going to do the work that Forrest requires, it had better get the 
actual world nature—the way this world is—right. Therefore, 
(iii) “Actually P” is true if and only of P is true.127 
Nature realism is finally starting to take shape. It began with Stalnaker’s idea that modal 
realism can be maintained without regarding possible worlds as the same kind of thing as the 
actual world. We can think of them as ways the world could be rather than as full-blooded worlds 
à la Lewis. The actual world is capable of instantiating any one of these world natures.128 The 
one that it instantiates is the actual world nature, and all the others are merely possible world 
natures. Forrest further developed Stalnaker’s theory by showing how we can understand 
possible ways as complex structural properties, suggesting the concept of a completion, and 
providing a modal semantics.129  
There is, however, a serious problem for Forrest’s version of nature realism. Forrest 
claims that an advantage of his theory over Lewis’s is that it makes a categorical distinction 
between the actual and the possible, the actual is particular and the merely possible is 
universal.130 This is in keeping with the actualist spirit of nature realism as presented by 
Stalnaker. However, this is going to cause a serious problem for Forrest’s version of nature 
realism. The problem is that if his semantic theory is correct, then what are we to make of certain 
obvious modal-logical principles, like “P implies Possibly P” and “Necessarily P implies P?” 
Consider some true proposition, P. According to Forrest’s semantic theory, if P is true, then 
 
127 Ways Worlds Could Be,” 16. 
128 I think that, for Forrest, we are supposed to think that the actual world is some kind of underlying “I know not 
what” that instantiates the actual world nature, but could have instantiated any one of the other world natures. 
129 John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter also endorse a version of nature realism in Science and Necessity, so they 
deserve mention in the history of the theory. However, as far as I can tell, they have not developed the theory 
beyond what Forrest has presented. 
130 Ways Worlds Could Be,” 22. 
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“Actually P” is true. However, it does not follow from this that “Possibly P” is true, since it does 
not follow from “Actually P” that P is true under at least one world nature. Nothing in the 
semantic theory suggests that a true proposition must be true under any world nature. 
Presumably, Forrest thinks that any proposition that is true is true under the nature of the actual 
world, but his semantic theory makes no mention at all of the nature of the actual world. We 
would expect Forrest’s theory to say “Actually P” is true if and only if P is true under the actual 
world nature, but instead it says “Actually P” is true if and only if P is true. Since Forrest 
believes that actuality is particular and possibility is universal, this seems to imply that “Actually 
P” is true in a different way than “Possibly P.” In other words, it looks like being true is a 
different property from being true under the actual world nature. If so, then Forrest’s theory fails 
to satisfy the semantic constraint. Being true under a world nature is a special kind of truth that 
does not apply to non-modal propositions. 
The problem, as I see it, is once again that the actual world has not been properly 
distinguished from the way the actual world is. To see this more clearly, let us look again at the 
four theses that Stalnaker finds in Lewis and that sparked the creation of nature realism in the 
first place: 
(1) Possible worlds exist. 
(2) Other possible worlds are things of the same sort as the actual world. 
(3) The indexical analysis of the adjective “actual” is the correct analysis. 
(4) Possible worlds cannot be reduced to something more basic. 
Stalnaker says that his theory denies (2) but maintains the other three. However, maintaining that 
possible worlds (world natures in Forrest’s terminology) are different in kind from the actual 
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world has led to the semantic problem noted earlier: since truth in the actual world is different 
than truth under world natures, certain obvious modal-semantic theses do not follow, notably “P 
implies Possibly P” and “Necessarily P implies P.” Again, this is because a proposition’s truth 
simpliciter does not imply a proposition’s truth under any world nature, and a proposition’s truth 
under all world natures does not imply its truth simpliciter. 
There is one obvious way around this issue. It is simply to accept that being true under a 
specific world nature (i.e., the one instantiated by the actual world, the actual world nature) is all 
that truth amounts to. Let me show how this helps to clarify and solve the difficulty for Forrest’s 
version of nature realism. So here are Stalnaker’s four (and a half) theses again with a change in 
terminology to match Forrest’s.  
(1) World natures exist. (True) 
(2a) Other world natures are things of the same sort as the actual world. (False) 
(2b) Other world natures are things of the same sort as the actual world nature. (True) 
(3) The indexical analysis of the adjective “actual” is the correct analysis. (True) 
(4) World natures cannot be reduced to something more basic. (True) 
If we take “actual world” to mean “I and all my surroundings,” then it is false that world natures 
are the same sort of thing as the actual world, but if we take it to mean “the way the world is,” 
then it is true that world natures are the same sort of thing as the actual world (or, more clearly, 
the actual way). 
 Still, this is supposed to be a version of actualism, so Forrest will have to accept this 
thesis: 
 P is true iff P is true under the actual world nature. 
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Now Forrest gets the results “P implies possibly P” and “Necessarily P implies P.” This 
clarification may seem innocuous. In fact, Forrest might simply say that this was too obvious to 
bother mentioning, but what I want to show now is that this clarification shows that Forrest’s 
specific version of nature realism is implausible. 
To showcase the problem for Forrest’s theory, we must think a little harder about the 
actual world nature. The actual world nature is understood to be a structural property, and so the 
other world natures are structural properties as well. What distinguishes the actual world nature 
from the non-actual world natures is that the actual world nature is instantiated and the others are 
not instantiated. All of these world natures exist, whether they are instantiated or not, and, since 
this is an actualist view, they are all part of the actual world. 
Now here comes the trouble. Forrest’s explanation for his version of nature realism relied 
on an analogy between Lewis’s true in (a possible world) and his own true under (a world 
nature). However, the analogy does not really work.131 For Lewis, propositions are true in the 
other possible worlds in just the same way that propositions are true in the actual world, but once 
Forrest removes all of the other possible worlds, save the actual world, the only world nature that 
propositions can be true under anymore is the actual world nature, because that is the only world 
nature that is instantiated. The other world natures are merely properties. How can anything be 
true under (or in) a mere property? Consider a Lewisian world with just a single talking donkey 
in it. According to Lewis, “talking donkeys exist” is true in this world, and according to Forrest, 
“talking donkeys exist” is true under the nature of this world. Being true at and being true under 
coincide, but now take the world away and just consider the remaining nature, which would 
simply be the property being a talking donkey and nothing else. How can the proposition 
 
131 This objection was suggested to me by Cass Weller. 
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“talking donkeys exist” be true under this property? It is just a property; there is no talking 
donkey there at all. Without instantiation, the world nature is left “dangling,” and a dangling 
property cannot account for truth. 
But maybe Forrest can get around this problem. Suppose that he modifies the semantic 
theory to accommodate this worry: 
“Possibly P” is true if and only if there is a world nature such that if it had been 
instantiated, P would have been true. 
 
“Necessarily P” is true if and only if all world natures are such that if they had been 
instantiated, P would have been true. 
 
Now there is no problem of propositions being true under dangling properties. However, the 
price to pay for this result is too high. The semantic theory now includes counterfactual claims, 
which are usually understood as modal claims. Lewis, for example, has suggested that the 
analysis of counterfactual claims comes down to truths about how “close” possible worlds are to 
one another.132 If this is close to the correct analysis of counterfactuals, then this modification to 
Forrest’s semantics will be clearly unacceptable. Still, it might turn out that the correct analysis 
of counterfactuals does not rely on possible worlds. Even if this is the case, though, the modified 
theory clearly does not satisfy the semantic constraint. The truth conditions for non-modal 
propositions will certainly not involve anything like the counterfactuals needed for the modified 
semantic theory. So, this semantic theory requires special truth conditions that do not apply to 
non-modal propositions, which fails to satisfy the semantic constraint.  
4.2 Constructionism 
 
 
132 In Counterfactuals. 
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I want to suggest a different solution to Forrest’s problem, one that takes nature realism 
in a completely different direction; a direction I think changes the view so drastically that it 
becomes a different, but related, theory altogether. For reasons that will become increasingly 
clear, I call the resulting view constructionism. The idea is simple; deny the existence of non-
actual world natures. There is just the world and the way that the world is. That’s it. If we can get 
modal truth out of this, then there is no reason to accept the existence of all these merely possible 
world natures and all of the problems that attend them. This is the view that I intend to defend. 
Under constructionism, there are no possible worlds, no ways that the world could have 
been, no non-actual world natures. Instead there is just the world and the way that it is, the actual 
world nature. Instead of all of the non-actual world natures, modal truth is accounted for by a 
proper part of the actual world nature, what I will call the necessary word nature. Intuitively, the 
necessary world nature is that part of the actual world nature that could not have been otherwise. 
On my account, it turns out that there is no such thing as a way that the world might have been. 
Instead there is only the way that the world is, and part of this is the way that the world must be. 
The necessary world nature, on this view, is not a thing over and above the actual world nature. 
Instead it is a part of the actual world nature. Possibilities are simply those propositions that are 
not ruled out by the necessary world nature. 
I now need to fill out the details of this theory and also show how it satisfies the 
constraints of the integration challenge. Fortunately, doing the latter will go a long way toward 
doing the former. Therefore, I will go right for the constraints of the integration challenge at this 
point. 
4.2.1 Necessary way Semantics 
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 I begin with the semantic constraint. According to constructionism, it turns out that there 
is no such thing as a non-actual world nature. Instead what accounts for modality is the actual 
world nature, which is naturally divided in two parts, the necessary and the non-necessary. 
Possibilities are simply understood to be those propositions that are not ruled out by the 
necessary part. Therefore, instead of possible world semantics, I need something that might be 
called necessary way semantics: 
“Necessarily P” is true if and only if P is true under the necessary way. 
“Possibly P” is true if and only if not-P is not true under the necessary way. 
Although my particular theory will take “the necessary way” to refer to the part of the 
actual world nature that is necessary, I put the semantic theory in these more general terms so 
that it is clearer that it is open to multiple interpretations, just like possible world semantics. For 
example, a conventionalist might accept necessary way semantics but claim that the necessary 
way is arbitrarily selected by our determination to use words in the ways that we do, or a 
conceptualist might accept it but claim that the necessary way is some kind of conceptual 
construct. In other words, acceptance of necessary way semantics no more forces one to be a 
realist about the necessary way than acceptance of possible world semantics forces one to be a 
realist about possible worlds. Part of the point of giving the semantic theory in these more 
general terms will be to more clearly show how constructionism satisfies the semantic constraint. 
The question, of course, is what distinguishes the necessary part of the actual world 
nature from the contingent part? For constructionism, the necessary way is understood simply as 
the structure of the actual world nature. Necessary way semantics requires that the actual way be 
divisible into a necessary part and a contingent part. Constructionism accepts that the actual way 
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is a complex structural property, which can be understood as having both structure and content. I 
suggest, therefore, that the content of the actual world nature—the properties—are the contingent 
part, and the structure itself is the necessary part. In other words, constructionism is the view that 
the actual world nature has a necessary structure and that all modal truth can be accounted for by 
this structure. This is not to say that the actual world nature can actually be divided into these 
parts. Obviously, there can be content without structure, and there can be no structure without 
content. 
So the specific version of necessary way semantics that constructionism accepts is  
“Necessarily P” is true if and only if P is true under the structure of the actual world 
nature. 
 
“Possibly P” is true if and only if not-P is not true under the structure of the actual world 
nature. 
 
What does it mean for a proposition to be true under a structure? Intuitively, the idea is that the 
structure of the actual world nature can preclude the existence of certain combinations of 
properties. Nothing can be both round and square is a necessary truth because “Nothing can be 
both round and square” is true under the structure of the actual world nature, which means that 
the structure of the actual world nature precludes the co-instantiation of the properties being 
square and being round. It is possible that talking donkeys exist because “Talking donkeys do 
not exist” is not true under the necessary world nature, which means that the structure of the 
actual world nature does not preclude the co-instantiation of the properties being a donkey and 
talks. This is the core idea of constructionism. 
For constructionism to satisfy the semantic constraint, it must be shown that it does not 
require special truth conditions—conditions that are not applicable outside the scope of the 
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theory. To do this, I want to compare constructionism with Lewis’s genuine modal realism. 
Lewis’s theory satisfies the semantic constraint fairly straightforwardly because possible world 
semantics suggests that sentences with modal content can be naturally translated into quantified 
sentences with no modal content, and Lewis believes that possible worlds are just like the actual 
world. Therefore, Lewis’s theory satisfies the semantic constraint because it maintains that truth 
just is truth in possible worlds, and that the contribution made to truth by the modal operators is 
just to establish which worlds the proposition is true in. So no special semantics is required for 
Lewis; he provides a theory that clearly shows how the truth conditions of modal propositions 
are a kind of truth condition. I claim that constructionism has the same semantic advantage as 
Lewis’s theory. According to constructionism, to be true is just to be true under the actual world 
nature, and to be necessarily true is just to be true under a part of the actual world nature (the 
necessary world nature). This clearly shows how modal truth is a species of truth. Truth just is 
truth under a world nature. 
Realists of all stripes tend to think that the truth of a proposition involves some sort of 
correspondence between that proposition and the actual world. I am suggesting a slightly 
different kind of realist theory of truth. I suggest instead that the truth of a proposition amounts 
to a correspondence between that proposition and the actual world nature rather than the actual 
world itself. In other words, truth just is truth under the actual world nature. If this much is 
accepted, then constructionism satisfies the semantic constraint because no special semantic 
theory is required. The general theory of truth it requires is simply: 
P is true iff P is true under the actual world nature. 
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And necessary way semantics simply extends this basic sematic theory to show the contribution 
that modal operators make to truth under the actual world nature: they mark the distinction 
between the structure of the actual world nature and its content. Therefore, constructionism 
satisfies the semantic constraint of the integration challenge. 
4.2.2 Way-View Epistemology 
 
We now turn to the harder constraint to satisfy for a realist theory, the epistemic 
constraint. In the previous chapter, we saw that the major epistemic difficulty for an actualist 
theory is that actualists have to define possible worlds as somehow complete entities (book 
realism) or maximal entities (Plantingan realism). The reason for the completeness requirement 
is that actualists who accept possible worlds need a way to distinguish possible worlds from 
entities that are similar but not possible. For example, book realism holds that possible worlds 
are consistent and complete sets of propositions. It is important for book realists to define 
possible worlds in this way because they must distinguish those sets of propositions that are 
possible worlds from those sets of propositions that are not possible worlds. Therefore, they 
maintain that the sets that are possible worlds are those that are consistent (in order that they are 
possible) and complete (in order that they are worlds). The completeness requirement causes an 
epistemic problem because in order to have a reason to believe that the truth conditions for a 
modal belief have been satisfied, one would have to have a reason to believe that a proposition is 
a member of a complete set. But how can we have such a reason? It seems that any such reason 
would have to be quite a powerful thing because it would not only have to be a reason to believe 
that the proposition in question is a member of a set of propositions, but it would also have to be 
a reason to believe that the set of which it is a member is complete. This would seem to require 
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the epistemic agent to know every proposition in the set, which is clearly asking too much. The 
limitations on human cognition seem to eliminate the possibility of justified modal belief from 
the start. 
Constructionism does not have this problem. The actual world nature is complete, but the 
necessary part of the actual world nature is not complete in any sense because it is just the 
structure of the actual world nature. Being justified in one’s modal beliefs, therefore, will not 
require having a reason to believe that the proposition in question is part of some complete or 
maximal set. So, it will not have the usual problem that actualist versions of possible world 
realism have. This is because constructionism is a realist theory of modality but it is not a realist 
theory of possible worlds. 
Constructionism has managed to avoid the problem of completeness that plagues other 
actualist theories, but it still must be shown how exactly it satisfies the epistemic constraint. As a 
reminder, here is the epistemic constraint again. 
Epistemic Constraint for Modality: A metaphysical theory of modality must provide an 
account of modal truth such that there are reasons to believe that the truth conditions for 
modal propositions are satisfied in at least some cases. 
 
For constructionism, the specific epistemic question is, “What reasons can we have for believing 
that some propositions are true under the necessary world nature such that those reasons are also 
applicable to non-modal beliefs?” 
 Before I attempt to answer this question, it will be important to remember what sort of 
answer we are looking for. First, we are only looking for a rough sketch of a rough 
epistemological theory. We are not looking for a complete epistemology. That asks too much of 
metaphysicians. Second, we are only looking for a rough sketch of a modal epistemology. The 
  125 
questions of modal epistemology are “How do we know when something that is false is 
nevertheless possible, and how do we know when something that is true is also necessary?” So, I 
will assume that there are some reasons to think that some propositions are true, and that some 
are false. What I want to sketch is a rough view of how we can come to have reasons to believe 
that some true propositions are necessary and that some false propositions are possible. Given 
constructionism, therefore, the search is for reasons to believe that some propositions that are 
true under the actual world nature are also true under the necessary world nature (necessary 
propositions), and that some propositions that are false under the actual world nature have 
negations that are also false under the necessary world nature (contingently false propositions). 
Let us start with an example. Consider the proposition that nothing can both be a cube 
and be a sphere. According to constructionism, what accounts for the truth of this proposition is 
that it is true under the actual world nature. What accounts for its necessity is that it is true under 
the necessary part of the actual world nature, the necessary world nature. What this means is that 
the co-instantiation of the properties being a cube and being a sphere is precluded by the 
structure of the actual world nature. So, it is not only true under the actual world nature; it is true 
under the part of the actual world nature that could not have been otherwise—the structure. To 
have a reason to believe that this proposition is necessary, we will need some reason to believe 
that it is true under the structure of the actual world nature. 
To show how this may be done, I need to introduce a mental analogue to the actual world 
nature.133 I will call this a way-view. I doubly hesitate to call this a “world-view” for fear either 
 
133 The theory that I will sketch shares some affinities with Hector-Neri Castañeda’s guise theory. However, what I 
offer is merely a sketch rather than a full-blown theory of the interplay between language, belief, and the world. 
Castañeda’s guise theory is a non-representational, direct-realist theory, for example, whereas the theory that I am 
sketching is open about whether or not it is representational. For my part, I find direct realism implausible, but we 
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that it will be confused with certain social constructs and personal biases or that it will be 
construed as possible-world-like. It is neither. A way-view is way-like; it is structurally 
composed of mental analogues to properties, which I will call, with some trepidation, 
concepts.134 A way-view, then, is a complex conceptual structure analogous to structural 
properties. I claim that every epistemic agent has a way-view. 
The rough intuitive idea behind a way-view is that it is essentially a conception of the 
world. Each of us has a way-view that is constantly in flux as we develop various concepts and 
relationships between concepts throughout our lives using all of our various epistemic faculties 
(whatever those may be). To be clear, though, a way-view is not a web of beliefs à la Quine.135 It 
is better understood as a complex structural concept formed from simpler concepts (the content) 
joined together in a particular way (the structure). It is from this scaffold of concepts that we 
develop our attitudes about the world, including beliefs, hopes, and desires. A way-view is 
epistemically prior to belief. How exactly propositional attitudes are developed from a way-view 
is a matter for complete epistemology, so I will leave this for further thought and study. For now, 
all I need is a rough idea of how beliefs arise from a way-view. 
I will say that S believes that P only if P is accepted under S’s way-view. I hope this way 
of talking is suggestive. The idea is that for S to believe P is for it to seem to S that P is true 
under the actual world nature. S’s way-view is S’s own particular conception of the actual world 
 
need not enter into that debate here. See Castañeda’s “Thinking and the Structure of the World,” and Thinking, 
Language, and Experience. 
134 I hesitate to use the term “concept” because it has a checkered past in philosophy, but I think it best captures the 
intuitive idea behind way-views. They are to be understood as complex mental structures. It seems to me that, from 
an intuitive standpoint, concepts are the best candidates to fill this role because, presumably, complex concepts can 
be “built up” out of simpler concepts in a structural way. 
135 As in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” for example. 
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nature.136 So, I will say that for it to seem to S that P is true is just for P to be accepted under S’s 
way-view. Being accepted under is the mental analogue to being true under. That gives us a 
rough sketch of way-views and how beliefs are developed from them. 
With way-views, I intend to show how constructionism satisfies the epistemic constraint. 
To do so, I will need a theory of belief formation. I only need to show that there are some 
reasons to believe that the truth conditions for constructionism are satisfied in some cases. So, a 
theory of belief formation will not be fully developed here. My intent is only to give enough 
detail to make the view seem plausible and to show how it, together with constructionism, helps 
to satisfy the epistemic constraint. 
Just like structural properties, concepts can be mentally constructed into more complex 
structural concepts, and they can also be mentally deconstructed into less complex concepts. I 
suggest that the justification of belief begins here. I claim the following necessary condition on 
justified true belief: an epistemic agent, S, is justified in believing P only if P is acceptable under 
S’s way-view. Of course, S does not have to actually accept P in order to be justified in believing 
it, but S must be in a position to believe it, given S’s way-view, even if S does not actually do so. 
To fill out the details of this, I will need a rough sketch of what it is to accept a belief under a 
way-view. 
The main idea is that we focus on various parts of our way-views in order to determine 
what to believe. We start from our own personal way-views, and then we mentally deconstruct 
the concepts within it to consider whether to accept a belief or not. In general, we must focus our 
attention on parts of a way-view because a way-view is just too big, so to speak, to think about 
 
136 Or maybe it just is the actual world nature if we accept some form of direct realism instead of 
representationalism. 
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all at once. Let us consider our usual example. Suppose that S believes that talking donkeys do 
not exist. I suggest that at least part of what it is for S to believe this is that S’s way view does 
not include the concept being a talking donkey. It is important to remember that concepts, as I 
am using the term, are analogues of properties, not objects. This is why the concept that S is 
considering is not the concept donkey; it is the concept being a donkey. There is no such thing in 
S’s way-view as the concept donkey. Concepts are property-like, not object-like. The concept 
being a donkey is a complex structural concept composed of many other concepts. Since S’s 
way-view does not include the concept composed of both of the properties being a donkey and 
talks, S thereby accepts that talking donkeys do not exist under S’s way-view, and thereby, 
believes that talking donkeys do not exist. 
More is needed, though, to justify S’s belief that talking donkeys do not exist. What is 
needed is some reason to believe that the relevant parts of S’s way view are getting the actual 
world nature right. Now this will require some epistemological theory that will take us over the 
infamous “gap” between belief and reality, and I regret to say that I have nothing special to add 
to that debate. That is the business of complete epistemology, not metaphysics. To satisfy the 
epistemic constraint I only need to show that we can have a reason to believe that the truth 
conditions required by constructionism are satisfied. Therefore, I do not intend to give a 
complete epistemological theory of way-view construction. I will just make two claims about 
what the epistemology will have to include. First, it will include the following necessary 
condition on justified beliefs: S is justified in believing that P only if S has a reason to believe 
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that the part of S’s way-view under which P is accepted is an accurate representation137 of the 
part of the actual world nature that satisfies the truth conditions for P. Second, it will include the 
claim that the objects of perception are structural properties rather than objects. These will both 
be needed to show how constructionism satisfies the epistemic constraint. Here is a rough sketch 
of how I imagine the epistemology coming together. S has a reason to believe that the part of S’s 
way-view that includes being a donkey is an accurate representation of the actual world nature 
because S has perceptually interacted with the relevant parts of the actual world nature. When we 
see a donkey, all we are really perceptually interacting with is a complex structural property, part 
of which we might call being a donkey.  
However, perception is surely just one among many other faculties that provides reasons 
to believe that a way-view is accurate. Like I have said, that is a task for complete epistemology 
to work out. I hope, however, that the idea of a way-view can spark new directions in 
epistemology that may help. The point is that our way-views are partly a product of long 
interaction with the actual world nature. That gives us some reasons to think that our way-views 
are accurately representing it. Of course, it is possible that we are getting the actual world nature 
wrong (perhaps because of some lingering skeptical hypothesis), but I think that this is not the 
epistemic issue here. I do not have any argument that will get us over the epistemic gap between 
belief and world. I merely claim that if perception (and other familiar epistemic faculties) 
provides reasons to believe that we are justified in some of our beliefs concerning the external 
world, then this is best understood as providing reasons to believe that our way-views are 
accurate representations of the actual world nature. If I am right about that and I can show how 
 
137 I have stated this condition in representationalist terms. If some version of direct realism turns out to be the 
correct epistemological theory, then replace “is an accurate representation of part of the actual world nature ” with 
“is part of the actual world nature.” 
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modal beliefs are justified in this same model of justification, then I claim that I will have shown 
how we can have reasons to believe that the truth conditions required by constructionism are 
satisfied, and, therefore, that constructionism satisfies the epistemic constraint. 
Way-view epistemology is, therefore, a minimal epistemological theory that gives two 
necessary conditions for justified belief: 
Way-View Epistemology: S is justified in believing that P only if (1) P is acceptable 
under part of S’s way-view, and (2) S has a reason to believe that S’s way-view is an 
accurate representation of the actual world nature. 
 
For ordinary beliefs about the external world, I hope this will strike most people as consistent 
with commonsense. Commonsensically, we are justified in our beliefs concerning the external 
world when we have reasons to believe that the way the world is is basically the way that we 
believe it is. I think of way-view epistemology as a means of cashing out this commonsense talk 
of ways in our thinking about knowledge of the external world. 
I now need to explain how way-view epistemology applies to modal beliefs. As I have 
already suggested, it will essentially be a variation on the theory as it applies to external world 
beliefs. Let us start with possibility first; then we will look at necessity. Suppose that S not only 
believes that talking donkeys do not exist but also believes that they could have. How is S 
justified in believing this? First S focuses on the concepts being a donkey and talks within S’s 
way-view. Nothing else in the way-view is relevant. Because S believes that talking donkeys do 
not exist, the concept being a talking donkey does not exist in S’s way-view, as we have already 
seen. The trick now is to figure out how to justify the belief that the property being a talking 
donkey could exist in the actual world nature even though it does not. This is how it goes. S 
simply mentally constructs the needed property; S combines the concept being a donkey with the 
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concept talks and adds this to S’s way-view. Having done this without difficulty, S can accept 
that talking donkeys exist under this reconstructed way-view, and consequently can believe that 
talking donkeys could have existed. In other words, S conceives of a talking donkey, which for 
way-view epistemology means that S constructs the needed concept from the concepts available 
in S’s way-view to form a new structural concept. This new concept is added back into the way-
view to create a hypothetical way-view, under which S accepts that “talking donkeys exist.” 
That is half the battle for justifying beliefs concerning possibilities. For the other half, I 
need to show how this basic idea of deconstructing and reconstructing parts of a way-view can 
be used to provide a reason to think that the truth conditions for a belief concerning possibility 
have been satisfied. We have seen that in order for a proposition to be true under the structure of 
the actual world nature, it must not be precluded by the structure—it must not be ruled out by the 
structure of the actual world nature. 
So what I need is to show how the acceptability of the belief that talking donkeys exist 
under S’s reconstructed, hypothetical way-view provides S with a reason to believe that “talking 
donkeys exist” is not precluded by the structure of the actual world nature. The second condition 
of way-view epistemology is now relevant, but first remember that we are assuming that S 
already has a reason to believe that talking donkeys do not exist because we are asking about 
what justifies S’s belief that talking donkeys could have existed even though they do not. To 
focus modal epistemology in the right place, we assume that S already has a reason to believe 
that talking donkeys do not exist. We want to figure out what justifies S in believing that talking 
donkeys could have existed despite the fact that they do not. 
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 Now we apply the second condition of way-view epistemology. Here are the conditions 
again: 
Way-View Epistemology: S is justified in believing that P only if (1) P is acceptable 
under part of S’s way-view, and (2) S has a reason to believe that S’s way-view is an 
accurate representation of the actual world nature. 
 
I have shown how the first condition is satisfied through the process of deconstruction and 
reconstruction of a way-view. What we need now is some reason for S to believe this newly 
constructed way-view (with talking donkeys) is an accurate representation, not of the actual 
world nature, but of the way the actual world nature could have been. For constructionism, 
however, there is no entity answering to the name “way things could have been.” So, what S 
really needs is a reason to believe that what the reconstructed way-view represents (the actual 
world nature plus the property being a talking donkey) is not precluded by the structure of the 
actual world nature. 
 I claim that S’s ability to reconstruct the way-view to make the concept of being a talking 
donkey provides the reason to believe that the co-instantiation of being a donkey and talks is not 
precluded by the structure of the actual world nature. Is S is able to reconstruct S’s way-view in 
the needed way, then that is a reason to believe that the structure of S’s way-view does not 
preclude that particular reconstruction. Furthermore, if S has a reason to believe that S’s way-
view is an accurate representation of the actual world nature, then having a reason to believe that 
the structure of S’s way-view does not preclude the reconstruction also counts as a reason to 
believe that the structure of the actual world nature itself does not preclude the corresponding 
reconstruction. Therefore, S has a reason to believe that “talking donkeys do not exist” is not true 
  133 
under the structure of that actual world nature, which is the truth condition for possibility claims 
given by constructionism. 
Things runs basically the same for beliefs concerning necessity, but there is a little twist. 
Let us take as our example S’s belief that nothing can be both a cube and a sphere. Remember 
that we are assuming that S already has some reason to believe that it is true that nothing is in 
fact both a cube and sphere. We are asking about what reasons S can have for thinking that this is 
also necessary. This time it is the first necessary condition in way-view epistemology that is 
going to give us problems. Here is way-view epistemology once again: 
Way-View Epistemology: S is justified in believing that P only if (1) P is acceptable 
under part of S’s way-view, and (2) S has a reason to believe that S’s way-view is an 
accurate representation of the actual world nature. 
 
What makes a belief of necessity acceptable under a way-view? We are assuming that S has a 
reason to believe that it is true that nothing is both a cube and a sphere. So, S need not attempt to 
construct a way-view under which this belief is acceptable because S’s current way-view already 
does this job. What is needed here is a reason to believe that the structure of the actual world 
nature precludes the property being a cube and a sphere. Consequently, S needs to be in a 
position to believe that the structure of S’s way-view precludes the concept being a cube and a 
sphere. What kind of reconstruction of S’s way-view must S perform to be in a position to accept 
this? 
Here is my suggestion. S attempts to reconstruct S’s way-view in such a way that the 
proposition that something is a both a cube and a sphere is accepted under it. In this case, S 
needs to construct the concept being a cube and being a sphere somewhere in S’s way-view. The 
most straightforward way to do this would be either to consider some concept that includes being 
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a cube and then try to add the concept being a sphere to it, or to consider some concept that 
includes being a sphere and then try to add being a cube to it. In either case, the added concept 
does not usurp the concept already in place but is just added to it. Anyone who attempts to do 
this will, of course, be frustrated by the attempt. It is this cognitive frustration, I suggest, that is 
the source of S’s reason to believe that it is necessarily true that nothing is both a cube and a 
sphere. The attempt to reconstruct the way-view such that the proposition that something is both 
a cube and a sphere is true under it results in something that S can no longer accept as a way-
view. It is not just that S cannot see how such a reconstructed way-view could represent the 
actual world nature; the problem is that S cannot see how it could represent at all because it 
simply cannot be constructed. The needed reconstruction would lose the power to represent 
altogether for S. This, I submit, is a reason for S to believe that the analogous part of the actual 
world nature cannot be reconstructed in the analogous way, and therefore, that it is precluded by 
the structure of the actual world nature. 
This will surely be seen to be a contentious claim, so a few more words are in order. 
There is an ever-expanding literature on conceivability and its relation to justified modal 
belief.138 I do not intend to enter into that debate here. Again, I only need a rough sketch of an 
epistemological view. However, I will say that I think that the issue here is not just that S finds it 
impossible to form the needed concept. The best that a failure to conceive could show is that S is 
not justified in believing that something could be a round square, when what we want to show is 
that S is justified in believing that something could not be a round square. The scope of the 
negation makes a big difference. I suggest that the failure of S to construct the needed concept is 
 
138 A nice collection of recent work can be found in Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne, Conceivability and 
Possibility. 
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not merely a failure of imagination or a failure of conceiving. I suggest that instead of thinking of 
S’s inability to construct the needed concept as a failure of conceiving, we think of it as a success 
of understanding. The situation is not just that S cannot construct the needed concept; it is that S 
“sees” that the concept cannot be constructed. The conceptual frustration involved in being 
unable to construct the needed concept is akin to “seeing” that 10 divided by three will result in 
an infinitely long decimal expansion. Once we do a couple of rounds of long division on 10 ÷ 3, 
we “see” that it will never end, so we stop and declare the answer to be roughly 3.33. S is not just 
cognitively frustrated, but is also cognitively inspired by the failed attempt. To my mind, this is 
the foundation of the a priori, but this takes us far beyond what is needed to satisfy the epistemic 
constraint, so I will say no more about it here. Once again, though, I hope that way-view 
epistemology can be a source of inspiration for further thought and study along these lines. 
If all of this seems plausible, and I hope it does, then I claim that S has a reason to believe 
that the proposition that nothing is a both a cube and a sphere is necessarily true. S already has a 
reason to believe that it is true under the actual world nature and the way-view that would 
provide a reason to believe that is false under the actual world nature could not be created. So, S 
has a reason to believe that there is no such reconstruction of the actual world nature into one 
under which it is true that something is a both a cube and a sphere. Therefore S has a reason to 
believe that the proposition that nothing is both a cube and a sphere is true under the structure of 
the actual world nature. 
The argument for constructionism is now complete. I have argued that constructionism is 
the most plausible metaphysical theory of modality, and I have done that by showing how it 
satisfies the constraints of the integration challenge while also arguing that no other theory on the 
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market can plausibly do so. I take it that this is a good reason to accept constructionism. Of 
course, there are many details that still need to be worked out, and the theory has suggested new 
avenues of research in both semantics and epistemology (and maybe even modal logic) that I 
believe are worthy of further investigation. Before I close this dissertation, however, I want to 
consider briefly three quick objections that might be brought against constructionism. 
4.3 Objections and Responses 
 
First, why accept such a drastic departure from contemporary metaphysics of modality, 
knowing the explanatory power of possible worlds? Well, I have gone a long way, I hope, in this 
dissertation to make this seem like a plausible move. However, there is one more thing I would 
like to say in favor of constructionism from the point of view of common sense and ordinary 
language. Lewis argued in favor of possible worlds by touting their power to explain ordinary 
beliefs and language concerning modality. I claim at least as much for constructionism. Consider 
Lewis’s argument: 
It is uncontroversially true that things might have been otherwise than they are. I believe, 
and so do you, that things could have been different in countless ways. But what does this 
mean? Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have 
been besides the way that they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence is an 
existential quantification. It says that there exist many entities of a certain description, to 
wit, “ways things could have been’, I believe permissible paraphrases of what I believe; 
taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe in the existence of entities 
which might be called “ways things could have been.” I prefer to call them “possible 
worlds.”139 
 
I can argue for constructionism in much the same way by making just a few changes: 
It is uncontroversially true that some things must be the way that they are. I believe, and 
so do you, that there are countless ways that things could not have gone differently. But 
what does this mean? Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there is a way that 
things must be in addition to the way that they are. On the face of it, this sentence is a 
 
139 “Possible Worlds,” 182. 
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particular proposition. It says that there exists two entities of a certain description, to wit 
“the way things are” and “the way things must be.” I believe that things could not have 
been different in countless ways; I believe permissible paraphrases of what I believe; 
taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe in the existence of entities that 
might be called “the way things are” and “the way things must be.” I prefer to call them 
“the actual world nature” and “the necessary world nature.” 
 
I, therefore, claim the same ordinary-language and intuitive benefits for necessary way semantics 
that Lewis claims for possible world semantics.  
 Another potential objection to constructionism is that it seems that possible worlds 
realists should be able to satisfy the epistemic constraint in the same way that I have, by positing 
the existence of way-views and using these to offer reasons to believe that certain propositions 
are true in other possible worlds. But that doesn’t really work. The reasons that they cannot do 
this is that being able to mentally manipulate one’s way view to create a reconstructed way-view 
will not give one a reason to think that some proposition is a member of a complete (or maximal) 
set or state of affairs or that anything in particular is going on in some other spatiotemporally 
isolated concrete possible world. This move works for constructionism precisely because one’s 
way-view is partly determined by the necessary world nature. It is a part of the actual world 
nature, which we have interacted with in the creation of our way-view. If there is interaction 
between the actual world nature and us, then there has to be interaction between the necessary 
world nature and us simply because the necessary world nature is a part of the actual world 
nature. Way-views can provide reasons to believe that the truth conditions for constructionism 
have been satisfied because a way-view is determined (partly) through experience with the actual 
world nature. By interacting with the actual world nature, we discover, not only its content, but 
also its structure. 
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 Another potential objection to constructionism is: why isn’t this just conceptualism?140 
To show how constructionism satisfies the epistemic constraint, I have suggested what amounts 
to a conceivability test for justifying beliefs concerning possibility. But I argued against 
conceptualism in chapter three on the grounds that it could not satisfy the semantic constraint. 
Haven’t I fallen into the very trap I have been at pains to avoid in this entire dissertation? It looks 
like I may have caught the epistemic constraint, but while I wasn’t looking, the semantic 
constraint got away from me again. 
 The answer is no. Conceptualism, we must remember is a metaphysical theory that says 
that possibility just is conceivability. As I argued in chapter three, this does indeed fail the 
semantic constraint. What I have suggested is a conceivability test for justifying modal beliefs. I 
have not suggested that modality is nothing but conceivability. I am only suggesting that modal 
beliefs are justified by conceiving (in the sort of way I have suggested). There is nothing in the 
epistemic constraint that restricts such conceivability tests for justifying modal beliefs. 
4.4 Conclusion: The Promise of Constructionism 
 
The overall argument of this dissertation is for the conclusion that constructionism is the 
only plausible theory that can resolve the integration challenge. I developed nature realism into 
this theory, and showed how it can satisfy the constraints of the integration challenge. I also 
argued that no other popular theory of modality is able to resolve the integration challenge, and 
therefore that constructionism is the most plausible metaphysical theory of modality. 
There are, however, some lingering issues that I would like to address before ending this 
dissertation. First, there is the issue of iterated modalities. What does constructionism have to say 
 
140 This objection was suggested to me by Ann Baker. 
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about how to understand stacked modal operators, like ààP, ¨¨P, ¨àP, and à¨P? Second, 
there is the issue of restricted modalities, such as nomological and deontic modalities. What does 
constructionism have to say about, for example, the natural necessity of “Every action has an 
equal and opposite reaction” or the purported moral necessity of “No one should ever lie?” 
Third, there is the issue of the metaphysics of properties. What does constructionism imply about 
the nature of universals and particular properties and relations? I do not intend to try to resolve 
these issues or even go on at great length about them, but I want to say a few words about each 
of them to suggest the trajectory I expect each inquiry to follow in future research. 
The main problem with iterated modalities is that it is very hard to understand what is 
being said when modalities fall within the scope of one another. What exactly does it mean to 
say, “It is possible that it is necessary that it is possible that men walked on the moon?” Still, a 
complete theory of modality has to be able to make sense of such statements. For 
constructionism, I suspect that the solution to such puzzles will be to accept the modal-logical 
system called S5. According to S5, iterated modalities always collapse into the operator with the 
narrowest scope. So, for example, ¨àP is true if and only if àP is true, and à¨P is true if and 
only if ¨P is true. The “stacked” modalities are simply lopped off, leaving the operator with 
narrowest scope (the one “closest” to the proposition) in place. Here is an intuitive argument to 
show why I think this will turn out to be the correct logic of iterated modalities under 
constructionism. 
It turns out, I think, that it is easiest to think about this issue by considering 
impossibilities and possibilities rather than necessities and possibilities. For constructionism, an 
impossible proposition is one whose negation is true under the structure of the world nature. To 
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make the issue here more intuitive I will say that an impossible proposition is ruled out by the 
structure of the world: the structure of the world (regardless of its content) is such that the 
proposition is false. Conversely, I will say that a possible proposition is not ruled out by the 
structure of the world: the structure of the world (regardless of content) is not such that the 
proposition is false. 
Given the intuitive language of ruling out, I think that the following is a plausible logical 
principle: when a proposition is not ruled out, that proposition’s being ruled out is itself ruled 
out. In other words, if P is not ruled out, then “P is ruled out” is ruled out. If that turns out to be 
right, then constructionism implies that if P is possible, then “P is impossible” is impossible. To 
put this in symbols: àP à ~à~àP (or àP à ¨àP), which is the characteristic theorem of S5. 
Therefore, I think it is plausible to expect that the correct modal logic implied by constructionism 
is S5, and therefore, that all iterated modalities will simply collapse into the modal operator with 
narrowest scope. 
For the issue of restricted modalities, I suspect that they will be accounted for by different 
structures. In this dissertation, I have been referring to a particular kind of modality without 
specifically naming it. I have done this for two reasons: for the sake of simplicity, and because of 
an ongoing debate about the purported distinction between logical necessity and metaphysical 
necessity.141 There are, however, many different kinds of modality. If constructionism is correct, 
how are these other modalities determined? I think that more than likely different types of 
structures determine the different types of modality. For example, I suspect that nomological 
necessity is determined by what might be called the physical structure of the world, as opposed 
 
141 For what it’s worth, I think that logical necessity is not the same as metaphysical necessity. For me, logical 
necessity is determined by the structure of way-views and has a normative component: it is how we should reason. 
Metaphysical necessity is determined by the structure of the world: it is how the world must be. 
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to the metaphysical structure, which is what I have been considering without naming it 
throughout this dissertation. The physical structure will obviously be contained within the 
metaphysical structure since the metaphysical structure is the entire structure of the world. So, I 
suspect that a substructure of the structure of the world determines nomological necessity. 
“Every action has an equal and opposite reaction” is not metaphysically necessary because it is 
not precluded by the ultimate structure of the world, but it is nomologically necessary because it 
is precluded by a substructure (the physical structure) of that ultimate structure. Similar 
reasoning applies to certain other modalities, like temporal and locative modalities, as well. 
Deontic modality, however, presents a problem because it is a matter of considerable debate 
whether or not morality is determined by facts about the world, or by facts about persons. If “No 
one should ever lie” is a moral truth (which is far from obvious), then it is an open question 
whether this obligation is determined by the world or determined by persons. Therefore, it is 
unclear whether the structure of the world or the structure of way-views determines deontic 
modalities. Either way, I expect that the structure of either the world itself or human way-views 
determine this kind of modality. 
Lastly, there is the issue of the metaphysical status of properties and relations. Is the 
actual world a structure of universals or a structure of particular properties and relations? For 
Peter Forrest, the world natures are composed of universals. But now that I have modified his 
view by doing away with the non-actual world natures, it is not clear whether this idea should be 
retained. For my part, I suspect that constructionism will remain neutral on this issue, simply 
because it is the structure rather than the content of the world that determines modality. Neither 
the content within the structure of the world nor the way that we conceptualize that content has 
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any obvious impact on the structure itself, and therefore it is unlikely to matter to 
constructionism which view is correct. 
But one might object here that the content makes a difference to the structure because 
there is no structure without content. So, we will have to determine just what is being structured 
in order to have a full understanding of the structure itself. Fair enough. So, let me just say that I 
suspect that the content within the structure of the world can be understood in either way and it 
will not make any difference to constructionism. I doubt that it will matter to constructionism 
whether the true ontology admits universals or not. Here is why I think this. Consider the 
proposition “Nothing can be both a sphere and a cube.” According to constructionism, this is a 
necessarily true proposition because the structure of the world precludes an object from being 
both spherical and cubic. But is this a prohibition against any particular object having its own 
particular properties, “spherical” and “cubic,” at the same time, or is it a prohibition against the 
universals “spherical” and “cubic” occupying the same space and time? I think it depends on 
how you look at it logically. On the one hand, we could understand “Nothing can be both a 
sphere and a cube” as ~($x)(Sx & Cx) [It is not the case that there is something that is both 
spherical and cubic.], which suggests a prohibition against a particular thing having certain 
particular properties. On the other hand, we could understand the proposition to mean (x)(Sx à 
~Cx) [Everything is such that if it is spherical, then it is not cubic.], which suggests a prohibition 
against these two properties (as universals) ever coming together in the same space and time. 
These two expressions are logically equivalent, but which one we focus on seems to make a 
difference to how we conceptualize properties and relations. Therefore, I suspect that the debate 
over universals is a logical debate based on how we conceptualize the world rather than a 
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metaphysical debate based on how the world actually is. So, constructionism will probably 
remain neutral on whether or not universals exist. 
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Appendix: Benacerraf’s Dilemma Revisited 
 
Although the aim of this dissertation was not to solve Benacerraf’s dilemma, I developed 
the integration challenge for modality by reference to it, and so I feel that a few comments about 
how I think it can be resolved are in order. In addition, as I indicated in chapter one, there is a 
sense in which a metaphysical theory of modality contains the metaphysics of mathematics, 
since presumably mathematical propositions are to be understood as necessary. Therefore, a 
plausibly theory of modality should have something to say about mathematical truth. I want to 
suggest in this short appendix how I believe that a plausible solution to Benacerraf’s dilemma 
might be worked out on the foundation of constructionism. 
Let us state the constraints of the integration challenge as they apply to the metaphysics 
of mathematics: 
Semantic Constraint for Mathematics: A metaphysical theory of mathematics must 
provide an account of mathematical truth such that the truth conditions for mathematical 
propositions are also applicable to some non-mathematical propositions. 
 
Epistemic Constraint for Mathematics: A metaphysical theory of mathematics must 
provide an account of mathematical truth such that there are reasons to believe that the 
truth conditions for mathematical propositions are satisfied in at least some cases. 
 
A plausible metaphysical theory of mathematics must respect each of these constraints, but of 
course, the realist theories are going to have more difficulty with the epistemic constraint, and 
the idealist theories are going to have more difficulty with the semantic constraint. Since 
constructionism is a realist theory, it will be the epistemic constraint that will be the bigger 
hurdle to clear. So I will go the easy way first. 
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 According to constructionism, the actual world nature is a complex structural property. A 
true mathematical proposition, therefore, must be true under this complex structural property. If 
we consider each of Benacerraf’s two examples, Platonism and combinatorialism, we can easily 
see that neither of these views is going to work with constructionism. Platonism requires a realm 
of abstract number-objects to satisfy its truth conditions, and the necessary world nature is not 
composed of any such things; it is composed of properties. Combinatorial theories require proofs 
(or some other linguistic/syntactic structures) to satisfy its truth conditions, and again, the 
necessary world nature is not composed of such things. What we need are truth conditions for 
mathematical propositions that require structural properties. 
Fortunately, a view of mathematical truth that requires properties as truth conditions is 
already at hand. Penelope Maddy has developed a view of mathematical realism called set 
theoretic realism, according to which numbers are properties of sets.142 I suggest that if we add 
this view to constructionism, the resulting theory solves the integration challenge for 
mathematics. In fact, one of the main motivations that Maddy had for developing the view is to 
use it to solve Benacerraf’s dilemma.143 
Now I just need to show how this theory satisfies the constraints. Consider a simple 
arithmetic example: 5 + 7 = 12. The truth condition for this proposition will be something like: 
“5 + 7 = 12” is true if and only if the property having 5 members and the property having 7 
members added together are equal to the property having 12 members. So, we have three 
properties and the suggestion that some relationship holds between them. But what is this 
relationship? I suggest that being added together can be understood as nothing more than 
 
142 Realism in Mathematics, 86-98. 
143 Realism is Mathematics, 36-50. 
  146 
Forrest’s operations of forming a product, contraction, and projection. Forrest showed how these 
operations could be used to construct a world nature from natural properties. If numbers are 
natural properties, then presumably, they can be used in much the same way to construct other 
properties. Here is how the operations would be carried out in this case: 
Step 1: Start with natural properties and relations. 
 51 is the natural property having 5 members. 
 71 is the natural property having 7 members. 
(Remember that the subscripts are just placeholders to show that these are one-
place properties.) 
Step 2: Form a product of the natural properties and relations. 
 51 x 72 
(The two different subscripts now show that this is a two-place property.) 
Step 3: Contract some of the relata. 
 51 x 71 
(Changing the subscript shows that the two-place property has been contracted 
into a one-place property.) 
Step 4: Project the resulting product into a single property. 
The result is the property having (5 plus 7) members. 
Deconstructing 12 can account for the fact that the result of these operations is the same as the 
property having 12 members in the appropriate way. We simply deconstruct the property having 
12 members into constituent parts: 121 is the property 51 x 71. Since one of these deconstructions 
of having 12 members is having (5 plus 7) members, it follows that 5 + 7 = 12. 
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This brief sketch of the semantics of set theoretic realism plus constructionism should 
make it fairly clear how the theory would satisfy the semantic constraint. Mathematical 
propositions do not require special truth conditions. Their truth conditions are understood as 
constructions of properties of the actual world nature. They are true in the same way that non-
mathematical propositions are true. That should give a good start toward satisfying the semantic 
constraint. 
Now I turn to the harder constraint to satisfy. If set theoretic realism plus constructionism 
is the correct view of the metaphysics of mathematics, then in order for S to be justified in 
believing that some mathematical proposition is true, S will need some reason to believe that 
certain complex structural properties exist. The main idea behind satisfying the epistemic 
constraint will be to show how if the arithmetic proposition 5 + 7 = 12 is accepted under a way-
view, and there is a reason to believe that that way-view is an accurate representation of the 
actual world nature, then that counts as a reason to think that the proposition is true under the 
actual world nature. This will work if one’s way-view is developed in the right sort of way from 
experience with the actual world nature. Part of what it is to believe 5 + 7 = 12 is to accept it 
under one’s way-view. To be justified in this belief, one must have a reason to believe it. The 
story goes like this: we basically do the mental analogue of the construction and deconstruction 
we just did for the semantic constraint. We attempt to construct and deconstruct the needed 
structural concepts to satisfy the truth condition for 5 + 7 = 12. In this case, we both construct the 
concept (5 + 7) and also deconstruct the concept 12.  
Step 1: Start with concepts. 
 51 is the concept having 5 members. 
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 71 is the concept having 7 members. 
Step 2: Form a product of the concepts. 
  51 x 72  
Step 3: Contract the relata. 
 51 x 71 
Step 4: Project the resulting product into a single concept. 
The result is the concept having (5 plus 7) members. 
That is half the job. The other half is to deconstruct the concept 121 (having 12 members) 
into 51 x 71. Since one of the mental deconstructions of 121 is 51 x 71, performing these mental 
operations provides a reason to believe that the truth conditions for 5 + 7 = 12 are satisfied. 
These operations will provide the needed reasons so long as we have a general reason to believe 
that the way-view is an accurate representation of the actual world nature because (presumably) 
the way view is partly determined through interaction with the actual world nature over time.  
While it is not needed to solve Benacerraf’s dilemma, if it is desirable also to show that S 
is justified in believing that 5 + 7 = 12 is not only true but necessarily true, then S will have to 
rely on the techniques described in chapter four. Essentially, S will try to construct the negation 
of 5 + 7 = 12, and finding this to be an impossible task, will be provided with the needed reason 
to believe that 5 + 7 = 12 is not only true but necessarily so. 
I hope that these brief comments are at least suggestive of the way that set theoretic 
realism plus constructionism can provide a plausible metaphysical theory of mathematics that 
resolves Benacerraf’s dilemma. Of course, much more work will need to be done to work out the 
details, but I believe that the project shows promise. 
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